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The overall purpose of this study was to use action research to investigate ways to engage faculty 
members of a large, francophone Canadian (public) university business school in online learning 
implementation through action learning. It aimed: (1) to understand the underlying motives of faculty 
members’ reluctance/refusal to participate in the implementation of online learning; (2) to use action 
research to investigate the role that micropolitics might have played in this change, with the aim of 
addressing power issues more effectively; (3) through action learning to find ways to engage faculty 
members opposed to the change; and (4) to develop a framework that might help address 
micropolitical behaviour in such a way as to help me, the change agent, move the change forward 
more effectively, thus generating actionable knowledge. 
 
Applying Crozier and Friedberg’s (1977) framework to study faculty members’ micropolitical “strategic 
games” and conducting thematic analysis with data obtained in the learning sets, it appears that faculty 
members engaged in strategic games as a way to gain power and influence over the change process to 
benefit from the outcomes of the change. Adopters of online learning (those who anticipated more 
gains than losses if the change succeeded) and resistors (those who foresaw more losses than gains) 
seemed to have engaged in the same mode of political action to gain power and influence in an 
attempt to steer the change process to their advantage. The consolidation mode of political action 
consisted of building alliances with the aim of shifting to an expansion mode. Once in this mode, both 
adopters and resistors tried to maintain their political position by empowering their other, less 
powerful allies so that they would exert influence on the change process. Adopters used their influence 
to move the change forward; resistors exerted their influence to try to derail it. Unsuccessful attempts 
to gain power and influence meant that there were people preventing them from doing so (the 
“political opponents”). Adopters and resistors then shifted to a protective mode of political action in 
an attempt to try to convert their political opponents (those who were trying to make them less 
powerful) into allies. The political goal of both adopters and resistors was to shift out of protection to 
go back to consolidation. For those who were not successful in doing this, their other option was to 
consider a confrontation mode of political action in order to make their political opponents less 
powerful, to then try to convert them into allies. Finally, as the change agent, I helped adopters move 
into an expansion mode of political action by engaging them in forming a powerful coalition. 
 
This research generated actionable knowledge that was useful to both adopters and myself in moving 
the change forward more effectively. We engaged in four modes of political action to gain power and 
influence over those who opposed the change. The adopters learned to use their power and influence 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background and Context of the Study 
 
For the last six years, I have been grappling with a complex problem in my organization, namely 
managing the change triggered by online learning implementation. My organization is a large, 
francophone Canadian (public) university business school with an enrolment of approximately 15,000 
undergraduate and graduate students. A total of 342 faculty members (97 full professors, 88 associate 
professors, 44 assistant professors, 3 guest and visiting faculty, 61 full-time lecturers and 49 guest and 
visiting professors without a career perspective, researchers, and associate and affiliate professors) 
teach at the business school which was founded in 1907. Our mission is “to contribute to society’s 
prosperity by providing leadership in all its spheres of activity, i.e. teaching at all levels, research and 
serving the community.” 
 
In 2012, management at the business school decided to gradually implement online learning. This 
decision was taken based on a survey conducted in 2009 to determine if our students would enrol in 
online courses. Over 88% of those surveyed said yes. Between 2010 and 2012, a pilot project to test 
the feasibility of such an endeavour was put in place. This pilot project consisted of developing and 
testing three online courses with three groups of students. I was involved in this project, and found 
that online courses answered the needs of both students and the school. More specifically, students 
were asking for the flexibility in delivery, pace and distribution that online learning offers, and the 
school was hoping to attract new students in order to generate a fresh source of revenue in response 
to declining public funding, and to explore how online learning might enhance both the content and 
delivery of courses that were offered in class. Finally, the school wanted to be part of an expanding 
trend as online learning was (and still is) growing in Canada. According to the National Student 
Clearinghouse Research Centre (an American organization), between 2012 and 2013 the number of 
institutions launching e-learning platforms increased by 23%. A study conducted in 2016 by the 
Canadian government1 concludes that Canada’s rate of expansion of online learning is approximately 
8.75% annually. Online learning is becoming mainstream. To remain competitive, higher education 
institutions such as my school will have no choice but to offer online courses. The success of the pilot 
project prompted management in my organization to announce that it was going forward with the 
implementation of online learning on a broader scale. The development of online learning required 
close collaboration with many faculty members as their courses would eventually be offered both in 
class and online. At the time, management was hoping to substantially increase the number of online 
courses offered to students. The number of courses to be offered online by the fall of 2018 was set at 
15. This number was never reached because of a lack of participation from faculty members in this 
endeavour, and that became even more serious in early 2013. This is when I was appointed by 
management to help implement online learning. As a former participant in the pilot project, it made 
sense that I was assigned this role as I understood some of the challenges of online learning 
implementation and I could provide some kind of guidance to faculty members who were to participate 
in the development and implementation of online learning. They actually did not have any choice but 
to participate in the project as management had determined which courses would be offered online 
based on student enrolment in those courses and on the student survey. I was hired at my school as a 
full-time lecturer in 2006. I mostly teach at the undergraduate level. I currently also teach online. 
Teaching online entails that I have to adapt course content so that it can be offered online, assist 
students online, deliver synchronous classes once a week, and grade papers and exams. This is what 
was expected from those who were to participate in the development of online learning. However, 
shortly after the decision to implement online learning was announced by management, many faculty 
members expressed their opposition to this project. 
                                                          
1 A national survey of university online and distance learning in Canada, 2016. 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem 
 
Faculty members are obviously in the forefront of this project as they are expected by management to 
actively participate in the development and delivery of the courses offered online. Many of them 
voiced their opposition to this project from the beginning, in meetings and face-to-face when I met 
with them about their future involvement in the project. Some expressed their concerns about the 
need for such courses to be offered online (the change “content” – Self and Schraeder, 2009), and 
others about the process that was being put in place to implement online courses (the change 
“process”). Some had issues about both content and process. 
 
The reasons underlying this decision were clear for most faculty members; however, management was 
not very clear about the implementation. They had made a top-down decision without first consulting 
faculty members and without providing any details about how implementation would unfold. They 
announced their decision by e-mail, informing faculty members that I was hired to help manage the 
change brought about by online learning implementation, and that management would coordinate 
the project in terms of resource allocation, deadlines, etc. It was left to me, based on my experience 
in the pilot project, to explain how it could be done. It appears that management had wrongly assumed 
that faculty members would actively participate in this endeavour with little hesitation. This was clearly 
not the case from the beginning as many faculty members expressed their opposition. 
 
I made numerous attempts to identify and address their concerns through private and formal 
meetings, but with limited results: out of 272 faculty members (at the time the project was initiated), 
only a small number (13) had agreed to actively participate in the design and delivery of online courses 
at the starting point of the project. An additional 25 members were involved in the process, and 
appeared at the time to be the most reluctant to engage in online teaching. Involved in an adversarial 
dynamic from the onset of the project, management tried to compel some of them to participate in 
the project by imposing fixed goals and a strict timeline, which was not the most effective strategy, as 
they then resorted to specific acts to slow down the project. For example, they would withhold 
relevant information that would have helped me move the change forward. Some tried to get those 
around them involved in order to oppose the change, then resorted to particular acts to block the 
change, such as overtly opposing the goals they were assigned or delaying their involvement in the 
project for obscure motives. It appeared at the time that this active opposition to the change was 
symptomatic of underlying causes that had not yet been unearthed, despite my efforts to address 
those issues. 
 
1.3 Purpose and Significance of the Study 
 
In informal meetings with a number of faculty members, I initially tried to uncover the reasons 
underlying their opposition to the project, but was unsuccessful in obtaining clear answers. Experience 
and the literature suggest that resistance to change is common in organizations (Dent and Goldberg, 
1999; and Ford and Ford, 2010). Within the framework of Lewin’s field theory, resistance to change 
may be conceptualized as a force that impedes the change process. Burnes and Cooke (2013, p. 421) 
argue that field theory can help answer “key questions […] about why so many change initiatives fail, 
why resistance to change arises and what the real barriers to behavioural change are.” However, in 
order to find out what triggers resistance behaviour, one obviously needs to engage with those who 
exhibit such behaviour. During the informal meetings I had with a number of faculty members, I tried 
to address some of the factors that might explain their resistance to the change brought about by 
online learning implementation. Drawing on existing literature, I addressed the effect of emotions and 
personality factors on online learning (Tanner, Noser, and Totaro, 2009), the role of low self-efficacy 
in adoption of online teaching (Zhen, Garthwait, and Pratt, 2008), cognitive and personal dispositions 
towards online learning (Panda and Mishra, 2007), intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors 
(Maguire, 2005), and professional values and norms (Mitchell and Geva-May, 2009). 
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I also explored institutional issues, such as the degree of support offered to faculty members for online 
teaching (Bolliger and Wasilik, 2009), ways to enhance online interaction between teachers and 
students (Wilkes, Simon, and Brooks, 2006), and career-related matters (Shea, 2007), but to no avail: 
many faculty members were still opposing the project and the change it entailed, some trying to derail 
the change initiative for purposes that remained obscure. Therefore, it appeared that faculty 
members’ active opposition to the change could not be explained by factors described in the literature 
on online learning implementation that I had read at the time. 
 
One of the things the change literature reveals is that organizational change often implies a perceived 
or actual reallocation of power among organizational members (Markus, 1983). Consequently, faculty 
members might resist the loss of power that the project entails. According to Bigley and Roberts (2001, 
p. 1295), loss of power intensifies “political acts and power struggles,” which may take the form of a 
great variety of resistance strategies (Gunn, 2001). Consequently, investigating the role that power 
might play in explaining faculty members’ opposition to the change may be a research endeavour 
worth pursuing. Assessing and addressing faculty members’ resistance behaviour using factors such as 
those found in the literature have failed. Investigating the role of power and how people use it 
(micropolitical behaviour) might shed some light on why they are resisting the change, and how I might 
address underlying political issues to help move the change forward. Also, micropolitics is an 
underdeveloped field of organizational research (McFarland, Van Iddekinge, and Ployhart, 2012), and 
investigating micropolitics could help to uncover new phenomena that might overcome resistance to 
change. Thus, this research aimed to explore how top-down change affected power among faculty 
members, and to find ways to address those power issues in order to help me manage the change 
process more effectively. Specifically, the purpose of this study was: (1) to understand the underlying 
motives of faculty members’ reluctance/refusal to participate in the implementation of online 
learning; (2) to use action research to investigate the role that micropolitics might have played in this 
change, with the aim of addressing power issues more effectively; (3) to find ways to engage faculty 
members opposed to the change through action learning; and (4) to develop a framework that might 
help address micropolitical behaviour in such a way as to help me, the change agent, move the change 
forward more effectively, thus generating actionable knowledge. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
In this study, I used action research to generate actionable knowledge, and action learning served as a 
mode of action research to understand micropolitical behaviour in the context of organizational 
change and to learn about the most effective ways to engage in micropolitical behaviour. Meetings 
with learning set participants helped to gather data about what participants had learned between 
meetings in their efforts to influence the change process. Data were gathered during two cycles of 
action research. Thematic analysis was employed to analyze data. 
 
1.5 Definition of Key Terms 
 
The following terms are used in this study: 
 
• Online courses: Fully online, undergraduate courses in finance, management, organizational 
behaviour, human resource management, marketing and business strategy; students can take 
those courses either in class or online; most of those courses are compulsory, and are offered in 
the fall, winter and summer semesters. Each course is comprised of visual aids, exercises, case 
studies, audiovisual material, e-questionnaires, and self-help documentation. Faculty members 
deliver the courses online, synchronously, once a week for 12 weeks, in periods that last from 90 
to 120 minutes each week. Faculty members are involved in online teaching, and students, in 
online learning, but I will use online learning and teaching interchangeably as they refer to two 
dimensions of the same process. 
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• Online learning implementation: Refers to the implementation of online courses, which is 
comprised of three steps: 1) selection of the courses to be offered online; this selection is made 
by management, based on the student survey, on whether the course is compulsory or not (if it is, 
then it is offered online), and on how many students traditionally enrol in the courses if they are 
optional; 2) course adaptation (existing course material is adapted so that it can be used online; 
visual aids are prepared, and audiovisual material is developed); and 3) course implementation, 
which consists of giving the courses online and assessing student responsiveness, which can lead 
to additional modifications to the courses. 
 
• Online learning adoption: Faculty members are expected by management to become “adopters” 
(i.e., “[individuals who] put an innovation into use” – Rogers, 2003, p. 474) of online learning; they 
are expected to participate in online course development and delivery, or are already doing so, as 
opposed to “resistors” who blatantly refuse to get involved in online learning. 
 
• Organizational change: The process that was established to promote the adoption of online 
learning internally, to enrol faculty members in the project, to help them deal with issues 
associated with a transformation in their teaching methodology, and to address problems relating 
to the acceptability and adoption of online learning implementation. I designed the change process 
as a series of regular meetings with faculty members in order to hear their concerns, to provide 
answers to their questions, to brainstorm solutions to problems relating to the project, to bring 
unresolved issues to management’s attention, and to ask management for needed resources. The 
change outcomes were to get faculty members to adopt online learning. This would involve 
teaching online synchronously once a week, providing support to students, facilitating online 
interactions among students, and grading papers and exams, to name some of the requirements. 
There is a need to distinguish between the change process (the way the change is done) and 
change outcomes (the consequences of the change for the people involved and for the school). 
 
• Change agent: The person in charge of the change (myself), who is different from the project 
leader (management) who is in charge of online learning implementation (mostly the technical 
side of the project); the change agent is primarily concerned with the human aspects associated 
with the project. My goal is to enrol more faculty in online course development and delivery. 
 
• Change recipients: Change recipients are end-users of the change (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999), 
namely faculty members targeted for online learning implementation. 
 
• Political behaviour and micropolitics: Behaviour exhibited by faculty members in their attempts to 
exert influence over others. Although some commentators define micropolitics as necessarily 
covert (Crocker, 2019), I have chosen to address explicit political behaviour that can be discussed 
in the context of the learning sets. Discussing individual political behaviour might help to uncover 
relational micro-political complexities, which constitute micropolitics (Gibson and Groom, 2019). 
 
1.6 Organization of this Thesis 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters: Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature pertaining to the 
politics of online learning implementation and organizational change. It explores power and 
micropolitics and describes the theoretical framework used for studying micropolitical behaviour in 
my school. Chapter 3 presents the research methodology used in this study. The following two 
chapters outline data obtained in two action research cycles and provide an analysis and a discussion 
of the results. The last chapter presents the findings, offers a conclusion to the study, and describes 




CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Conducting successful change appears to be quite a challenge as roughly 80% of change initiatives fail 
(Beer and Nohria, 2000; Dawson, 2019; Higgs and Rowland, 2000; Hirschhorn, 2002; Knodel, 2004; 
Kotter, 2008; Sirkin, Keenan, and Jackson, 2005; and Whelan-Berry and Sommerville, 2010). Change 
brought about by the implementation of online learning has yet to be investigated (Dermentzi and 
Papagiannids, 2018; and Dumont and Raggo, 2018). Not only might a novel approach to understanding 
why organizational change fails be necessary, but we also might need to consider micropolitical 
behaviour as a potential positive force to move organizational change forward (McFarland, Van 
Iddekinge, and Ployhart, 2012) and, more specifically, how micropolitical behaviour might help to 
implement online learning. This chapter is divided into three sections: the first section provides a 
definition of micropolitics, and the following sections describe how micropolitics can help to 
understand and conduct organizational change and online learning implementation. 
 
2.1 Micropolitics: A Definition 
 
Micropolitical behaviour (and micropolitics) refers to idiosyncratic attempts to exert influence 
(Buchanan and Badham, 2008; Prasad and Rubenstein, 1992; Valle and Perrewé, 2000; and Vigoda, 
2003). These influence attempts are intentional and aim to induce others to act in a certain way (Allen 
et al., 1979; Dean and Sharfman, 1993; Farrell and Peterson, 1982; and O’Connor and Morrison, 2001). 
Consequently, micropolitical behaviour might be conceptualized as the combination of those daily 
influence “tactics” with which power is constructed and applied in order to extend the room for 
maneuver and to defy external control, especially in the context of top-down organizational change 
(Neuberger, 1995). Since influence attempts may either facilitate or impede change initiatives (Crozier 
and Friedberg, 1977), power and politics become essential variables to introduce and manage 
organizational change, which evolves into a political process, with those involved functioning as 
“micropoliticians” or “influencers,” as Mintzberg (1983) labels them. Influence attempts are not 
necessarily associated with a particular formal role in the organization, such as a leadership role (Drory 
and Romm, 1988, and 1990; and Sussman et al., 2002), and are sometimes covert (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Consequently, such attempts might not be easily identifiable among organizational 
members. Nevertheless, I have chosen to investigate micropolitical behaviour as explicit efforts to 
influence others in the context of organizational change due to online learning implementation. 
 
Burns (1961) was undoubtedly the first scholar to use the term “micropolitics” in referring to 
interactions among organizational actors working to create change. In studying institutional change, 
he developed a two by two matrix to account for the political behaviour of people in such contexts: 
organizational members might have similar beliefs about how the change should be conducted (the 
“rules of the game”) or not, and change might involve the mobilization of new resources (in the case 
of external change) or an altered balance of resources in the case of internal change. He also 
considered political behaviour to be the main driver for social change in organizations. He asserts that 
micropolitical behaviour refers to the behaviour that organizational actors engage in when mobilizing 
individual power resources to create and change formal structure. People cooperate and compete 
through political behaviour: 
 
“[Burns] argued that the organizationally cohesive forces of cooperation and 
competitiveness are both the product of, and the incubator for, political behavior. 
Furthermore, he suggested that these political behaviors represented a mechanism 
for the survival of the individual and could be seen as legitimate to the degree that 
one’s interests are aligned with those of [others].” 
 
(Ferris and Treadway, 2012, pp. 6-7) 
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Burns (1961) did not clarify what form organizational actors’ behaviour takes when they cooperate or 
compete, nor who decides whether or not one’s interests are aligned with those of others. The idea 
that cooperation and competition are the result of political behaviour assumes that, without power, 
an organizational actor can neither cooperate nor compete. To do so, one would need to acquire 
power, which forms the basis of political behaviour one needs to engage in to survive within the 
context of organizational change. This means that loss of power diminishes one’s chances of 
“surviving” the change, which might explain why people are reluctant to lose power and see their 
“scope of action” diminished (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977), as faculty members in my organization 
appear to have shown through their resistance strategies. Burns (1961) did not define what “surviving 
a change” means, nor how power can help one do that. 
 
Since Burns (1961), it appears that no attempt was made to provide a clear definition of the concept 
of micropolitics. Nullmeier, Pritzlaff, and Wiesner (2003) contend that, today, there is no common 
understanding among researchers of the definition and nature of micropolitics and organizational 
politics. McFarland, Van Iddekinge, and Ployhart (2012, p. 102) maintain that “in the review of the 
published organizational politics literature, little work was found that focused solely on clarifying the 
underlying conceptualization of organizational politics.” There is, however, agreement about the scope 
of the concept: micropolitics refers to politics within the organization, among organizational actors, as 
opposed to macropolitics which is often associated with politics beyond the organization, such as 
coalitions and alliance building among firms (Mintzberg, 1999). One could argue that coalitions and 
alliances might become “tools” to gain power within the organization in an attempt to exert influence 
over others in order to move organizational change forward, or block it. Consequently, the study of 
micropolitics could also involve an analysis of the way organizational members use coalitions and build 
alliances in attempts to influence others in the change process. 
 
Although micropolitics can be studied on an individual level, it can also be seen as a theoretical 
organizational concept which, as Küpper and Felsch (2000) (translated and cited in Willner, 2011) 
suggest, “analyzes actors’ behaviour within an organizational context.” (p. 149) Organizations are, 
thus, analyzed through the lens of scopes of action and power relations among organizational 
members, and how these relations act as “stabilizing regulatory mechanisms within organizational 
scopes of action” (Alt 2001, p. 294, cited in Willner, 2011). Consequently, micropolitics can serve as a 
framework not only to analyze faculty members’ political behaviour within the context of the change 
taking place in my organization, but also to examine power relations that they have established with 
management. 
 
I would further argue that micropolitics provides a framework for exploring how change disrupts 
power relations among organizational actors (change recipients), thus destabilizing their scopes of 
action. To prevent that, change recipients might engage in resistance strategies through coalition 
building, alliances and the use of power bases to exert influence over others in order to block change 
perceived as being incompatible with their interests. To counter these forces against change, the 
change agent would need to address the question of how power dynamics can be used to facilitate 
change with respect to the different interests of individuals and groups involved in the change process; 
in so doing, change agents might engage change recipients in pursuing a collaborative strategy to 
achieve common goals and help the change succeed. 
 
If one accepts the idea that political behaviour is the process by which people mobilize power to exert 
influence, why do people become political? Mayes and Allen (1977) were among the first scholars to 
argue that political behaviour is an attempt to link a means (“what is done?”) and an end (“for what 
purpose?”). Means and ends can be organizationally sanctioned (Zanzi and O’Neill, 2001) or not. 
Functional (positive) political behaviour involves the use of means that are not necessarily sanctioned 
by the organization, to achieve ends that are organizationally sanctioned. Dysfunctional political 
behaviour, on the other hand, implies the use of means that are either sanctioned or not, but to 
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achieve ends that, in both cases, are not sanctioned by the organization. Furthermore, their approach 
removes from political analysis all activities and interests sanctioned by the organization. In essence, 
this model ignores formal organizational programs, policies, and goals and the formal processes used 
by organizational actors to achieve their goals (Blase, 1991). Despite these limitations, their definition 
suggests that political behaviour is based on power, which is exerted to influence others, and links 
influence attempts to a purpose, which may or may not serve the greater good. Political behaviour can 
thus be categorized as being “positive” (it serves the interests of organizational members) or 
“negative” (it only serves the personal interests of the individual who engages in such behaviour). It is 
unclear, however, who decides whose interests it serves. 
 
Buchanan and Badham (2008) argue for establishing linkages between political behaviour and 
outcomes, and have used a constructivist approach to study this relationship. They developed the 
“actor-theory-in-use” model that links antecedents to political behaviour, to the actual behaviour, and 
to their consequences. Antecedents refer to individual and contextual factors that trigger political 
behaviour, which takes the form of influence strategies and tactics; when such political behaviour is at 
play, it may have positive or negative outcomes for individuals and for the organization as a whole. 
This view is convergent with that of Blase (1991, p. 1) who asserts that micropolitics is about power 
and how people use it to influence others and to protect themselves. It is about conflict and how 
people compete with each other to get what they want. It is about cooperation and how people build 
support among themselves to achieve their ends.” In the context of conducting organizational change, 
this suggests that it might be worthwhile to investigate the triggers underlying change recipients’ 
political behaviour, especially when they oppose the change initiative by building coalitions and 
cooperating with those who share their concerns about the outcomes of the change related to the 
implementation of online learning. 
 
Based on the above, it appears that power can be “managed” in the sense that people might want to 
increase their power in an attempt to exert influence over others. Buchanan and Badham (2008) argue 
that power can indeed be “managed” if it is understood using two, broad theoretical perspectives: the 
“episodic” perspective (Cobb, 1984) and the “pervasive” perspective. The episodic perspective views 
power as a way to shape the behaviour of others in particular contexts. Within this framework, the use 
of power is explicit, and power is exerted at a specific point in time. The other perspective refers to 
values, norms, routines, etc. embedded in organizational structures and processes, and which 
implicitly shape people’s behaviour. 
 
Buchanan and Badham (2008) argue that the episodic and pervasive nature of power operate as two 
complementary forces that shape people’s behaviour in organizations. If one assumes that this is the 
case, then the implicit (pervasive) nature of power has to be made explicit for power to be fully 
understood. The episodic perspective on power started to gain momentum in the early 1980’s, with 
the theoretical advances of three analytical frameworks that have come to gradually dominate 
research on power. These are coalition analysis, resource analysis, and strategic analysis (Rouleau, 
2007). These frameworks enhance our understanding of the nature of power, its origin, and how it is 
used in organizational settings. 
 
The main purpose of coalition analysis is to examine power as a phenomenon by which organizational 
members try to influence decisions through coalitions (Rouleau, 2007). The ability to form coalitions is 
a source of power. Cyert and March (1963) were among the first scholars to posit that organizations 
are composed of a number of coalitions that pursue different objectives. March and Olsen (1976) have 
argued that ambiguous rules within an organization account for this plurality of views: not being 
constrained by precise and explicit rules, organizational members are free to pursue objectives that 
might differ from those of the organization. Those sharing the same objectives might get together and 
form coalitions to increase their chances of achieving their objectives. This opens the door to all kinds 
of influence strategies and “power struggles” among organizational members; a conflict of 
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perspectives is the “norm,” which makes organizations “anarchies” within which power is a central 
feature. According to Vigoda (2003), coalition analysis is a macropolitical approach to studying power. 
However, I disagree. Once again, I contend that coalitions can become micropolitical tools that change 
recipients use to oppose organizational change, as Pettigrew (1985a) has shown. He asserts that 
organizational change is shaped by power struggles among coalitions within and outside the 
organization. Those coalitions influence decisions and the change process itself through their control 
of scarce resources and the use of symbols to make demands on management, and to minimize the 
influence of other groups pursuing divergent objectives. Mintzberg (1983) studied power in and 
around organizations and stresses the role of internal and external coalitions. He comes to the 
conclusion that there are basically six configurations of power determined by the relationships among 
those coalitions: instrumental, closed system, autocratic, missionary, meritocratic, and political. He 
does not explain how organizational actors establish and maintain those coalitions. In conclusion, 
coalition analysis might shed some light on the micropolitics of change because coalitions are 
comprised of individuals who have decided to come together and exert influence to achieve a common 
goal. While some commentators consider a coalition to be a macropolitical concept (Vigoda, 2003), 
analysing how they are formed from a micropolitical perspective, i.e., through the interactions of 
individuals, particularly in the context of organizational change, might help to enhance my 
understanding of the political dynamics underlying the change in my organization. 
 
Resource analysis contends that power is derived from a person’s degree of dependency on certain 
types of resources (Pfeffer, 1981): an individual who is sure to have access to the resources needed to 
function (low uncertainty) has more power than an individual who is not. Those who have and/or 
control access to scarce resources (those resources that other people or units need to function) that 
cannot be replaced by other types of resources, have power. Finally, those who have resources on 
which many people depend (centrality) have power. Pfeffer (1981) argues that identifying those 
resources is relevant because it is then possible to find out who is more powerful within the 
organizational setting, and how they use those resources to gain power and exert influence. Those 
resources can take many forms, such as information, money, expertise, access to powerful individuals, 
etc. (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986). I would argue that both the type of resource and its scarcity 
provide power: certain resources might be relevant in specific contexts, and if they are, then their 
relative scarcity provides power to those who control or have access to those resources on which 
others depend. In the context of change, I would contend that people might try to gain access to and 
control of tangible and intangible resources to influence the change process and/or the outcomes. 
Pfeffer (1981) maintains that people might use narratives and symbols to appear more powerful than 
they really are, and this is why it is important to distinguish between “real power” and “perceived 
power:” real power refers to the resources that one possesses and/or has access to, while “perceived 
power” is related to how others perceive the power that those resources yield. It is, thus, possible for 
someone to “manage” the perceptions of others. In conclusion, resource analysis helps to explain how 
power can be derived from structure and organizational processes. From a micropolitical perspective, 
incorporating this approach in examining the strategies that individuals use to access and control 
scarce resources on which others depend to exert power might provide insights into organizational 
members’ micropolitical strategies. I would assert that these resources take the form of “power 
bases,” such as those defined by French and Raven (1958), who have argued that power results from 
the use of five bases: reward power, coercive power, referent power, legitimate power, and expert 
power. These five power bases provide power to those who can mobilize them. Benfari, Wilkinson, 
and Orth (1986), on the other hand, claim that there are eight power bases which could be used 
“strategically” by organizational members to either support or oppose the change initiative: reward, 
coercion, authority, referent, expert, information, affiliation, and group power. Whatever the actual 





In the 1970’s, strategic analysis became a prominent approach to studying how power is acquired and 
used in organizations (Rouleau, 2007). Power is gained through the ability to control uncertainty, to 
make and implement rules, and to engage in strategic behaviour. Crozier and Friedberg (1977) are in 
the forefront of this theoretical programme. Crozier showed that, in large bureaucratic organizations, 
the capacity to control “zones of uncertainty” provides considerable power (Crozier, 1963). Crozier and 
Friedberg (1977) developed a set of concepts to analyse power relations between individuals to explain 
how and why they collaborate, or fail to do so. These power relations take the form of “strategic 
games” in which people engage to control uncertainty in such a way that they can achieve their goals, 
or prevent others from doing so, in order to gain an advantage, thus increasing their power to control 
the work assigned to them (to increase their “scope of action”). Crozier and Friedberg define the power 
of individual “A” over individual “B” as being dependent upon the capacity of A to predict how B will 
behave, and the uncertainty of B’s behaviour with respect to the behaviour of A (Crozier and Friedberg, 
1977). Consequently, strategic games aim at increasing one’s own “scope of action” for gain 
maximization and loss minimization. In everyday organizational settings, people constantly negotiate 
their zones of uncertainty to acquire as much leeway as possible. Their games are bounded by their 
understanding of their particular contexts, but can always be explained by situational variables. In 
other words, bounded rationality imposes constraints on the strategic games in which people engage, 
but can be explained by an analysis of the particular situations. This perspective promotes the idea 
that the nature and scope of political behaviour influences social phenomena within a particular 
context, and that one’s propensity to collaborate depends on gain maximization and loss minimization. 
 
Strategic analysis provides an interesting framework for understanding organizational members’ 
micropolitical strategies. The analysis of people’s perceptions of organizational problems, their goals, 
their stakes (in terms of gains and losses), the resources that they use to achieve their goals, formal 
and informal rules, as well as people’s identity in the workplace, might shed some light on the 
strategies that they adopt to increase their scope of action and, in so doing, gain power. Within this 
framework, power is eminently relational, as Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) have argued: power 
should be defined as a relational phenomenon, and is activated, gained and lost in the context of 
relationships with others. This view was initially proposed by Crozier (1973), for whom power is a 
relationship that develops and changes over time. It is a dynamic process which is specific and 
reciprocal. The concept of reciprocity, according to Crozier (1973), is central to strategic analysis: 
reciprocity forms the basis of collaboration and alliance-building among organizational members. Thus, 
the analysis of how faculty members in my organization form alliances, maintain reciprocity and 
collaborate might be important for this study. 
 
The other perspective of power, its “pervasive” nature, emphasizes “hidden” dimensions of power 
(Buchanan and Badham, 2008). Power is viewed as inherent to organizational structure and processes. 
Frost and Egri (1991) refer to “deep structure,” as opposed to the “surface structure” of organizational 
power, in describing those invisible dimensions of power, such as rules and procedures that are built 
into organizational structure and processes and that shape people’s behaviour. Individuals might 
increase their level of power by gaining access to information, to decision making, or to those higher 
up in the hierarchy through organizational structure and processes. They might also exploit rules and 
procedures to their advantage (Reynaud, 1997). The strategic contingency theory of intra-
organizational power (Hickson et al., 1971) is consistent with this approach to power, and advances 
the idea that certain dimensions of organizational power are more “visible” than others (Buchanan 
and Badham, 2008). For example, organizational culture, rituals, routines, and modes of behaviour are 
invisible as they are built into the organizational fabric and impact the way that power is distributed 
and used within the organization (Scott-Morgan, 1995). They represent invisible dimensions of power, 
but can be made explicit by those who want to manipulate them, or to enforce them in their efforts to 
gain power (Buchanan and Badham, 2008). Consequently, “hidden” dimensions of power might be 




Bachrach and Baratz (1962) have shown how organizational members engage in “backstage” (i.e., 
invisible) activities to construe rules and procedures that prevent others from expressing views which 
are deemed controversial. They developed the concept of “non-decision making” to describe those 
attempts made by key organizational members to manipulate rules and procedures to avoid conflict 
with those with opposing agendas. They also developed the concept of “mobilization of bias” to 
account for attempts that are made to use organizational rules and procedures to the benefit of some, 
and the detriment of others (Buchanan and Badham, 2008). This “strategy” might be used to render 
individuals and groups politically “passive.” Clegg (1989) describes the various forms that these 
strategies might take when powerful members try to silence the less powerful members of the 
organization, such as by ignoring their concerns and grievances, or sending them to committees that 
engage in inconclusive deliberations. Powerful members remain powerful, and may even gain more 
power by institutionalizing such procedures that become so embedded in organizational structures 
and procedures that organizational members take them for granted. Lukes (2006) refers to this 
phenomenon as the “third dimension” of power, which describes how organizational members have 
been socialized to not recognize certain problems: members are socialized into norms that close off 
debate, or cause actions to be perceived as routine or result in them being concealed. In conclusion, 
the embedded power relations within the organizational structure and procedures give rise to 
strategies that, at a micropolitical level, might account for how people gain power by manipulating the 
structural and procedural components of the organization. Consequently, uncovering hidden 
micropolitical strategies employed by faculty members who resist the change in my organization might 
prove difficult. 
 
In conclusion, based on the above literature, organizational members’ micropolitical behaviour can be 
conceptualized as influence attempts to encourage others to cooperate when their interests are 
compatible with the change. Those whose interests are incompatible with the change might compete 
for more power to increase their influence in order to disrupt the change. Assembling a coalition of 
people with compatible interests, controlling the resources needed to move the change forward and 
building alliances with others are all ways to gain power and influence. 
 
2.2 Micropolitics Applied to Organizational Change 
 
Mangham (1979) was perhaps the first scholar to explicitly address the politics of organizational 
change. According to Blase (1991), Mangham has developed one of the most thorough analyses of the 
political perspective in the context of organizational change. Through symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
1969), he offers a detailed discussion of some of the underlying causes of political behaviour in 
changing organizations, such as differing views about the goals of the change and the means to achieve 
them. To negotiate those differing perspectives, organizational members have no choice but to engage 
in political behaviour. These negotiation attempts might be conflictive or consensus-building: “Where 
there are rival positions and rival advocates, competition for support ensues and all the techniques of 
politics may be displayed—persuasion, compromise, bargaining, and destabilization of the other’s 
position” (p. 18). Joint action is characterized by both competition and collaboration of individuals and 
groups attempting to manage their own behaviour and the behaviour of others to achieve their self-
interests. To Mangham, power is the common currency of all negotiation and the basis of all social and 
organizational behaviour. 
 
Mangham’s approach provides insight into the politics of organizational change, but fails to 
acknowledge that context might play a role in the nature, frequency and intensity of organizational 
members’ political behaviour: for example, do people exhibit the same political behaviour towards the 
different types of organizational change? Do organizational rules and norms impact political 
behaviour? What about the change agent’s political behaviour? And how does one distinguish 




What seems to be clear, though, is that change triggers and intensifies political behaviour among 
organizational members (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981; Buchanan and Badham, 2008; Frost and Egri, 
1991; Markus, 1983; and Pettigrew, 1973). Markus (1983) makes a compelling argument that 
organizational change often implies a reallocation of power among organizational members, and that 
the loss of power generates resistance to the change. Bigley and Roberts (2001) concur and argue that 
the loss of power increases the occurrence of political acts against the change initiative and those who 
manage it. Gunn (2001) contends that resistance behaviour and strategies are basically political acts 
against the change. Frost and Egri (1991) argue that power struggles are initiated by those who hope 
to block the change process, and/or who want to offer an alternative mode of change which has a less 
detrimental effect on their interests: for these authors, power is “the potential capacity to get others 
to do things they might otherwise not want to do and/or to resist others’ efforts to get one to do what 
they want one to do” (p. 236). Following this definition, power can indeed be utilized to impede change 
efforts. This form of power (i.e., power used for this purpose) is considered as being used to oppose 
managerial authority, viewed as the legitimate form of power (Demers, 2007). Consequently, power 
and political behaviour through which organizational members express power might be used as a form 
of resistance to change (Hardy, 1995) that hinders organizational progress. However, the literature is 
not clear on the form that political acts to resist the change might take: How can one characterize 
those political acts? Are they mostly covert? Do people who engage in them do so for legitimate 
purposes? Those are questions left unanswered. 
 
Political behaviour may be exhibited by those impacted by the change (the change recipients), as well 
as by those implementing the change (the change agents) (Buchanan and Badham, 1999). For example, 
change recipients might resist and oppose the change by engaging in political activity to undermine it, 
and change agents might need to become politically astute to move the change forward. Thus, political 
behaviour can be observed in both change agents and change recipients. Therefore, the question is: 
are there any discernible patterns in the way people behave politically in the face of change, from a 
change recipient’s and a change agent’s perspective? To answer this question, one needs to look into 
the type of change being introduced in the organization. As Demers (2007) maintains, organizational 
members’ political behaviour is shaped by the type of change occurring in the organization: top-down, 
radical change does not trigger the same political behaviour as bottom-up, incremental change. 
Heyden et al. (2017) make a clear distinction between “top-down change” and “bottom-up change” 
based on the roles played by managers across the hierarchy. Top-down change involves discontinuous 
change across a range of organizational features and parameters (McAdams, 2003) such as 
organizational structures, cultures and processes (Al-Mashari and Zairi, 1999), and is usually initiated 
and managed by top management or their representatives (Heyden et al., 2017). 
 
Organizations that are most resistant to change are those with a structure that is highly differentiated 
vertically and horizontally (Pettigrew, 1973), with a culture that values conformity (Feldman, 1985) and 
control (Ban, 1995), and in which processes are diversified and complex (Quinn, 1978). This leads to 
higher authority appropriation by top management and to passiveness, and a lack of new ideas from 
employees (Claver et al., 1999). These features, all of which apply to my school, might explain why 
management decided to impose their decision to implement online learning on faculty members. 
However, management has obviously underestimated the degree of resistance exhibited by faculty 
members. As Bates and Sangrà (2011, p. 200) rightly note: “[people higher up in the hierarchy of higher 
learning institutions] have little power over their colleagues, who can usually resist suggested changes 
or activities with little fear of adverse consequences.” 
 
One stream of research about the politics of top-down change is mainly embodied in the work of Quinn 
(1978) who, like Mintzberg (1985), sees organizations as political arenas in which the “power-
behavioural” dimension accounts for the fact that organizations put forward change initiatives that 
usually evolve in a step-by-step, opportunistic and continuous fashion. Organizational members 
pursue multiple goals, and coalitions (such as sub-systems of the organization) are constructed to 
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negotiate the change. As such, Quinn (1978, 1980) echoes the views of Braybrooke and Lindblom 
(1963) and Cyert and March (1963) about the political nature of organizations. Furthermore, in order 
to move the change forward, management needs to be aware of power issues within the organization, 
namely in terms of building a power base for certain actions that promote the change initiative, and in 
terms of preventing or defeating opposition to the change (Demers, 2007). 
 
Quinn’s (1980) logical incrementalism is a model of how to avoid (political) resistance to top-down 
change: if it cannot be avoided, it must then be managed through the use of several strategies to foster 
incremental change, which gradually evolves into more important change. There are no positive side 
effects to political activity, according to Quinn (1980). However, by focussing on management, Quinn 
(1980) ignores the political dynamics among lower-level employees, which might give rise to bottom-
up, organizational change. Also, there is an underlying ideological element to this perspective, which 
assumes that management is always right, which might not be the case. 
 
Even if the literature has focussed on the political activity of change recipients, and to a much lesser 
extent, on the political behaviour of change agents, many commentators agree that change recipients 
might engage in political activity to oppose top-down, radical change (Hardy, 1995; Markus, 1983; and 
Pfeffer, 1981). From a Lewinian perspective, political activity instigated by change recipients is 
considered to be a force against top-down, radical change. When change is emergent (bottom-up), 
then political activity among organizational members is considered a force for change and a source of 
organizational innovation (Kanter, 1983). This is the approach taken by Crozier and Friedberg (1977), 
Pettigrew (1985b), Giddens (1979), and Tsoukas and Chia (2002). According to these scholars, change 
is an emergent, context-specific process driven by organizational actors. Crozier and Friedberg (1977) 
adopt this view, and their concept of “games” and their underlying rules posit that organizations are 
continuously changing because those rules are constantly renegotiated among organizational actors 
(“players”). People engage in a negotiation process, hoping that they will maintain or improve their 
position within the organization, i.e., increase their “zone of uncertainty” (their freedom of action, or 
“scope of action”) and the power that they wield or to which they have access. 
 
A formal structure is established to maintain equilibrium among opposing strategies within the 
organization. Consequently, power games induce incremental organizational change: transformations 
in the nature of the power games and in the rules that regulate the system inevitably provoke change. 
For Crozier and Friedberg (1977, p. 30), change “can only be understood as a collective creation process 
through which members of a given collectivity learn together, that is, invent and crystallize new ways 
of playing the social game of cooperation and conflict.” Pettigrew (1985b) also focuses on 
organizational actors and the system: actors embody action, and a system means that there is 
structure. Change is the study “of actors and systems in motion” (p. 287). Power is a central feature of 
the study of “the dynamics of changing.” He asserts that the micropolitics stemming from competition 
among organizational members with different goals and rationalities is linked to the macropolitics that 
changes in the environment bring about. Micropolitical strategies serve to legitimize one’s or a group’s 
position: more specifically, micropolitical strategies enact a “process of symbol construction and value 
use designed both to create legitimacy for one’s actions, ideas and demands, and to delegitimize the 
demands of one’s opponents” (p. 44). Pettigrew (1985a, and 1985b) insists on the importance of 
deciphering front-stage and back-stage use of power to better unearth the micropolitics associated 
with organizational change. Burns (1961, p. 260) asserts that “it is backstage, so to speak, that the 
imputations of empire building, caucus log-rolling, squaring, and obstructionism occur.” 
Contextualism, according to Pettigrew (1985a), is the process by which a researcher can methodically 
uncover legitimation and delegitimation processes that organizational change entails. 
 
The literature on the politics of top-down and bottom-up change fails to take into account that change 
might also be a multilevel process that should be described both at a macro level (the organization—
the structural level) and a micro level (the individual) (Demers, 2007). Furthermore, the political school 
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has generated much criticism from those who promote a radical view of power and change. Hardy and 
Clegg (1989), who are foremost proponents of this approach, assert that organizational rules “embody 
discretion and provide opportunities for resistance; and, so, their interpretation must be disciplined, 
if new powers are not to be produced and existing powers transformed” (p. 634). Consequently, the 
study of micropolitical strategies implies delving into strategies that management uses to dominate, 
and those that subordinates use to resist and liberate themselves from this domination. 
 
To a certain extent, these two opposing perspectives on the political behaviour of change recipients 
(change recipients can be a force for change or an impediment to change) determine the way that 
change agents should address the change politically: in the context of top-down change, change agents 
should try to prevent change recipients from engaging in political activity because it is detrimental to 
the change itself, and they should foster constructive, political activity among change recipients in the 
context of bottom-up change. I would argue that patterns of political behaviour observed in change 
recipients are shaped not only by the type of change occurring in the organization, but also by the way 
that change agents address and deal with the political behaviour exhibited by change recipients. I 
would further posit that the change agent’s inability to effectively address and deal with the political 
behaviour of change recipients might encourage them to resist the change, which might be conducive 
to power struggles. The next section explores power, its management and its manifestations in the 
context of online learning implementation. 
 
2.3 Micropolitics Applied to Online Learning Implementation 
 
Micropolitics has mostly been studied in schools and similar settings (Ball, 1987; Blase, 1991; and West, 
1999), but not in the context of online learning implementation. It appears that most of the current 
literature on the adoption of online learning is set within a traditional-rational approach to 
organization, and neglects the role that power might play in the adoption/rejection of the change 
brought about by the implementation of online learning. Scholars in the field of education have defined 
micropolitics as a set of practices ranging from conventional management practices to self-interested 
manipulation (Hoyle, 1999). Blase (1991, p. 11) defines micropolitics as “the use of formal and informal 
power by individuals and groups to achieve their goals in organizations … both cooperative and 
conflictive actions and processes are part of the realm of micropolitics.” Lindle (1999) offers the 
following definition: micropolitics consists of “the networks of individuals and groups within and 
surrounding schools, who compete for scarce resources, even power. [It] encompasses the daily 
interactions, negotiations and bargains of any school” (p. 171). These definitions highlight the idea that 
micropolitical behaviour is distinct from everyday behaviour associated with a particular formal role, 
and that it encompasses collaborative and competitive strategies used for self-serving purposes and/or 
to achieve common goals. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, online learning is becoming mainstream. Therefore, the literature on online 
learning is expanding, and conditions underlying successful online learning implementation have been 
the focus of many studies. However, the literature on online learning adoption by faculty members in 
a university setting is sparse (Martins and Nunes, 2016; and Mitchell, Parlamis, and Claiborne, 2015). 
Many commentators have identified personal and organizational factors that have an impact on faculty 
members’ decision to teach online (King and Boyatt, 2015; Maguire, 2005; Mehta et al., 2019; and 
Zhen, Garthwait, and Pratt, 2008). These factors become barriers to adoption when they lead to a 
decision to not teach online. First- and second-order barriers (Kearney et al., 2018) are found in the 
literature to help explain why faculty members are reluctant to engage in online learning. First-order 
barriers refer to organizational factors, such as the degree of support offered to faculty members to 





Second-order barriers are idiosyncratic and refer to beliefs, values, emotions, personality factors, self-
efficacy, cognitive and personal dispositions, intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors, and 
professional values and norms. Such categories are rather static; their authors fail to account for causal 
relationships among barriers of the same or a different category, and do not always consider that some 
barriers might overlap both categories. Nonetheless, identifying barriers to online learning adoption 
has long been the goal of many studies. For example, Maguire (2005) investigated both first- and 
second-order barriers and produced a literature review that shows that certain external conditions, 
specifically, incentives in the form of promotion and tenure, have to be met in order to engage faculty 
members in online learning. Faculty members who are promoted if they teach online may influence 
their peers to do the same. Other factors such as administrative and technological support, and 
adequate policies and procedures that meet the needs of faculty members, play a role in the adoption 
of online learning. Panda and Mishra (2007) showed that “lack of credit toward promotion,” “lack of 
technical support,” and “lack of institutional policy” were the most important barriers to online 
teaching. Nonetheless, these authors fail to provide any indication of the type of administrative and 
technological support or specific policies and procedures that might be conducive to online learning 
adoption. 
 
Faculty members’ unease with online teaching was assessed by Wilkes, Simon and Brooks (2006). They 
demonstrated that faculty members are mostly concerned about the lack of opportunity to interact 
with students, the reduced quality of online courses, and time-related issues. Those results are similar 
to those of Shea (2007) who analyzed data from 386 faculty members teaching online in 36 colleges in 
a large state university system in the U.S. The author found that part-time faculty members are more 
motivated by the opportunity to teach online because this could promote job security. He also found 
that “traditional faculty members (assistant, associate and full professors) were more discouraged by 
the perception that online teaching was more time consuming than were faculty members who were 
part-time and non-traditional” (Shea, 2007, p. 80). Finally, he concludes that compensation issues and 
the administration’s failure to recognize that additional effort is required to teach online are the most 
important institutional inhibitors to online learning adoption. 
 
Some more recent studies did confirm that time, concerns about course quality and copyright issues 
are institutional inhibitors to online learning adoption (Akbarilakeh, Razzaghi, and Moghaddam, 2019; 
and Ali, Uppal, and Gulliver, 2018). In 2012, Ithaka S+R, a non-profit American organization, conducted 
interviews with senior academic leaders at 25 institutes of higher learning to understand the barriers 
to online learning adoption in U.S. colleges and universities, and to identify strategies to overcome 
those barriers. They provide a list of eight obstacles that prevent the adoption of online learning in 
higher education, such as the fear that online teaching is used by universities to reduce faculty 
employment, the concern that developing online courses takes time, and the worry by faculty 
members that they might lose the intellectual property of the teaching material that they develop for 
online courses. The results of these studies are not specific about the criteria with which faculty 
members assess the quality of online courses, nor on how to address copyright issues. When the 
authors offer strategies to overcome barriers to online learning adoption, their suggestions are often 
too generic to be of any assistance. Nonetheless, researchers might one day come up with a list of 
definitive barriers that need to be addressed for online learning adoption. 
 
Second-order barriers were the focus of a certain number of studies. Faculty members might be less 
inclined to adopt online learning when they entertain misconceptions about online education 
(Alhabeeb and Rowley, 2018; Allen, Seaman, Lederman, and Jaschik, 2012; and Lin, Singer, and Ha, 
2010). Zhen, Garthwait, and Pratt (2008) argue that personality factors, such as confidence regarding 
the use of online technology, can also explain faculty members’ adoption of online learning. Ideological 
factors, such as faculty members’ overall philosophy about online teaching (Zhen, Garthwait, and Pratt, 
2008) and the idea that online learning is of lesser quality than the learning that takes place in the 
classroom (Ithaka S+R, 2012) can also explain faculty members’ reluctance to teach online. Zhen, 
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Garthwait, and Pratt (2008) identified one set of factors that correlate with faculty members’ decision 
on whether or not to teach online, namely self-efficacy. Other factors such as previous experience in 
online teaching, time-related issues, faculty peer-pressure, and class innovation had no significant 
effects on the decision-making process. These results suggest that faculty members who strongly 
believe in their own ability to complete tasks and reach goals related to online teaching are most likely 
to overcome other types of barriers. Consequently, the strategy which consists of giving time to faculty 
members by reducing their workload in order to engage them in online teaching may not be necessary. 
On the other hand, lack of time is one of the major concerns of faculty members who are reluctant to 
teach online courses (Zhen, Garthwait, and Pratt, 2008). Consequently, a major critique of these 
studies is that they do not provide any clear guidance about ways to reduce or eliminate the barriers 
that they identified. The only few to have done that are Tanner, Noser, and Totaro (2009). They studied 
business faculty members’ and undergraduate students’ perceptions of online learning and found that 
university administrators need to take into account faculty members’ perceptions, concerns and 
anxieties to enhance the likelihood that online courses will be viewed as valuable. 
 
It appears from the above discussion that many first- and second-order barriers have been identified 
to explain faculty members’ unwillingness to adopt online learning. However, there are few 
suggestions about ways to reduce or eliminate them. When advice is offered, it is often too generic to 
be of any help. Many studies seem to assume that these barriers are static, and fail to acknowledge 
causal relationships among them and that some might change over time. Finally, I contend that some 
of those barriers might be used as political tools by those opposing online learning in an attempt to 
block the project. For example, someone could justify inaction by complaining that institutional 
procedures are not clear enough or that administrative support is insufficient, despite considerable 
effort by the institution to clarify procedures and offer assistance to those it hopes to enrol in online 
teaching. This might be the reason why, instead of focusing on the barriers to online learning, some 
authors have conceptualized online learning implementation as a process that faculty members go 
through in their efforts to learn and adopt the technology (Hsbollah and Idris, 2009). Online learning 
is essentially a technologically driven change. The rate at which an individual adopts a new technology 
can explain a person’s willingness to use new technology at a particular point in time (Rogers, 2003). 
 
The adoption rate of a new technology is based on the perception of potential adopters: what are the 
advantages of adopting this technology? To what degree is it compatible with existing values, past 
experiences and actual needs? How complex is this new technology? Is it possible to experiment with 
the new technology on a limited basis? To what degree are the results of adopting the technology 
visible? According to Surry (1997), these perceived five attributes (relative advantage, compatibility, 
complexity, trialability, and observability) determine the rate at which a new technology is adopted. 
There is a possibility, in the context of the research, that faculty members opposing online learning are 
just “slow” adopters, or they might be involved in micropolitics to slow down the adoption process 
with the undisclosed intention of derailing online learning implementation. 
 
The numerous efforts by my school to reduce and eliminate first- and second-order barriers and to 
provide training and coaching to faculty members to assist them in adopting the technology have been 
unsuccessful and, thus, justify the need to investigate the political side of online learning 
implementation in order to shed some light on my problem. 
 
Samarawickrema and Stacey (2007) are among the few commentators who have looked into the 
politics of online learning/teaching implementation, but only superficially, as it was not the focus of 
their study. They argue that efforts to better understand the factors enabling and impeding the 
adoption of new technology have to take into account the power and politics of the setting in which 
the adoption is taking place. They have found that “many teaching academics’ adoption (of new 
technology) […] are not just related to improving learning but are stimulated by the politics of the 
context such as top-down authority directives, funding grants, and faculty politics” (p. 332). To support 
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this, they conducted research to identify the factors (political and non-political) underlying the 
adoption or rejection of web-based teaching and learning. Using actor-network theory (Latour, 1992) 
to interpret their findings, they found that the influence of colleagues plays an important role in the 
adoption of the technology. They also concluded that when faculty members are forced to adopt web-
based teaching mainly for institutional motives (such as to increase student enrolment or to follow a 
trend), faculty members might adopt the technology, albeit unwillingly: “These political aspects of the 
work setting, though negative, exerted a powerful influence that directed the routines of these 
teaching academics and forced their adoption of web-based learning” (p. 327). The authors failed to 
provide any clue about how colleagues exert their influence on others to get them to adopt new 
technology, nor on whether adoption of the technology is successful in the long term when faculty 
members are forced by management to do so. In the same study, Samarawickrema and Stacey (2007) 
also used Rogers’ (2003) theory of diffusion of innovations to analyse their results. They determined 
that decisions to adopt web-based teaching are mostly based on the relative advantages of using the 
technology, although they are unclear about what those advantages may be. They also found in their 
study that teachers adopted the technology in response to “top-down authority innovation directives:” 
if teachers are compelled to use the technology, then adoption is not voluntary but imposed, which, I 
would argue, might trigger covert political acts of rebellion. 
 
Dermentzi and Papagiannids (2018) have looked at peer influence and the role that social norms might 
play in adopting new teaching technology. They have found that social norms, in a higher education 
setting, are affected only by peer influence. They argue that if institutions want to take advantage of 
the benefits that new learning technology offers and decide to use a top-down approach to 
implementing the technology, first-order barriers, such as having adequate technology, providing 
support to faculty members and offering compensation, have to be addressed at the outset; then 
efforts to empower faculty members can be put in place in the form of providing adequate coaching 
and inviting them to attend action learning sessions. Other authors support such an approach: 
Aubusson et al. (2014), for example, make a case for taking into account faculty members’ preferences 
and pedagogical styles when engaging them in adopting a particular teaching technology. I would add 
that this can only be achieved if faculty members actively participate in the design of online learning 
activities so that they can indicate what their preferences are, an approach that was not taken in my 
school. 
 
Kearney et al. (2018) also support a participative approach to foster the adoption of new teaching 
technology. They argue that action learning groups might support the adoption of new teaching 
technology more effectively, and they appear to be strong proponents of “bottom-up” professional 
learning opportunities such as “action learning group strategies […] and individually negotiated, 
authentic immersion activities” (p. 492). They do not indicate under which conditions such action 
learning group strategies might work, nor how to engage faculty members in those strategies, as 
academics tend to work independently and often prioritize their own agendas (Aarrevaara et al., 2015). 
 
Dumont and Raggo (2018) have looked into faculty resistance to the adoption of new teaching 
technology from an implicitly political perspective. They report a comment made by a research 
participant in their study about the perception of faculty members towards online teaching: “The staff 
hired to help faculty have never taught and have no idea what’s involved. They are just technicians 
and they have a lot of power over your course. There is not the same freedom that one has in the 
classroom” (p. 56). This might be indicative of a loss of power, which might trigger resistance towards 
the new technology. Lawrence and Tar (2018) also have investigated resistance towards the adoption 
of new technology, again with an implicit political lens when they report that some of their research 
participants felt they were losing power as the technology might replace them: “so instead of losing 




The sparsity of the literature on online learning adoption by faculty members in a university setting 
makes it very difficult to draw any definite conclusion about the politics of online learning 
implementation. The few authors who have investigated the topic offer very little insight into the 
underlying politics of the phenomenon; for example, how do faculty members who are forced to use 
new online teaching technology use their influence to either oppose or support such an endeavour? Is 
there a political context more favourable to online teaching implementation? How do people influence 
existing social norms that might become barriers to online teaching? Is it desirable and possible to 
engage faculty members in the decision-making process about online teaching implementation? What 
might be the political consequences of doing that? All those questions are left unanswered by the 
current literature on online learning adoption. 
 
Although many acknowledge that online learning adoption is a change in the way faculty members 
teach (Al-araibi et al. 2019; Salmon and Asgari, 2019; and Zheng, Gibson, and Gu, 2019), few have 
addressed the change that online learning entails (Shahbaz et al., 2019). The politics of organizational 
change might offer some clues as online learning implementation is in itself an organizational change 
that can alter the distribution of power in my school (Markus, 1983). This is the purpose of the next 
section. 
 
2.4 Relevance and Applicability of Micropolitics to Solving My Organizational Problem 
 
The goal of this study is to discover ways to manage the change triggered by online learning 
implementation in my university. Well-known methods to manage change (such as increasing change 
recipients’ readiness level with regards to this change by providing training, by regularly 
communicating the organizational benefits of this endeavour and by eliminating barriers to online 
learning implementation) have proven ineffective in reducing resistance towards this change. Even if 
all agree that online learning implementation changes the way faculty members teach (Al-araibi et al., 
2019; Salmon and Asgari, 2019; and Zheng, Gibson, and Gu, 2019), few have addressed the change 
process it entails (Shahbaz et al., 2019). For some, the adoption of online learning involves loss of 
power (Lawrence and Tar, 2018) which triggers resistance towards the change itself (Dumont and 
Raggo, 2018). This resistance might increase if the change is imposed on faculty members instead of 
being driven by them (Kearney et al., 2018), as is the case in my university. In other words, empowering 
faculty members to initiate a bottom-up change might increase the likelihood of successfully 
implementing online learning (Aubusson et al., 2014; and Dermentzi and Papagiannids, 2018). The 
influence of peers and other incentives might help move the change forward (Samarawickrema and 
Stacey, 2007) as long as first- and second-order barriers have been eliminated (Kearney et al., 2018). 
However, the literature offers no definitive list of first- and second order barriers that, once eliminated, 
increase the adoption of online learning by faculty members. Thus, resistance might not be triggered 
by management’s inability to eliminate these barriers, but rather by the loss of power and status that 
online learning implementation entails for faculty members. 
 
Thus, investigating how micropolitics might help manage the change is an endeavour worth pursuing, 
particularly because it could shed some light on how it can sustain or hinder cooperation (Burns, 1961). 
It could also help clarify the concept of organizational politics by focusing on organizational actors’ 
behaviour as they try to prevent loss of power (McFarland, Van Iddekinge, and Ployhart, 2012). 
Investigating the micropolitical behaviour of both change recipients and the change agent (myself) 
might serve to determine if and how coalitions (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Olsen, 1976; and 
Vigoda, 2003), building alliances and managing scarce resources (Pfeffer, 1981) including power bases 
that people have or have access to (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986; French and Raven, 1958) are 
tools that can be used to either facilitate or block the change. Furthermore, micropolitical behaviour 
might assume many forms: is there a repertoire of political behaviours used by change recipients, as 
Küpper and Felsch (2000) suggest? How effective are those behaviours in influencing others (Allen et 
al., 1979; Dean and Sharfman, 1993; Farrell and Peterson, 1982; and O’Connor and Morrison, 2001)? 
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What are the “back-stage” and “front-stage” political activities (Burns, 1961; Pettigrew 1985a, and 
1985b) of people at various levels of the organization (Demers, 2007)? What triggers such behaviour 
(Buchanan and Badham, 2008; and Mayes and Allen, 1977)? Finally, investigating micropolitics in the 
context of organizational change might help to answer the following questions: Do people exhibit the 
same political behaviour towards top-down and bottom-up organizational change? Do organizational 
rules and norms impact political behaviour? Do people engage in political acts to hinder organizational 
change for legitimate purposes? What is the most effective political behaviour, if any, that change 
agents should engage in to help move the change forward? Many of those questions remain 
unanswered. This research might provide some answers and, thus, contribute to disciplinary 
knowledge. 
 
2.5 Theoretical Framework 
 
Organizational micropolitics can be investigated through various frameworks. For example, Ferris et 
al. (2002) and Ferris and Treadway (2012) studied political skill (social astuteness, interpersonal 
influence, networking ability, and apparent sincerity) in terms of its effectiveness in everyday 
organizational settings, as a variable underlying leadership effectiveness, and as an antidote for 
stressors. They did not investigate how political skill can help manage organizational change. Kimura 
(2015) argues that it would be worth examining managers’ political skill, as defined by Ferris et al. 
(2002) and Ferris and Treadway (2012), in the context of organizational change: “Such perspectives 
are important in qualitative studies that are designed to reveal the process of political struggle in 
organizational change and strategic management.” (p. 325) 
 
Fligstein’s (2001) theory of skilled social actors could also be used to investigate micropolitical 
behaviour. Skilled social actors exhibit various behaviours such as framing “stories that help induce 
cooperation from people in their group that appeal to their identity and interests, while at the same 
time using those same stories to frame actions against various opponents” (p. 133), setting agendas, 
convincing others that what they can get is what they want, and engaging in “brokering more than 
blustering.” Such behaviour could be deemed political in nature, especially with Fligstein and 
McAdam’s (2011) concept of “strategic action fields” which are “the fundamental units of collective 
action in society.” Power and advantage play key roles in this concept: strategic action fields are socially 
constructed arenas within which actors with varying resource endowments compete for advantage. 
Their approach has more to do with broad societal changes rather than changes occurring at the micro-
organizational level such as the one I want to investigate. I could also have chosen other theories as a 
theoretical framework, such as Roger’s (2003) theory of diffusion of innovations or actor-network 
theory (Latour, 1992). Although Roger’s theory has been used in several studies on the adoption of 
learning technologies (Li and Lindner, 2007; Shea, Pickett, and Sau Li, 2005; and Wilson et al., 2000), it 
fails to take into account external conditions which can include and/or be distorted by political factors 
(Wilson et al., 2002). It also does not clearly define adoption. As for actor-network theory, which also 
has been used to study the adoption of technology (Samarawickrema and Stacey, 2007), it considers 
actors as physical objects and intangibles, and studies their interactions. It does not, however, offer 
any insight into the political nature of these interactions and their underlying dynamics: since change 
is inherently dynamic, the theory might not be appropriate. 
 
Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) theory, which is a view reflected in the tenets of micropolitics (Willner, 
2011), presents a nuanced picture of how micropolitical strategies are construed and used in the 
context of organizational change; this theoretical framework might be most appropriate for 
investigating how people exert power in the context of the organizational change taking place in my 
school. More specifically, applying the framework developed by Crozier and Friedberg (1977), using 
action research to study organizational actors’ micropolitical “strategic games,” might increase my 
understanding of the way people form coalitions, build alliances, manage scarce resources, and 
develop and use micropolitical strategies with others, in the context of the organizational change in 
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my school. The change currently occurring in my organization is generating resistance and power 
struggles that impede the change process, so using the framework developed by Crozier and Friedberg 
seems appropriate to interpret these phenomena, and to manage them in such a way that they 
become a force for, rather than against, change. Furthermore, Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) concept 
of “strategic games” offers an interesting way to study collaboration and competition among 
organizational actors as they constantly try to change the “rules of the game” to their advantage by 
influencing others at the micro-organizational level. In doing so, they attempt to gain power and 
increase their freedom of action. Consequently, management (and change agents) have no choice but 
to get involved in those games if they want to “win,” i.e., successfully implement change (Quinn, 1980). 
These games can take many forms such as coalition building, developing alliances and using power 
bases to influence others. One could argue that they represent “survival strategies” (Burns, 1961) to 
gain power and influence over the change process so that the outcomes are most beneficial to the 
change recipients. Resistance takes the form of political behaviour that faculty members engage in to 
block the change (Hardy, 1995; Markus, 1983; and Pfeffer, 1981). Thus, their micropolitical behaviour 
is a way to retaliate against top-down change which imposes losses on them. They sustain a 
competitive dynamic against management to derail the change process. Some collaborate with 
management as they foresee positive outcomes from the change process; they are more likely to 
engage in a bottom-up change to innovate and help move the change forward (Kanter, 1983; 
Pettigrew, 1985b; Giddens, 1979; and Tsoukas and Chia, 2002). 
 
Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) theory provides a framework that could help explain the many 
situations I have encountered in my organization in my attempt to manage the change brought about 
by the implementation of online learning (such as specific acts taken by some faculty members to slow 
down the project, some withholding relevant information that would have helped me move the change 
forward, attempts to involve others to oppose the change, and acts to block the change such as overtly 
opposing the goals of the change or delaying one’s involvement in the project for obscure motives, to 
name a few) and could potentially provide answers to many questions outlined in the last paragraph 
of the previous section. (Is there a repertoire of political behaviour that is used by change recipients? 
How effective are those behaviours in influencing others? What “back-stage” and “front-stage” 
political activities do people at different levels of the organization engage in? What triggers such 
behaviour?) 
 
The framework is widely used to study organizational micropolitics (Willner, 2011). For example, 
Bogumil and Kissler (1998a, 1998b) have applied the framework to study organizational (radical) 
change, specifically, reforms in public administration organizations in Germany. These consisted of 
reducing the hierarchy, redefining government’s responsibility, and creating new structures and 
procedures. These reforms generated many conflicts among organizational members involved in the 
process. The authors analyzed power struggles and resistance to change, and used Crozier’s and 
Friedberg’s framework to interpret the underlying causes of the change failure. Crozier and Friedberg 
(1977) argue that organizational change basically results from the strategies that organizational 
members put forward: they constantly strategize in order to increase their power and gain influence 
over others, which leads to power struggles. Those with more power have the advantage over those 
with less power and, thus, have more impact on the outcome of the change by exerting their influence 
on the change process. Finally, the theory has also been used to study ways to reduce the cost of 
training in organizations (Seddik, 2017), to study absenteeism (Lux, 2015) and to investigate the 
management of knowledge (Brauner and Becker, 2006). 
 
The strength of Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) framework is that it takes into account the idea that 
change is a multi-level process that includes actors at every level of the organization who initiate 
and/or become involved in organizational change: anyone can initiate strategic games in the context 
of organizational change to either promote or oppose the change, depending on their evaluation of 
the outcomes that the change entails, and on the power that they wield in order to exert their 
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influence. Consequently, organizational actors engage in micropolitical behaviour to gain power and 
influence. Also, the framework helps to present a nuanced picture of how micropolitical strategies are 
construed and employed in the context of organizational change. 
 
2.5.1 Key Concepts of the Theory: Definition and Evaluation 
 
The theory has four basic components (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977): (1) the concept of organizational 
actors (called “players”) who act in their own interests (they want to “win”) and interact with other 
actors in their quest of maximizing their gains and minimizing their losses; (2) the concept of a concrete 
action system, which is formed by the interactions with other actors; (3) the concept of a strategic 
game where actors seek to exploit “zones of uncertainty” and increase their power; and (4) the concept 
of power itself, which is viewed as a set of relations between actors. The definition of an actor is 
flexible: an actor is a social entity in the sense it enters into relationships with other actors and has 
objectives, which may or may not be different from the objectives of the organization. An actor always 
has freedom of choice, even if this choice is passivity, i.e. to do nothing. An organization is seen as a 
set of relationships or “concrete action systems” which are created by the players themselves. Within 
these, actors negotiate, exchange, make decisions and bargain. Such systems are usually a compromise 
between the formal objectives of the organization and those of the actors themselves. The strategic 
game is the method used to regulate these systems and through which the actors come to cooperate 
or compete. The game is about both freedom and constraint. The actor has to accept the rules of the 
game and, at the same time, develop a strategy to achieve their own objectives. The organizational 
forms that result from this are a series of interconnected games. Figure 1 below provides an illustration 
of the framework. 
 
Figure 1: Crozier’s and Friedberg’s Framework 
 
The idea that organizational actors seek to preserve the power they hold and want to increase in an 
attempt to gain more freedom in a particular situation is particularly relevant in the context of 
organizational change which can disrupt power relations. Greater freedom means less uncertainty 
about what the outcomes of the change may be in that particular situation; in other words, the actor 
has the liberty to choose from a wide variety of actions from which positive outcomes are possible. 
The organization might constrain available options in order to foster cooperation among organizational 
actors from which positive outcomes for all are foreseen. Consequently, Crozier’s and Friedberg’s 
(1977) strategic analysis of intra-organizational power provides the conceptual apparatus to analyse 
micropolitical behaviour in all types of organizational change (Willner, 2011). When applied to 
organizational change, the theory is mostly articulated based on the following concepts: 
 
• Strategic (Political) Games: Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) framework conceptualizes the 
behaviour of both change agent and change recipients as “strategic games;” change recipients 
engage in these games to either facilitate or impede the change process, depending on the gains 









• Behavioural Patterns: These “games” take the form of patterns of behaviour that can be described 
by the “players” themselves, or by an observer. It is through this behaviour that organizational 
members exert their power to influence others. 
 
• The Concept of Resistance is Useless: Describing these patterns of behaviour initiated by 
organizational members can help us to understand why and how they might collaborate or 
compete in the context of organizational change (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Resistance to 
change, as it is generally defined in the literature and from a Lewinian perspective (as a force 
against change), is futile: within Crozier’s and Friedberg’s framework, resistance is conceptualized 
as a “competitive” strategic game that those opposed to the change engage in to block it; 
resistance is merely the symptom of underlying power struggles among those who promote the 
change, and those who oppose it. 
 
• Interactions Among Organizational Actors: Strategic games can be described by analyzing (1) how 
people define a particular organizational problem, (2) the goals that they will pursue in that 
context, (3) their stakes (in terms of gains and losses), and (4) the resources that they will use to 
achieve their goals. An individual’s decision to act in a certain way is based on an analysis of these 
variables; one might choose from a set of possible actions those that are likely to help to “expand” 
one’s zone of uncertainty (and scope of action) and increase the chances of achieving one’s goals. 
People might engage in offensive strategies to increase their zones of uncertainty, and in defensive 
strategies to protect their zones of uncertainty (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Consequently, 
analyzing interactions among faculty members using this framework might help to uncover some 
of the strategic games that they have engaged in and/or initiated to block the change. These 
strategic games might involve building alliances and developing coalitions, which entails that 
strategic analysis encompasses both coalition and alliance building. 
 
The theory examines the actions posed by organizational actors among themselves and rejects any 
contextual determinism. Organizational actors follow bounded rationality when they decide to act in 
a certain way, but are convinced that they behave in a rational manner based on the information 
available in their context. Despite limited and/or biased information, organizational actors are 
persuaded that their actions result in the best possible outcomes for them and for others as well. 
 
This involves the organization being socially construed through the interactions among actors. It is a 
fabric of multiple power relations among actors who comprise the organizational system. While the 
organization might restrict freedom and actors’ capacity to act, they still have the ability to shape the 
context in which they operate. Actors are always active and try to act in the social system of which 
they are part in such a way as to increase their relative freedom. Organizational actors, thus, need to 
act strategically to increase their relative freedom aimed at reducing uncertainty associated with the 
context. In other words, to act strategically means to take advantage of a particular situation, and/or 
to avoid losing the benefits that are already acquired in that context, which entails interacting with 
others. “Games” are the mechanism by which actors regulate their relationships among themselves. 
The game allows organized actions by balancing actors’ freedom of action and constraints. 
 
There are multiple games in which an actor can be involved. To “play the game,” organizational actors 
rely on their power. In theory, power is an exchange relationship and renders possible mutual 
negotiations among actors. Since the exchange among organizational actors is negotiated, this entails 
a certain unpredictability: an actor can never be sure whether others will collaborate because of the 
resources that actors exchange among themselves. The concept of strategy refers to the deliberate 
action of the actor to allow or deny access to resources that are useful to other actors. Being 
dependent on others is a sign of weakness: an actor will always seek to reduce the level of dependency 




A limitation of the framework can be found in the nature of the resources that organizational actors 
use to gain and exert power and influence. The theory posits that organizational actors use expertise, 
networks, information, and rules to gain power (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). I would contend that 
this is quite restrictive, and that organizational actors can utilize coalitions, a variety of resources and 
alliances to exert power and influence, by manipulating the pervasive dimensions of power, as 
described in the literature review. For example, they might use personal relationships to gain influence 
over the change process, or engage in covert activities (“back-stage activities,” as Burns, 1961; and 
Pettigrew 1985a, and 1985b, call them) to manipulate rules and procedures. 
 
Another limitation of the theory is that it does not include concepts such as trust (Edmondson and 
Moingeon, 1999) and legitimacy, two concepts that organizational actors rely on to exert influence. 
Furthermore, the framework fails to offer a classification of strategic games (or any criteria to help do 
this) which would be useful in understanding people’s micropolitical behaviour. It does not explain the 
underlying dynamics of those games, and how they fit into the larger context of organizational change. 
Despite its limitations, however, the framework might help: 
 
1) To understand the underlying motives of faculty members’ reluctance/refusal to participate in the 
implementation of online learning; 
2) To investigate the role that micropolitics might play in this change using action research; doing so 
might help me address power issues more effectively; 
3) To find ways to change faculty members’ opposition to the change through action learning; and 
4) To develop a framework that will help address micropolitical behaviour in such a way as to help 




CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The purpose of this study was to use action research to investigate faculty members’ micropolitical 
behaviour, and to generate actionable knowledge to facilitate the implementation of online learning. 
Action learning would help to find ways to address power issues in order to help me manage the 
change process more effectively. The overall objective of this endeavour was to induce faculty 
members to be actively and constructively involved in the change process underpinning the 
implementation of online learning in my organization. This would involve taking action to assess their 
motives for opposing the change, and addressing these issues using action learning in such a way as to 
engage them in online learning. 
 
Consequently, the focus of the research was twofold: firstly, to identify micropolitical behaviour (and 
the underlying motives) exhibited by faculty members in their attempts to influence others, and assess 
the effectiveness of these attempts. Drawing on existing literature, micropolitical behaviour is any 
deliberate attempt made by faculty members to mobilize power for a specific purpose (i.e., to promote 
or oppose the change associated with online learning implementation). Mobilizing power refers to 
activities to acquire, develop, and use power such as coalition building, using scarce resources and 
acting strategically to create alliances aimed at influencing others, i.e., inducing them to act in a certain 
way (Allen et al., 1979; Dean and Sharfman, 1993; Farrell and Peterson, 1982; and O’Connor and 
Morrison, 2001). Following Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) contention, faculty members’ bounded 
rationality would not prevent them from justifying their actions since they would be persuaded that 
their actions bring the best possible outcomes for them and for others as well. The challenge would 
stem from covert political acts which would certainly not be addressed openly by faculty members in 
the course of the research if they felt that these acts were reprehensible (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988). Consequently, data would consist of discussions that would take place openly during the 
meetings, interpreted within the framework of Crozier and Friedberg (1977). 
 
Secondly, the research focussed on the change induced by the adoption of online learning. A member 
of faculty who adopts online learning would frame the endeavour as being worthwhile and would be 
able to make a case that it should be pursued, and act accordingly. A person could well say that the 
entire project is worth it, but would do nothing to help move it forward. These individuals would be 
“passive supporters” of the change since they would not use their influence to actively advance the 
project. Investigating why they are passive might shed some light on their real motives: are they just 
conforming to norms that they don’t really agree with because of peer pressure, or are there 
constraints that prevent them from becoming active supporters of the change? Similarly, someone 
could be a passive resistor or an active resistor of the change as resistance can be considered a sub-
set of non-adoption (Patsiotis, Hughes, and Webber, 2012). A resistor can be active and wield power 
to influence others not to get involved in online learning, while passive resistors lack sufficient power 
to influence others and would most likely try to increase their power in an attempt to gain more 
influence and, hence, more freedom. Since greater freedom means less uncertainty about the 
outcomes (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977), it was safe to assume that faculty members would discuss 
their attempts to gain power and influence to either support or oppose the change by exhibiting 
specific micropolitical behaviour. 
 
3.1 Studying Micropolitical Behaviour: Ontological and Epistemological Considerations 
 
Some researchers (Ferris et al., 2002; Kipnis et al.; 1984; and Vigoda, 2003) have studied micropolitical 
behaviour within a quantitative, functionalist paradigm, and argue that power and micropolitical 
behaviour are objective and inherent realities of organizations. These scholars tend to promote a 
positivist approach to studying micropolitical behaviour, and argue that it can be objectively assessed. 
A few have designed models to explain and predict micropolitical behaviour in organizational settings 
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(Fedor, Maslyn, and Bettenhausen, 2008). Others (such as Buchanan and Badham, 2008) have used an 
interpretive framework to study micropolitical behaviour, and argue that it is socially constructed. 
Finally, some believe that power and micropolitical behaviour constitute a reality constructed by the 
powerful (Hardy, 1995; Hardy and Clegg, 1996; and Hardy and O’Sullivan, 1998). Furthermore, 
Buchanan and Badham (2008) argue that there will never be an agreed upon definition of 
micropolitical behaviour, as many commentators have contended (Bradshaw-Camball and Murray, 
1991; Drory and Romm, 1990; and Kacmar et al., 1999), because micropolitical behaviour is socially 
constructed. Evidently, there is a wide diversity of perspectives about what power is really about and 
how it should be studied. 
 
Because of the many, sometimes divergent, definitions of the concept of “micropolitical behaviour” 
(Buchanan and Badham, 2008), and because I agree that it is socially constructed, I have chosen to 
investigate micropolitical behaviour based on a constructionist research philosophy to better 
understand how people perceive and assess their behaviour (and those of others) as micropolitical 
(Buchanan and Badham, 2008). Furthermore, using a constructionist approach to study micropolitical 
behaviour could shed some light on how faculty members gain and use their power to influence others 
in their pursuit of individual and/or organizational goals. Through action learning, the behaviour with 
which they exert their influence might become more apparent and form the basis of their repertoire 
of micropolitical strategies (their “strategic games,” to use the words of Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) 
for use in the context of the change brought about by the implementation of online learning. This is 
why my intention was to use action research to focus on a single phenomenon (change) taking place 
in the context of the research participants and to be involved with them so that we jointly construct 
an understanding of online learning from a political stance, the problem, the actors involved, the types 
of games being played, the goals, the stakes and the resources at play. Learning would be derived from 
the actions to use power and exert influence in the context of the change. 
 
McFarland, Van Iddekinge, and Ployhart (2012) have found that qualitative methodologies (such as 
action research) are techniques rarely used to investigate organizational politics, despite the nature of 
this phenomenon; they argue that qualitative inquiry results in more in-depth, comprehensive 
information, and that it can lead to new insights “that may not be recognized in existing theoretical 
work” (p. 116). They offer the following recommendations for the use of qualitative methodologies in 
investigating organizational politics: (1) detailed notes and recordings should be made before and 
during data-gathering sessions (i.e., action learning meetings); and (2) data analysis and conclusions 
should be triangulated, that is, participants’ perceptions should be verified in a systematic manner. 
Finally, maintaining that most scholars recognize that behaviour is a function of the context,2 they 
suggest that situational factors should be taken into account when investigating micropolitics. I 
integrated McFarland, Van Iddekinge, and Ployhart’s (2012) recommendations into the action research 
process of this research: detailed notes of each of the meetings were taken and incorporated in a log 
and the analyses of participants’ perceptions of their micropolitical behaviour (and that of others) were 
compared in terms of their impact on the context (the change process and outcomes). 
 
Cassell and Johnson (2006) suggest that any action research project should be evaluated in the context 
of ontological and epistemological assumptions made by the researcher. Consequently, I am aware 
that using a constructionist approach to study micropolitical behaviour entails that the results obtained 
during the action research cycles may not apply to other organizations in which change is being 
conducted and where change recipients are apparently engaging in micropolitical behaviour to derail 
it. Moreover, investigating micropolitical behaviour using action research and action learning is 
compatible with the approach taken by Crozier and Friedberg to study micropolitical behaviour. 
                                                          
2 Which somewhat goes against Crozier’s and Friedberg’s Methodological Individualism approach which consists 




The first step in their methodology consists of establishing the actual situation as it stands and 
reconstructing the logic of situations from the actors’ experience (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). This 
corresponds to the first step of any action research process: constructing the issues. Knowing how the 
actors construct the issues helps the researcher plan for ways to foster learning among actors. 
Bounded by their rationality, the actors are encouraged by the researcher to expand their 
understanding of the issues and to assess the effectiveness of their previous actions in such a way as 
to get them to act more effectively to solve the problem (planning action, the second step of the action 
research process). The researcher then looks for data on the actors’ experiences following actions that 
they took (the third step, taking action) and involves them in assessing the impact of those actions. 
The goal is to reconstruct the logic underlying the concrete action system among actors and to look 
for underlying micropolitical strategies to bring about learning and new ways of doing things. This is 
how I planned to generate actionable knowledge for my school. 
 
3.2 Action Research Design and Implementation 
 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this study was to use action research to investigate faculty members’ 
micropolitical behaviour, and to engage them in learning sets to get them to support the 
implementation of online learning in an attempt to generate actionable knowledge. This knowledge 
would ultimately help me: (1) foresee change recipients’ micropolitical behaviour when they oppose 
or support the change; and (2) support change recipients’ micropolitical behaviour when it sustains 
the change process, or counteract micropolitical strategies that impede the change process. Achieving 
these two objectives might constitute a contribution to professional practice, as “micropolitics is an 
underestimated topic in literature on action research” (Eilertsen, Gustafson, and Salo, 2008, p. 304). 
Moreover, since actionable knowledge “reflects the learning capability of individuals and organizations 
to connect heterogeneous elements (social, political, economic, and technological); […] (and) the focus 
of actionable knowledge is on (learning) practice as a form of self-organization that is fluid, dynamic” 
(Antonacopoulou, 2008, p. 2), I incorporated learning sets in the action research process in such a way 
that we learn together to use influence constructively to help the change move forward; in other 
words, to come up with a repertoire of influence strategies (“games”) conducive to change. 
 
Coghlan’s and Brannick’s (2010) four-step action plan for developing and implementing an action 
research process, namely (1) managing insider action research; (2) framing the issue; (3) enacting the 
core action research cycle; and (4) learning in action, formed the basis of the research design. The 




Figure 2: The Action Research Design (based on Coghlan and Brannick, 2010) 
 
According to Eilertsen, Gustafson, and Salo (2008), action research implies by its very nature that 
taken-for-granted routines, social relations and cultural “world-views” are unveiled more often than 
in other research strategies. This also includes the micropolitical order of things, formal and informal 
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They argue that action research can not only shed light on people’s political behaviour, but can also 
“change established roles and relations within an actual group of participants […]” (p. 304). Thus, 
action researchers need to reflect on the micropolitical consequences of their actions, especially when 
action research is used in the context of organizational change, as Mangham (1979) argues: 
 
“In essence, power and politics dramatically affect and even drive all key dimensions 
of change and innovation in organizations. They typically reflect the strong advocacy 
of some and the strong opposition of others. The self-interest of both groups is at 
stake and every trick and resource will be called into service to bring about or 
successfully oppose the innovation under consideration.” 
(Mangham, 1979, p. 133) 
 
Badham, Couchman and McLoughlin (1997) have used action research to demonstrate the importance 
of adopting contextualized politicized change strategies. Furthermore, using action research to 
investigate the micropolitics of organizational change can take multiple forms: 
 
“[…] we know of an individual manager whose Master’s Action Research Project was 
about the organizational change he was leading. His second-person intervention 
work to manage the politics, power dynamics and the conflicts between key 
protagonists was central to both his managerial role in leading change in his 
organization and his action research dissertation. His reflection in action was central 
to his dissertation.” 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2005, p. 48) 
 
This form is somewhat similar to the research I conducted. 
 
The first action research cycle in the four groups of participants opened with a dialogue about the 
desirability of online learning implementation, while the desired future state (the outcomes of the 
project) was to be co-constructed with faculty members. Establishing “fair power relations” (Hilsen, 
2006) with faculty members at the outset has not always prevented power struggles (namely in groups 
3 and 4 in which the second action research cycle broke down). In some groups, this has eventually led 
to enhanced collaboration, based on mutual trust and respect. Some faculty members engaged in a 
dialogue to co-construct the issue and future actions (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010), and defined the 
steps to manage the change. With faculty members who were resisting the change initiative, I needed 
to learn how I could bring their assumptions to light. We learned that building alliances with those 
receptive to the change initiative, and encouraging them to influence others to participate, proved 
useful. My implicit goal in the action research cycles was to engage faculty members in the research 
process in order to address resistance to change more effectively (Ford and Ford, 2010), to help them 
deal with their anxiety about the change process, to promote reflection and learning, to support a 
dialogue and to develop “collaborative alliances” (Wood and Gray, 1991). 
 
3.3 Action Learning as a Mode of Action Research 
 
Grieves (2000) argues that change initiatives precipitate the need to learn. He proposes five key 
learning processes to enhance organizational capacity for change, one of which is action learning. 
Incorporating action learning into each of the two cycles of the action research process to co-create a 
vision of things to come has undoubtedly increased my organization’s capacity to change. Zuber-
Skerritt (2001, p. 15) argues that transformational change is facilitated when “action learners’ vision 
aligns with the organization’s mission and goals.” 
 
My approach to action learning in this study is the one put forward by Coghlan and Brannick (2005), 




“[…] is an approach to the development of people in organizations which takes the task 
as the vehicle for learning. […] In action learning the starting point is the action. […] Its 
three objectives are (1) To make useful progress on the treatment of some real problems 
or opportunity; (2) To give nominated managers sufficient scope to learn for themselves 
in the company of others; and (3) To encourage teachers and others in management 
development to help others learn with and from each other.” (p. 15). 
 
In engaging faculty members in the learning sets, I hoped that, together, we would learn better ways 
to gain and use power to exert influence in the context of the change induced by online learning 
implementation. The four phases of the action research process (constructing the issues, planning 
action, taking action and evaluating action) were indeed conducive to action learning, as it was decided 
to bring together in the learning sets both members who have adopted online teaching and those who 
were still resisting it at the time the meetings took place, in order to involve resistors (non-adopters) 
in a dialogue in which they could learn from colleagues who have chosen to engage in online teaching. 
 
The first meeting with the research participants in each of the two cycles would start with the 
experience phase (constructing the issues) during which factual events would be discussed by initiating 
a dialogue around several questions such as the following: “Is online learning relevant to the 
organization and to our students? Why? Is it being implemented properly? What could have been done 
differently? (The meetings took place in 2017 and the project started in 2013.) What were the events 
that you experienced recently, in relation to the change brought about by the implementation of 
online learning? What was the impact of those events on you and others? How did these events affect 
power relations in the school?” The goal of this step was to help set members become attentive to 
their own personal experiences. Thus, each learning set member was encouraged to discuss their 
common experience of events related to the implementation of online learning, such as their 
perception of the change caused by the implementation, their feelings about the change that was 
imposed on them, the gains and losses that the change entailed for them and/or for the institution, 
and the way they tried to exert power and influence to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. 
Through the lens of a constructionist approach, the expression of both positive and negative views 
about the change was encouraged in such a way that resistors would engage in actions that would help 
the change move forward. The ultimate goal of the action learning process was to initiate a third order 
attitudinal change (Argyris, 1977) among participants opposing the implementation of online learning. 
Based on how research participants experienced these events, I would then try to involve them in co-
constructing the issues in such a way that these issues would be seen as encompassing the concerns 
of most participants. It is during this phase that personal issues would tend to overshadow collective 
ones and that ethical issues were addressed. 
 
The following phase for them was to make sense of these events and their political impact on a micro, 
meso and macro level (“Understand”) so that we plan adequate action (planning action): “What might 
explain people’s reactions towards these events? Why do some people react positively, others 
negatively? What is the best course of action?” The goal of this phase was to make sense of their 
experiences and devise an action plan. The “Judge” phase would serve to assess the effectiveness of 
the action plan using a list of criteria determined by set participants: “How can one influence most 
effectively the change process in such a way that it is most beneficial for all? What are the 
micropolitical strategies that might help the change move forward? What are those that might block 
the change?” Answers to these questions would help us choose a proper course of action to move the 
change forward. Encouraging set participants to reflect on/weigh available evidence was the goal of 
this phase. After taking action, the “Decide” phase would allow for the agreement on which action 
brought about the best outcomes, and the last phase would serve to find out why these actions were 




The second cycle would then be initiated and start by reconstructing the issues based on knowledge 
acquired in the first cycle. This process engaged people in double-loop learning to produce actionable 
knowledge. The process would then unfold for a second iteration. Figure 3 below illustrates the 




Figure 3: Embedded Action Learning within the Action Research Cycles 
 
The purpose of the action research process was to produce actionable knowledge in order to improve 
the way change is being managed in my school. The purpose of the action learning cycle was to induce 
new mental models among set participants to solve the problem, i.e. the lack of participation in online 
learning implementation. This implies that action learning “asks for critical reflection about self and 
others, and action research asks for critical reflection about [management] practice” (Willis, 2010, p. 
176). 
 
Finally, incorporating reflexivity in the action research process served as a learning device to “shape 
my understanding of the costs and benefits of different behaviours and courses of action” (Lawrence, 
Mauws, Dyck, and Kleysen, 2005, p. 187) that I adopt as a change agent. Using a log, at the end of each 
meeting with set participants, I consistently wrote what I had learned, both on a personal level and as 
the change agent. My reflections are summarized in the last chapter. 
 
3.4 Setting and Set Participants 
 
My approach to investigating the micropolitics of organizational change has consisted of conducting 
group discussions with faculty members impacted by the implementation and the change process. Out 
of a total of 272 faculty members (at the time the research was conducted), 13 members had adopted 
online teaching, and about 25 members were being directly or indirectly impacted by the change, and 
were actively resisting it at the time of the research. 
 
My selection criteria of set participants were the following: (1) in the case of those who already had 
adopted online learning (the adopters), I mostly selected those who had at least a year’s worth of 
experience teaching online so that the person had accumulated sufficient knowledge about what it 
implies (those with less experience would not be excluded as they could learn from their most 
experienced colleagues). In the case of those resisting online learning (the resistors), I targeted those 
whose course was supposed to be offered online at the time of the research but implementation was 
delayed because of a lack of interest on their part; (2) I chose participants who were vocal about their 
position on online learning in such a way that I knew where they stood: there was no ambiguity about 
how they view online learning. I particularly did not want to end up with having recruited exclusively 
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I first made contact with potential subjects. I sent an e-mail to approximately 40 individuals (who were 
not informed of who else was contacted) to ask for their voluntary participation in the research. The 
e-mail was sent at the beginning of April 2017 to the 25 members who felt impacted negatively by the 
implementation and were vocal about it, and 15 e-mails were sent to those who had adopted online 
teaching (the 13 faculty members who adopted online teaching almost a year before the research, and 
2 new adopters who had their first experience with online teaching in January 2017). The rationale was 
to put in place learning sets made up of those resisting the change, as well as those who have already 
adopted online learning, so that we have a variety of perspectives in the learning sets. In the e-mail, 
participants were informed of the reason why they were contacted, and the e-mail briefly outlined the 
objectives of the research, and the methodology (action research, data collection and transcription, 
confidentiality issues, and communication of final results), and the informed consent form was 
attached to the e-mail. They were also informed that during the first meeting with those agreeing to 
participate in the research, the study would be described in more detail, and relevant documentation 
would be distributed (meeting schedules, information about action research and action learning, etc.). 
The consent form would be reviewed, and questions would be answered. Consent would be 
documented via signature by all participants, on site. Eight 3-hour long meetings were scheduled, 
approximately 2 meetings every month for 4 months. This would allow for two full cycles of the action 
research process (constructing the issues, planning action, taking action, and evaluating action, 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). 
 
Out of the 40 e-mails sent, 32 positive responses were received during the following two weeks. The 
recipients of the e-mail were informed that they needed to respond in the course of the following two 
weeks so that the research could take place during the months of April to September: this is the period 
during which most participants do not take on teaching assignments. It was assumed that they would 
have time to actively participate in the research, which proved to be the case. An e-mail was sent to 
those 32 who had responded to confirm their participation in the research. A week later, 4 participants 
declined to participate in the research without providing any reason, and 4 did not respond. A total of 
24 participants agreed to be part of the research, 14 of them resisting the change, and 10 already 
teaching online. The 24 participants were divided into 4 groups of 6 participants each to foster 
interactions among them. Each group comprised a certain number of “Resistors” (R) and “Adopters” 
(A). Table 1 below describes the group composition and key relevant characteristics of research 
participants. (A indicates an Adopter of online teaching, and R a Resistor of online teaching at the time 
the research was initiated in April 2017.) Between April and September 2017, 8 meetings were held 
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Table 1: Group Composition and Key Relevant Characteristics of Research Participants 
 
The initial distinction between adopters and resistors proved useful in setting up the learning sets as I 
wanted to gather data both from those who actively participated in the development of online learning 
and were engaged in the change process, and those opposing it. Using the distinction made by Crossan 
et al. (2016), adopters are those whose attitude towards change is one of enthusiasm and willingness, 
and resistors are those who project an attitude of opposition and reluctance. Gradually, as meetings 
took place, resistors projected a more positive attitude towards the change. 
 
In the selection process, I did not take into account participants’ prior (positive and negative) 
experience with online learning, level of appointment, tenured/contracted, length of time at the 
school, age, or other characteristics that have been associated with online learning adoption, primarily 
because I did not have this kind of information about everyone when I extended the invitation and, 
secondly, because my focus was on the micropolitical behaviour that they exhibited in the context of 
the change induced by online learning implementation. Nonetheless, in the course of the research, a 
few would mention some of those factors as being important in the adoption process of online 
learning. Throughout the meetings, this type of (sociodemographic) information was made available 
by most set participants and is presented in Table 1 above. 
 
Some of those characteristics might have played a role in the comments made by the participants and 
influenced the findings. For example, those who are tenured might have felt free to express their 
opposition to the change since there were no consequences for them in doing so, as opposed to those 
who were not yet tenured and might have been more reluctant to oppose the change because they 
thought it might prevent them being promoted. Also, those with more experience with traditional 
teaching might have acquired certain habits that might be more difficult to change and they would 
oppose the initiative. They might also rely on their experience, positive or negative, to make a case for 
or against online learning. While those factors could have influenced the data, they were not taken 
into account when analyzing it. 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
 
Approximately 8 meetings were held with each group; the first four meetings were for the first action 
research cycle, and the other four, the second action research cycle. The first meeting of each of the 
four groups consisted of “constructing the issues,” the second, of “planning action,” the third, of 
“taking action,” and the last, of “evaluating action.” Typically, for each of the four phases of the action 
research process, I would ask the following generic questions: 
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(1) Constructing the issues 
What were the events that you experienced recently, in 
relation to the change brought about by the 
implementation of online learning? 
What was the impact of those events on you and others? 
What are the short/long term consequences? 
(2) Planning action 
What might explain people’s reactions towards these 
events? 
Why do some people react positively, others 
negatively? 
What should be done about that? 
 
(4) Evaluating action 
What actions brought about the desired results? 
Why were these actions more effective than others? 
 
(3) Taking action 
How can one take action in a way that is most beneficial 
to all? 
What are those actions? When should they be taken? 
With whom? 
What are the anticipated outcomes? Why? 
 
Answers to those questions brought up more specific questions pertaining to micropolitics such as 
“How is this event an example of loss of power? What goals are you pursuing in that particular context? 
What are the goals that others might pursue? Why? How might they achieve their goals using their 
power? What are your stakes? What are the stakes of your colleagues? Of the school? What would be 
the most appropriate strategy to use in that context? Why? Who are your allies? Your opponents? 
What power bases do you have to exert influence? What are the power bases of other, important 
stakeholders?” A series of guiding questions (Figure 4) were addressed in the course of the meetings. 
Guiding questions are questions that are related to context and which help to enact the action research 
cycle and the action learning process. They are questions pertaining to the action research process 
itself and relating to management practice of conducting change, and action learning questions are 
questions related more specifically to set participants. I kept the focus on these questions as the action 




Figure 4: Guiding Questions Asked in the Meetings 
 
I facilitated each of the meetings. The meetings were held in the morning and the afternoon, on the 
premises where the participants work. Meetings took place in a room where they apparently felt free 
to express themselves. Interruptions were minimal (e.g., a participant leaves for a few moments to 
take an important call). From 8 to 10 chairs were arranged around a large round table, and no place 
was assigned initially. In the course of the meetings, participants mostly sat at the same place they 
chose to sit in the first meeting. Refreshments (coffee and water) were provided. Participants took a 
10-minute break at mid-point in the meeting. Most of the meetings started on time. Discussions were 
recorded using a Sony ICDBX140 Digital Voice Recorder. All meetings were held in French. Data took 









• How do faculty members 
frame online learning?
• How do they frame the 
underlying change in 




• How can I engage resistors 
in the change?
• How can I maintain the 
support of those who 
have adopted the change?
Planning action
• What micropolitical 
actions do I need to take 




• How successful was I in 
engaging resistors and 
maintaining the support of 
adopters?
• What might explain the 
outcomes?
Evaluating action
• How do I frame online 
learning and the change 
resulting from it?
• How do I frame the 
consequences of my 
actions? And why?
Experience
• Why should one support 
online learning?




• What is the best way to 
gain power and influence 
through micropolitical 
behaviour?
• How can I increase gains 
and minimize losses?
Judge
• Has the course of action 
taken yielded the 
anticipated outcomes?
• What do I learn from this?
• What is the next step? 
Decide
3 5 72 4 6
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3.5.1 Forms of Data Collected 
 
All of the data collected come from dialogues and discussions during the set meetings. The topic of 
micropolitics was brought out more explicitly in the second action research cycle even if the research 
subjects were all informed in the invitation that the research dealt with organizational micropolitics 
(Appendix A). During the first cycle, set participants were more reluctant to address the issue of 
micropolitics; when they did, they tended to assign such behaviour to those opposing the change. In 
the second cycle, many acknowledged that they had engaged in such behaviour and a clearer, more 
positive definition of political behaviour emerged in the discussions. My intention was to let 
participants raise the topic without my intervention and then to encourage them to share their 
accounts of their own experiences of micropolitical behaviour. In the course of the meetings, some 
used micropolitical behaviour to influence others, but their attempts were overt and acknowledged as 
such. In analyzing the data, I have used only what was shared in the learning sets as I did not have 
access to what was discussed among set participants outside the meetings. 
 
Finally, I used a log to take notes in each of the meetings. Many of my notes were reflections about my 
role as a change agent, about myself as a researcher, and about my interpretations of what I observed 
in the meetings. In my journal, I made two columns: the left hand column to write down some of the 
comments and non-verbal reactions of those participating in the meetings that appeared relevant, and 
the right hand column to take notes about how some of the items in the left hand column might shed 
some light on the research questions. Figure 5 below is a synthesis of the participant selection process 




Figure 5: Participant Selection Process and Meeting Schedules 
APRIL 2017
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Since the phases of the action research cycles for each of the four groups of participants overlapped, I 
was able to use data from one group to feed the following groups. For example, data obtained in the 
first phase of the first action research cycle for Group 1 helped me prepare questions to better grasp 
how participants in Group 2 experienced online learning implementation, and then use data obtained 





Figure 6: Overlapping Phases of the Action Research Cycles for the Four Groups of Participants 
 
Below is a summary of each group’s contextual background, and an overall description of the groups’ 
dynamics during the set meetings for the two action research cycles. 
 
3.5.1.1 Group 1 
 
The first group met in the last week of April 2017. It was the first meeting of the entire research 
process. I was becoming acquainted with my role as researcher/change agent. I am known by all 
members of the group, having worked with them on other institutional projects. I wrongly assumed 
that group dynamics would be constructive and evolve in such a way as to change the attitude of 
Participants 1-D, 1-E, and 1-F who, at the time, resisted the implementation of online learning. 
Everybody attended the first meeting, but attendance dropped by the third meeting. Participants 1-A 
and 1-C are enthusiastic adopters of online teaching, and have been with the university for over 10 
years. They were among the first to teach online. Participant 1-B was hired 8 months prior to the 
meeting, and has taught online ever since. Participant 1-C has a good reputation among her colleagues, 
but does not seem to have much influence over them. In the meetings, her point of view seldom 
contradicted those of others, even those of the resistors. Participant 1-D and 1-E are long-time faculty 
members, and are strong resistors: they have voiced their concerns about online teaching since the 
beginning, but are now being compelled to adapt their course content which would be offered online 
the following year. Participant 1-F appeared to be a “weak” resistor: he did not seem to support online 
teaching, but had only voiced his opposition privately to me. During the first three meetings, group 
dynamics evolved from “forming” in the first two meetings to “storming” (Tuchman, 1965) by the third 
meeting in June. Only 4 participants attended the meeting in June, Participants 1-D and 1-F being 
absent; prior to the meeting, they did not provide any reasons as to why they did not attend. I met 






























































































































































































































































































































































An example of how data from one phase of the action research 
cycle for one group fed the next phase of the following groups. 
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They felt that the first two meetings were a waste of time, and that whatever they would say or do, 
their concerns would not be heard by management. They appeared to have talked to each other 
because the reasons they provided for not attending the third meeting were very similar. The dynamics 
of this meeting among the participants in attendance were very positive as two resistors, one of whom 
had not voiced his concerns against online teaching before (but his absence spoke volumes), were 
absent. Only one resistor, Participant 1-E, attended. Participants 1-D and 1-F returned to attend the 
following meetings, and their attitude was much more constructive in those final meetings. 
 
3.5.1.2 Group 2 
 
The second group of participants first met in the third week of June. Like the first group, three adopters 
and three resistors were brought together so that the adopters would have the possibility of expressing 
themselves and offering their input about online learning implementation to counterbalance the view 
that resistors had that this entire project was doomed to fail. Based on prior contacts that I had with 
the three resistors, Participants 2-D and 2-E appeared to be less forcefully opposed to online learning 
implementation than participants 1-D, 1-E, and 1-F of the first group. Participant 2-F is a strong resistor. 
It appeared, though, that the latter had influenced the former prior to the first meeting as similar 
comments were made by Participants 2-D, 2-E, and 2-F about the idea that management was not 
interested in considering faculty members’ concerns in the implementation process. All six participants 
of the second group have been long term faculty members. They have met before, but have not been 
involved in any particular project together. Participant 2-B is very much focused on rules and 
procedures, and tends to be somewhat authoritarian. Participant 2-C is an adopter, but his reputation 
as a teacher is not very good: students often complain about his teaching methods, both in-class and 
online. Participant 2-F is a “strong” resistor as he seems to be greatly influenced by Participant 1-D 
with whom he shares certain deeply held views on academic freedom; he believes that faculty 
members should never be told what to do, and should be free to participate in the projects of their 
choice. 
 
The group dynamics among participants were driven by the adopters, namely Participants 2-A and 2-
B. Those two participants were willing to share their experience, as well as the influence “strategies” 
that they used to overcome some of the obstacles they encountered, namely in obtaining resources 
to help them deal with particular technical issues, with other set members. They sometimes 
overshadowed the resistors, who must have felt compelled to support a positive view of online 
learning implementation. Consequently, the effect of conformity (Asch, 1956) might have played a role 
in the dynamics among set members. This group engaged in action learning more directly than any 
other group as they tested some of the influencing strategies discussed in the set. 
 
3.5.1.3 Group 3 
 
The third group was made up of 2 “strong” adopters and 4 “weak” resistors. The group was 
purposefully configured that way so that the views of the resistors did not overshadow those of the 
adopters. All set members are long-time faculty members. Many of them have worked together on 
other assignments in the past, and have developed a strong sense of teamwork. Some have had 
contact with participants from other groups, especially with Participant 1-C who is an influential 
adopter with a very good reputation. Participants 3-A, 3-B, and 3-D have had contact with her, and 
discussed some of the issues that were addressed in other groups. I know all of the set members very 
well, and have developed friendly relationships with some of them (Participants 3-C and 3-D). Other 
set members were aware of this, and I was careful not to let those relationships interfere with the 
research process. Even though all set members are long-time faculty members, three of them 
(Participants 3-C, 3-E, and 3-F) were more or less interested in participating in the research: they had 
seen projects come and go within the university, and many fail. They were somewhat reluctant to get 
involved in an action learning process that would yield nothing much, in their view. 
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Their scepticism proved contagious to a certain extent, which could explain why the second action 
research cycle was not completed. Two participants (3-A and 3-B) were in line to obtain a promotion, 
so they kept a very low profile throughout the entire process: their participation in the discussions was 
sporadic, and they never once challenged other participants’ perspectives, even if those points of view 
contradicted one another. 
 
The group dynamics were somewhat positive at the start of the first action research cycle but became 
much less constructive at the beginning of the second cycle. A factor that might explain this is the “non-
involvement” of Participants 3-A and 3-B, who chose to remain silent or support contradictory views 
on the issues discussed, allowing the resistors to control the agenda. I tried unsuccessfully to steer the 
discussions toward a more constructive mode. At the start of the second action research cycle, things 
went astray: the participants would initiate and engage in discussions that had nothing to do with 
online learning implementation, and some comments fuelled opposition to this project: in other 
words, the “weak” resistors (Participants 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, and 3-F) became “strong” resistors. They had 
more reasons to be opposed to the project than reasons to support it. 
 
3.5.1.4 Group 4 
 
The final group brought together the most senior faculty members: among them, 4 “strong” resistors, 
and 2 “strong” adopters. I had hoped that by bringing together those with extensive working 
experience within the school, discussions would shed some light on underlying, historical issues related 
to online learning implementation. Among the resistors, there appeared to be a coalition of three 
(Participants 4-C, 4-D, and 4-F) who consistently shared the same concerns, and voiced the same 
apprehensions about online teaching in each of the meetings they attended. Furthermore, they have 
been among the most vocal opponents of online learning implementation: they would challenge 
management publicly on their decision to implement online learning, and some would even resort to 
threats if the project went forward. I had cultivated strong, positive relationships with the two 
adopters (Participants 4-A and 4-B), thus alienating the resistors who, nevertheless, contributed to 
advancing the discussions in the initial meetings. There had been implicit competition among some 
group participants: Participant 4-F was recently involved in a project that failed, while Participant 4-A 
was involved in a similar project that succeeded. There was intense competition among Participants 4-
B and 4-C for financial resources when the meetings took place: each had hoped to obtain much 
needed financing to move their other projects forward, but in the face of declining public funding (in 
2017), money was rather scarce, and they were told by management that they would not get the 
money. Participants 4-A, 4-C, and 4-F were a few years away from retirement (4-F just retired in June, 
2019). Participant 4-E refused to participate in online learning implementation despite recurring 
pressure from management. He threatened to quit and go to another university. Stakes are high 
among this group. 
 
I was apprehensive about the meetings with this group, because as the change agent, I could have 
become the focus of the resistors’ frustrations with the project. Instead, the group dynamics evolved 
in such a way that the already tense relations among adopters and resistors increased in intensity and 
became more predominant as the meetings took place. The two groups became polarized, which 
brought about the emergence of two clearly defined subgroups: the two adopters got together to 
justify online learning implementation, and the four resistors worked together to find arguments 
against the project. The micropolitics underlying the project were never more apparent than in this 
group. I found myself having to manage the internal politics of this group as each subgroup regularly 
tried to persuade me to side with them. The politics had to be managed, both during the meetings and 
outside the meetings: I would be the target of influence attempts from both adopters and resistors. 
To neutralize these attempts, I had to remind them of the research objectives, and steer clear of any 




3.6 Data Analysis 
 
Audio files containing approximately 85 hours of discussions held in French were transcribed by a 
certified steno typist. Those transcripts were then coded using N’Vivo 10 software for Windows to 
classify, sort and arrange information, and to examine relationships in the data using thematic analysis 
(Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2012), and more specifically theoretical thematic analysis (Braun and 
Clarke, 2012, p. 58) “[…] where the researcher brings to the data a series of concepts […] to code and 
interpret the data.” Thematic analysis conducted within a constructionist framework cannot and does 
not seek to focus on motivation or individual psychologies, but instead seeks to theorize the socio-
cultural contexts, and structural conditions, that lead to the individual accounts that are provided. 
Following Creswell’s (2013) recommendations for phenomenological analysis, “significant statements, 
sentences, or quotes that provide an understanding of how the participants experienced the 
phenomenon” (p. 82) were highlighted in the transcripts. The concepts that I used to code the data 
were derived from the theoretical framework, which means that concepts such as power, influence, 
strategy, coalitions, alliances, games, etc. were used as coding categories. As codes “can provide a 
pithy summary of a portion of data” (Braun and Clarke, 2012, p. 61) or be descriptive of the data, I 
have chosen to follow that route as I felt this would capture the essence of what research participants 
shared in the learning sets. In reality, codes are often a mix of the descriptive (what the participants 
said) and the interpretative (how I think what they said relates to theoretical concepts derived from 
the framework). 
 
At the beginning of the analysis, the amount of data made it very difficult to sort out what was most 
relevant, and I ended up with many more descriptive codes than interpretative codes. As I went back 
to the data with a better grasp of the theoretical framework, it became easier to determine which 
codes were relevant to my research. Once I had identified a code that would capture the essence of 
what was said by participants and could be linked to the theoretical framework, I went back to the 
data to identify the next excerpt to which the code could apply. If it did not, I asked myself if a new 
code should be generated. As I was progressing, I modified and refined some of the codes that I had 
established earlier. All in all, I generated 43 different codes which represent first-order concepts 
(categories of meaning assigned to data). This first cycle of coding was done using N’Vivo. I then 
searched manually for emerging themes among those first-order concepts. At this point, coding 
gradually shifted to thematic analysis. A theme “captures something important about the data in 
relation to the research question.” (Braun and Clarke, 2012, p. 63) Similarities and overlap among first-
order concepts gave rise to 15 second-order themes which are more abstract (Saldana, 2015). Finally, 
I was able to aggregate second-order themes into 11 second-order theoretical aggregate dimensions 
(Gioia, Corley and Hamilton, 2012) which can be linked directly to theory. Using concepts from the 
theoretical framework, it was easier to analyse data and assess convergence among themes (Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2012) and to come up with second-order theoretical aggregate 
dimensions. 
 
This entire process can be captured visually in a data structure that “provides a graphic representation 
of how we progressed from raw data to terms and themes in conducting the analyses—a key 







Figure 7: Data Structure (based on Gioia, Corley, and Hamilton, 2012) 
 
Convergence of the first order concepts derived from statements and sentences obtained during the 
meetings was assessed and gave rise to second order themes which described the way participants 
experienced the phenomenon (change) and the underlying political dynamics. When these second 
order themes appeared in more than one set, they were aggregated in dimensions that would help to 
answer the research questions. Thus, through theoretical thematic analysis, common experiences of 
participants (which gave rise to dimensions) emerged and are discussed in the following chapters. For 
example, at one point during the first action research cycle, set participants in three groups agreed 
that a collaborative strategy should have been put forward by management to increase the likelihood 
of the change succeeding (aggregate dimension). Many comments were made that it is important to 
convert opponents to the change into allies (second order theme) which management did not do at 
the onset of the project. To achieve that, set participants argued that being more visible to change 
recipients, managing relationships with them, acknowledging interdependency and demonstrating 
that online learning is relevant (first order concepts) constituted the best approach. Figure 8 
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• 29 meetings of approximately 3 hours 
each took place with the research 
participants:
8 meetings were held with Group 1
8 meetings were held with Group 2
6 meetings were held with Group 3
7 meetings were held with Group 4
• 2 full action research cycles (made up 
of 4 distinct phases – constructing the 
issues, planning action, taking action 
and evaluating action) were possible 
with groups 1 and 2.
• The second action research cycle with 
groups 3 and 4 was not completed.
• 85 hours of discussions (in French) 
were recorded.
• These discussions were transcribed by 
a certified steno typist.
Data Analysis
• The transcripts were then coded using 
N'Vivo 10 software for Windows to 
classify, sort and arrange information.
• Data were examined using theoretical 
thematic analysis.
• 43 codes – first-order concepts – were 
generated.
• 15 second-order themes were 
identified.
• 11 second-order theoretical aggregate 
dimensions were derived from the 
data.
Data Discussion
• Chapter 4 presents data obtained in the 
first action research cycle.
• Chapter 5 presents data obtained in the 
second action research cycle.
39 
 
3.7 Ethical Issues 
 
Several ethical issues needed to be addressed in conducting this research: (1) handling potential 
conflicts that may arise by mixing adopters and resistors; (2) dealing with the risks of discussing political 
behaviours and inviting participants to see themselves and others as political actors; (3) managing 
people’s unwillingness to disclose information on micropolitical behaviour in the presence of others; 
and (4) possible Hawthorne effects and other related phenomena. 
 
In addressing the first issue, it was made clear, from the onset and in each of the learning sets, that 
resistance to change is not necessarily a threat to the change process, but rather an opportunity to 
engage participants in an open and honest dialogue to address their concerns. Dialogical inquiry taps 
into the information underlying resistance to change (Dent and Goldberg, 1999). A dialogue with 
resistors was initiated to “engage [them] in constructing what the issues are” (Coghlan and Brannick, 
2010, p. 9). Thinking about their own assumptions about resistance to change, and challenging them 
shed light on how underlying “beliefs, values, assumptions, ways of thinking, strategies and behaviour” 
(Coghlan and Brannick, 2010, p. 18) shaped the non-adoption process. 
 
The second issue was tackled by framing political behaviour as a way to influence others. Influence can 
be used as a means to promote the change or to oppose it, which then takes the form of resistance 
strategies that might be totally legitimate. This was accomplished in the initial meetings. Coghlan and 
Brannick (2010) argue that “it may be that organizational members embrace problems with a sense of 
loss, wondering about the organization’s ability to reach a satisfactory resolution and often preferring 
to remain somewhat detached and uncommitted” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010, p. 54). This accounted, 
in part, for resistors’ reluctance to participate in the change process, and presented an opportunity for 
me to engage in second-person activities, such as building relationships with them, and “listening well 
and having a range of ways of interacting with them so that collaborative inquiry and joint action can 
take place” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010, p. 29). This was the purpose of the following meetings. 
Moreover, framing the issue as an opportunity has given rise to divergent thinking (Coghlan and 
Brannick, 2010), which supported the problematizing process and opened paths to problem resolution. 
Second-person activities helped reveal “embedded assumptions” about the change (Palmer and 
Dunford, 2008). Finally, framing problems through “public reflection” (Raelin, 2001) within the learning 
sets has helped in exploring claims and assumptions about online learning (Gold, Holman, and Thorpe, 
2002). 
 
The third ethical issue posed the most important challenge as people are undoubtedly reluctant to 
disclose their own micropolitical behaviour when it only serves their interests. Each participant signed 
a consent form (Appendix B). I addressed ethical issues that have arisen in the learning sets when some 
set participants seemed to put their own self-interests above organizational interests. Hilsen (2006) 
argues that “the focus in [action] research should be on the best interests of the other.” (p. 28) While 
remaining truthful and authentic, I aimed to engage faculty members to “work in the best interests of 
others,” and to encourage them to participate actively in the success of online learning 
implementation by demonstrating that they stand to benefit from the change. The following tasks in 
the meetings helped to neutralize the negative use of power that might impede the change (Seo, 
2003): addressing ethical issues using “critical reflexivity” (Cunliffe, 2004), discussing the determinants 
of unethical behaviour in the organization (Trevino, 1986), addressing what was perceived to be 
devious, unethical behaviour (Batten and Swab, 1965; and Gandz and Murray, 1980), and promoting 
the ethical use of power (Cavanagh, Moberg, and Velasquez, 1981). 
 
As for the last issue, Hawthorne effects and other related phenomena seemed minimal: research 
shows that consequences of research participation for behaviors being investigated do exist, although 
little can be known with certainty about the conditions under which they operate, their mechanisms 
of effects, or their magnitudes (McCambridge, Witton, and Elbourne, 2014). 
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My ability to manage these issues was influenced by three factors: preunderstanding, role duality, and 
internal politics. Taking into account these three factors and managing them effectively helped me 
maintain my position as an insider action researcher within my school. Preunderstanding refers to 
explicit and tacit knowledge that I have accumulated over the years. I have worked in my organization 
for over fifteen years, and have acquired tacit knowledge of the organization’s culture, norms and 
traditions (the components of “pervasive” power). My familiarity with the internal political landscape 
was enhanced through the learning sets. Many adopters engaged in discussions that revealed a much 
more complex landscape than I had anticipated. I also learned that this landscape was fluid and that 
certain individuals had more power than others to alter this landscape. This proved useful in preparing 
questions to pose to set participants. 
 
Role duality refers to my role as both a change agent and an action researcher. Management placed 
me in charge of managing the change related to the implementation of online learning in my 
organization, and holds me accountable for this endeavour. My official role is that of a change agent. 
Conducting research while implementing this change had the potential to create confusion: How 
would I be perceived by faculty members? Could they become suspicious of my motives? My roles as 
researcher and change agent overlapped in certain instances (more specifically when interacting with 
those resisting online learning implementation). As Coghlan and Brannick (2010) recommend, I 
cultivated role flexibility and permeability, and negotiated stakeholder demands when possible. For 
example, following the first action research cycle, participants and I agreed that the change had to be 
conducted bottom-up instead of top-down so that resistors have a voice in how online learning was 
being implemented. This was a major shift in what I had considered my role to be: to steer the change 
with the help of resistors and accept that they exert their influence on the change process instead of 
imposing the views of management. Internal action researchers also “show a high potential for self-
destruction, particularly if roles and politics are not managed well” (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010, p. xi). 
Deciphering political agendas and understanding the origins of power struggles initiated by faculty 
members who, in their roles as “tempered radicals” (Attwood, 2007), could have derailed the project, 
are actions that I undertook. A clearer understanding of the internal political dynamics, and developing 
my skills as a “political entrepreneur” (Buchanan and Badham, 2008), including building alliances and 





I became aware that, in the action learning cycles, it was sometimes difficult to engage people in 
discussions about power, and more specifically, about how they used it to achieve personal goals. 
Power in organizations and political behaviour is often negatively connotated (Buchanan and Badham, 
1999). This might explain, at least partially, why some learning set participants were disinclined or 
unwilling to engage in conversations about power and organizational politics in everyday 
organizational settings. This poses a major challenge for research on the topic of power and internal 
politics (Coghlan and Brannick, 2010). It may seem paradoxical that organizational members will not 
engage in discussions about power and politics, as political activity is widely viewed as an important 
element in understanding organizational change (Demers, 2007). To increase our knowledge of the 
role that political activity plays in the context of organizational change, one needs to explore how 
people use their power to engage in political activity, and their underlying motivations (Hardy, 1995). 
 
Waters-Adams (1994, p. 197) considers the imperative to collaborate in action research to be suspect: 
“[…] although knowledge construction within action research may need collaboration for validity, the 
same process may also have acted against the likelihood of it happening” as people may be enthusiastic 
about working together at the onset of action research, and then the action research process may 
uncover underlying feelings and conflicting views impeding collaboration. This can result in “adverse 
social processes (e.g., groupthink, intimidation) [that] can undermine true participation” (Kidd and 
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Kral, 2005, p. 191). Although there are numerous discussions about why collaboration is essential in 
the action research process, “there is often very little recognition of how it is supposed to develop” 
(Waters-Adams, 1994, p. 198). I would argue that collaboration does not occur just by putting people 
together in a group and asking them to discuss what the issues are and how to interpret them; 
individual needs have to be met in the process: “the need for collaboration [is] intrinsically linked with 
the [individual] motivation for the inquiry” (p. 199). Wood and Gray (1991, p. 161) support the idea 
that stakeholders have “to derive some benefit (individual or collective) [that] makes collaboration 
possible.” Thus, the action researcher has to demonstrate how, through stakeholders’ mutual action, 
their individual needs and concerns can be met. This imposes on the researcher the necessity to 
negotiate collaboration with stakeholders by “going step-by-step through a process of negotiating 
authority, clarifying tasks and roles, and setting boundaries among the group members” (Ospina et al., 
2004, p. 49). Therefore, collaboration does not just occur by putting people together and asking them 
to have a discussion; it is an ongoing negotiation effort that takes work to contribute to creating the 
conditions for stakeholders’ participation in the action research process. 
 
In terms of meeting stakeholders’ interests in my project, Taylor (2002) has examined the pros and 
cons of online teaching, and recommends asking reflective questions to assess stakeholders’ interests 
in the action research process. Answering these questions helped to mitigate faculty members’ 
opposition to the change. Lack of information about the change and uncertainty may have fuelled their 
opposition. Some research participants seem to have adopted an avoidance conflict-management 
style (Meissonier and Houzé, 2010) which may have prevented them seeking pertinent information 
regarding the change. Engaging faculty members in the action research process by questioning the 
“salient features of the situation and underlying evidence, the desired outcomes for individuals, teams 
and the organization (taking into account interlevel dynamics), why these outcomes are desirable, and 
what actions would deliver these outcomes” (Dick, 2002, cited in Coghlan and Brannick, 2010, p. 78) 
helped to collectively address the need for change, the desired future and the work to be done. The 
fact that faculty members did not—yet—have the opportunity to participate in an open dialogue about 
the change and the desired outcomes may account for their resistance to the change. As Coghlan and 
Brannick (2010, p. 96) rightly point out: “resistance is a healthy, self-regulating manifestation which 
must be respected and taken seriously by the action researcher.” This reflects the current theoretical 





In this chapter, my goal was to provide a clear argument about my philosophical stance and the 
underlying research methodology for the study of micropolitical behaviour in my school. I contend that 
constructionism can shed some light on how faculty members gain and use their power to influence 
others in the change brought about by the implementation of online learning. Engaging research 
subjects in action learning to identify their micropolitical behaviour in their attempts to influence 
others, and to assess the effectiveness of these attempts would hopefully lead to new mental models 
to help solve the problem. As for the action research cycles, they would produce actionable knowledge 
in order to improve the way change is being managed in my school. The methodology is compatible 
with the approach taken by Crozier and Friedberg to study micropolitical behaviour. 
 
In the following two chapters, I present data which helped to answer questions in Figure 9 on the 
following page. I have chosen to present the data obtained for each of the four phases of the action 
research process as it makes it easier to understand how the change was affected by the micropolitical 
behaviour of the stakeholders. Chapter 4 describes data obtained during the first action research cycle, 
and Chapter 5, data obtained during the second action research cycle. Using the literature, an analysis 





Figure 9: Summary of the Questions Addressed in the Action Learning Process 






• How do I frame online learning and the 
change resulting from it?
• How do I frame the consequences of 





• How do faculty members frame online 
learning?
• How do they frame the underlying 
change in terms of outcomes and 
process?
Questions Addressed in the Learning Sets
• Is online learning relevant to the organization and to our students? Why?
• Is it being implemented properly?
• What could have been done differently?
• What were the events that you experienced recently, in relation to the change 
brought about by the implementation of online learning?
• What was the impact of those events on you and others?
• What are the short/long term consequences?





• Why should one support online 
learning?






• How can I engage resistors in the 
change?
• How can I maintain the support of 
those who have adopted the change?
Questions Addressed in the Learning Sets
• What might explain people's reactions towards these events?
• Why do some people react positively, others negatively?
• What should be done about that?





• What is the best way to gain power and 
influence by engaging in micropolitical 
behaviour?






• What micropolitical actions do I need 
to take to engage resistors and 
maintain adopters' support?
Questions Addressed in the Learning Sets
• How can one most effectively influence the change process so that it is most 
beneficial for all?
• What are the micropolitical strategies that might help the change move forward?
• What are those actions? When should they be taken? With whom?
• What are the anticipated outcomes? Why?





• Has the course of action taken yielded 
the anticipated outcomes?
• What do I learn from this?





• How successful was I in engaging 
resistors and maintaining the support 
of adopters?
• What might explain the outcomes?
Questions Addressed in the Learning Sets
• What actions brought about the desired results?
• Why were these actions more effective than others?
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CHAPTER 4: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST ACTION 
RESEARCH CYCLE 
 
The first action research cycle began with constructing the issues with faculty members. My goal was 
to better understand how faculty members framed online learning and the underlying change it 
entailed. Based on this understanding, I planned to take micropolitical action to engage resistors and 
maintain adopters’ support. I would then evaluate the effectiveness of those actions prior to initiating 
the following action research cycle. As for action learning, I hoped to help participants determine the 
current situation (online learning implementation was stalling, opposition was gaining momentum…) 
and reconstruct “the logic of situations from their experience” (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Helping 
set participants become aware of how they constructed the issue(s) was the first step in fostering 
learning. Bounded by their rationality, I encouraged them to expand their understanding of the issues 
(“Understand”), to assess the effectiveness of their previous micropolitical actions (“Judge”) that 
brought about the current situation, and to decide what should be the next step. 
 
4.1 The First Action Research Phase: Constructing the Issues 
 
In the initial phase of this first action research cycle, I was able to better understand how both adopters 
and resistors view online learning implementation and the rationale that they put forward to justify 
their stance. Very early on in the learning sets, the participants addressed the fact that the change was 
top-down, and that it was the catalyst to all the political activity surrounding it. Adopters quickly 
framed the change outcomes positively. They argued that the technology would yield positive 
outcomes mainly for our students. In most of the learning sets, adopters were less vocal than resistors 
about implementation and the way the change was being managed. They were more inclined to focus 
on the positive outcomes of the change, without offering any guarantee that those outcomes would 
materialize (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10: Positive Framing of the Change Outcomes by Adopters 
 
Some of those who framed the project in a more positive light (most of the adopters) apparently 
engaged in influence tactics to counter the influence attempts of those opposed to the project. They 
consistently argued that online learning would yield positive outcomes for all groups of stakeholders: 
faculty members, students and the university. However, at this point in time, their influence attempts 
did not have much effect on the resistors, who were more forceful in making their point. 
 
There were some early attempts by adopters in the learning sets to cast online learning 
implementation in a positive light in their efforts to support the change, but the negative view put 
forward by resistors remained largely overwhelming in each of the four groups, at least at the 
beginning. Strong adopters highlighted the positive outcomes of online learning implementation. For 
example, in the fourth group, the adopters took the lead and were the first to speak to outline the 
Online learning encourages faculty members to think 
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positive consequences of online learning implementation: it has forced them to rethink their 
pedagogy, it has allowed them more flexibility in interacting (online) with students, grades have gone 
up, and this has helped the university to become more competitive with other institutions which have 
already implemented online learning (Comment 4.4.3.1-2). Adopters’ comments clearly focussed on 
the positive impact that online learning can have on all stakeholders, mainly faculty, students and the 
university as a whole. These attempts can be interpreted as micropolitical behaviour to gather support 
for the change. The impact of such behaviour was not as strong as the impact of the behaviour that 
resistors engaged in to oppose the change. Nevertheless, adopters appeared to support the change by 
constantly stressing the positive outcomes of the change for themselves, for students, and for the 
university. 
 
Among the positive outcomes for faculty, adopters argued that online learning supports innovation 
(Comment 4.4.3.1-1) and allows for flexibility (Comment 4.4.3.1-2). Those comments were met with 
scepticism by strong resistors participating in the meetings: they argued that those outcomes do not 
benefit everyone, and faculty members are the ones who are the most negatively impacted by this 
endeavour (Comment 4.4.3.1-3). According to many adopters, although an enhanced learning 
experience and better grades were among the most important benefits for students, they were unable 
to provide proof to support their claim. Had they referred to the literature, they would have found 
compelling data to support their stance. Finally, the obvious benefits for the institution (online learning 
makes the university more competitive and provides increased revenue) did not have much impact on 
resistors, who maintained their claim that management was pursuing undisclosed goals in the project. 
Figure 11 offers a synthesis of the reasons given by resistors to oppose online learning implementation. 
 
 
Figure 11: Negative Framing of the Change Content and the Change Process by Resistors 
 
To a certain extent, opposition to change content by resistors was somewhat predictable as 
management, in their communication efforts to engage faculty members in online learning 
implementation, kept insisting on the positive outcomes that online learning would bring. Resistors 
disagreed, some more forcefully than others, and early on framed online learning in a negative way. 
In what appear to be attempts to generate greater opposition to the project, many resistors resorted 
to another influence strategy (a “game”) and overtly questioned the change process itself put forward 
by management. Some resistors would use both strategies to justify their stance against online 
learning implementation. Resistors framed management’s communication strategy as a “PR exercise” 
to entice faculty members to participate in the project, and “those gullible enough to do so” (i.e. the 
[Online learning is] another project that is doomed to fail, 
prior negative experiences, anecdotes of past projects 
that did not succeed
Insufficient information about the project, no shared 
vision, lack of resources to implement online learning, 
inconveniences in developing online courses
Perceived management's undisclosed intentions about the 
project, hidden agendas, real issues are not addressed
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adopters) were being led “to the slaughterhouse” (Comment 4.1.3.1-2). This vocabulary is an example 
of how intense the opposition of some resistors was towards online learning. To give legitimacy to 
their stance in challenging the content of the change, resistors engaged in two micropolitical strategies 




This was mainly a ploy adopted by those who had some kind of previous experience with institutional 
projects that had failed in the past. They did not trust management as they had witnessed many 
projects fail despite management’s assurance that those projects would succeed. In their attempt to 
fuel pessimism, resistors never explicitly addressed the underlying causes of such failures as some of 
them might have had a role to play in derailing those projects. They forcefully argued that newly hired 
faculty members should not support online learning implementation and should not blindly follow 
every project put forward by management: scepticism was in order (Comment 4.1.3.1-1). A strong 
resistor (Participant 3-F) talked about his disastrous experience with online teaching at another 
university. He had had some previous experience in teaching online and had not appreciated it. 
Without considering that the technology used in the current project has proven to be much more 
stable and reliable than that used at the institution where he used to teach, he insisted that online 
teaching was not for everyone: some like it, some do not; some have the abilities to teach online, and 
some lack the required abilities. His main argument was that the decision to teach online should be 
entirely voluntary (Comment 4.3.3.1-3): forcing people to engage in such an endeavour was surely 
doomed to fail. 
 
These comments (and similar ones) were obvious attempts to influence the less-experienced, newly 
hired faculty members to get them to oppose online learning implementation. These comments were 
somewhat deceptive (prior projects that had failed had nothing to do with online learning), but that 
was never brought up by adopters who were present and who knew that these comments were 
misleading. When I raised this issue, resistors resorted to another tactic: they couldn’t trust 
management as they had had “bad” (undisclosed) experiences with them before and were reluctant 
to engage in “another project that will fail—online learning is just a fad” (Participant 1-E). These 
comments intensified the lack of trust in management and gave credence to the belief that 
management had purposefully withheld crucial information from faculty members (Comment 4.1.3.1-
2). A common belief among resistors was that management was not credible, and whatever positive 
outcomes management anticipated from online learning would not happen. The project was doomed 
to fail, and that would be confirmed when people realized that anticipated positive outcomes would 
not materialize. 
 
Anticipating Negative Outcomes 
 
The second micropolitical behaviour that resistors engaged in to challenge online learning was to 
anticipate and predict negative outcomes from online learning implementation. Participant 1-E argued 
that this project was clearly aimed at reducing the costs of the institution’s functioning in the face of 
declining public funding, and not really at offering students more flexibility and an enhanced learning 
experience. When a discussion about personal versus collective outcomes was initiated, resistors 
consistently put the focus on the negative consequences that online learning would have on others 
(mostly the students) but not on themselves; for example, Participants 3-D and 3-E mentioned that 
online learning was diluting the quality of courses offered by the institution: 
 
“One has to agree that to teach online will never be the same as teaching in class… 
having the possibility of interacting face-to-face with students makes all the 
difference in the world! This is why students come to school: they want to have the 
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opportunity to talk to professors… this makes it all worthwhile for them!” 
(Participant 3-D) (Comment 4.3.3.1-1) 
 
For the most part, discussions that took place in the learning sets remained largely unfavourable to 
online learning implementation. If the project was to move forward, nothing positive would come of 
it. The obvious lack of trust in management might have compelled many resistors to question the way 
the change was being managed. In what appear to be undisclosed attempts to derail online learning 
implementation, some resistors challenged the change process itself that was (and is currently) used 
to implement online learning. In doing so, they used three micropolitical strategies: overtly questioning 





Clearly, many resistors lacked trust in management. This was deepened by the perception that 
management intentionally withheld information about the project (Comment 4.1.3.1-2), which in turn 
fuelled resistors’ claim that the real issue—and management’s undisclosed intention, in the face of 
declining public funding—was to reduce the costs of the institution’s operations by implementing 
online learning. This strategy of overtly questioning intentions put forward by management to justify 
their decision to implement online learning, to suggest that management had hidden agendas and was 
not addressing the “real” issues (i.e. the issues faced by faculty members), appeared to be 
micropolitical behaviour used by resistors to discredit those who had initiated the project. 
 
Negatively Assessing the Change Process 
 
The argument that management was pursuing undisclosed objectives and had hidden agendas 
pertaining to online learning implementation was met with scepticism by some as those making these 
claims had no proof whatsoever. Resistors then quickly resorted to another strategy to challenge the 
change process by negatively assessing the actions (and mitigating measures, or lack thereof) put 
forward to implement online learning, and by complaining that all of this was wasting valuable 
institutional resources: 
 
“The number of hours that I put in my work is already too high: I will never find time 
to adapt my course material… by the way, why should we get involved? Let younger 
faculty members take the responsibility for the project. I’ll be retired in four years… 
I don’t want to waste the last four years implementing something that others will 
benefit from…” (Participant 4-F) (Comment 4.4.3.1-3) 
 
“This [the project] is all a waste of resources…” (Participant 4-D) (Comment 4.4.3.1-
6) 
 
A common understanding of the importance of having the right information from the beginning to 
build a shared vision of the project gradually emerged from the discussions in each of the four groups. 
Management had obviously failed to offer a compelling vision of online learning implementation. 
 
Justifying Lack of Participation in the Project 
 
In the second group, Participant 2-B (an adopter) prompted a discussion about the idea that the 
decision came from management, and that they expected faculty members to follow the decision, 
whether they liked it or not. Pressed by other participants to know if Participant 2-B would have 
actively participated in the project if a colleague had put it forward, she said that she would not have 
participated because of time issues. Her argument (to comply with the decision) did not have much 
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impact on other set members. It is in this group that some resistors started to develop an argument to 
justify their “non-participation” in the project. Because the decision to implement online learning was 
imposed on them, and the change was being conducted top-down, many resistors felt that their 
resistance was justified and legitimate. In their attempt to justify their lack of participation in the 
project, they argued that if they were given an opportunity to question management, they might have 
agreed to participate; they essentially blamed management for their lack of involvement: 
 
“We would have liked it if management had taken the time to answer some of the 
questions we have about the project… it still is not clear how many courses will be 
transformed to be offered online… what is the timeline? What training will we be 
given…?” (Participant 2-F) (Comment 4.2.3.1-2) 
 
Some argued that the decision to teach online should rest entirely with the individual: top-down 
managerial decisions to “coerce” people to teach online are bound to be met with resistance. This 
effort to legitimize resistance appeared to be a recurring tactic that resistors engaged in to derail the 
project: justifying lack of participation as a way to resist top-down managerial decisions. 
 
In the next phase of the action research cycle, I devised an action plan to engage resistors in online 
learning implementation and to maintain the support of adopters. I developed the action plan using 
data from learning sets: adopters were more than willing to share how they tried to gather support for 
online learning implementation. Using this data, I came up with an action plan that might serve to 
engage resistors in the project. Also, discussions about failed attempts made by management to get 
people to participate in online learning implementation taught me what not to do. 
 
4.2 The Second Action Research Phase: Planning Action 
 
In this second phase, my goal was to plan action to engage resistors in the change based on data 
obtained in the first phase of the action research cycle. Also, I wanted to maintain (and hopefully 
increase) the support of those who had adopted the change. Finding answers to questions such as 
“Why should one support online learning? What may be the benefits of supporting/opposing online 
learning?” would hopefully help find ways to engage resistors. 
 
I developed an action plan that had two goals: discussions during the first phase of the action research 
cycle in the learning sets showed that adopters were not seeking to gain influence over the change 
process. They were relatively passive in the context of this top-down change. Management was 
implementing online learning that adopters felt was beneficial to all stakeholders. Adopters might not 
have felt the need to gain power and exert influence as management was “taking care of business.” 
Consequently, the first goal was to plan action so that adopters gain power and actively influence the 
change process. The second goal of the action plan was to “sell the change” to resistors. It appeared 
that they did not have much influence over the change process, and were trying to gain power to 
actively influence the change process and derail it. Before they gained too much power, I was hoping 
to engage them in the change. I needed to find ways to get them to reframe online learning in a more 
positive way. Extensive discussions in the learning sets offered some cues on how to do that. For 
instance, data obtained provided information about how faculty members made sense of the actions 
taken by management to implement online learning, which would prove helpful in formulating a 
narrative to counteract the efforts made by resistors to generate opposition to the change. 
 
Management (and, to a lesser extent, adopters) had engaged in micropolitical behaviour to generate 
support for the change, and resistors tried to generate opposition to the change, both in an apparent 
attempt to bring together the largest number of adopters/resistors to facilitate/impede online learning 
implementation. Aggregated data from the learning sets show that adopters relied on five different 
micropolitical strategies to support their narrative (Figure 12), and resistors, on two (Figure 13). 
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Using some of those strategies put forward by adopters might help me more effectively engage faculty 
members who were not participating in the learning sets. 
 
 
Figure 12: Micropolitical Strategies for Selling the Change 
 
Indeed, adopters apparently engaged in several micropolitical games to generate support for the 
change in their effort to “sell” the change to many people as possible: 
 
Making a Case for Online Learning 
 
Challenging the various interpretations about online learning appeared to be one way to convince 
others to participate in this endeavour. Strong adopters were the ones who initiated these discussions, 
mostly in the first and second group of participants, in their efforts to offer a different perspective on 
online learning. These rhetorical attempts to influence other set members (mostly resistors) were not 
very successful as resistors had already framed the project as certain to fail. In a way, resistors were 
successful in “contaminating” the discourse about online learning implementation. For instance, 
adopters tried making a case for online learning through compelling arguments; this was useful in 
generating some support for the project, which quickly faded as the project moved forward. For 
example, Participants 1-A and 1-C shared the information they had gathered about the project: they 
had met with management the week before, and they provided other set members statistical data 
showing a growing interest in online learning among the institution’s students. (These data were based 
on the 2009 survey on students’ perceptions of online learning, and their intention to enrol in such 
courses.) I was asked to validate those statistics, which I did. Participants agreed that those numbers 
were compelling (over 88% of those surveyed mentioned that they would enrol in online courses if 
they had the chance), and a shift in the group dynamics took place. For instance, Participants 1-A and 
1-B took the lead and reframed the issue of online learning implementation in a much more positive 




This event changed the group dynamics which became much more positive, temporarily at least. A 
discussion followed about ways that “tempered radicals” (organizational members who want to 
change the system from inside – Meyerson and Scully, 1995) might exert influence to attain both their 
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Participant 1-C volunteered to meet with management to share the set’s concerns about the 
implementation of online learning: since she has experience within the institution, and a good 
reputation, set members decided that this would be the first step towards gaining access to 
management about this change that was imposed on them. These discussions about micropolitical 
strategy are illustrative of how behaviour can be interpreted as influence attempts and power plays. 
The ability to reach out to others to gather information and obtain access to much needed resources 
in order to actively participate in online learning implementation was interpreted as an effective 
micropolitical game involving allies: 
 
“We met with Mr. X who was more than willing to answer our questions… Despite 
the fact that the project has met with so much resistance, he is very optimistic that 
it will succeed. He provided us with lots of info that we did not have before…” 
(Participant 2-A) (Comment 4.2.3.2-1) 
 
Allies (adopters) were helpful in building a common vision of the change, mostly in the second group 
of participants, and planned to engage faculty members less willing to participate in the project by 
sharing with them the information they had obtained: 
 
“We should go out there and let others know about this… we will need to work with 
them… I have two colleagues who will be teaching the course next year. They are 
not willing to participate in the project… not yet. They obviously don’t have this 
information, and management has done a lousy job of sharing information with 
them… if they learn what we know, they will most certainly agree to participate in 
online learning implementation…” (Participant 2-B) (Comment 4.2.3.2-3) 
 
A few adopters agreed that they would talk to their most reluctant colleagues about the project, and 
share what they had learned from management, in their attempts to garner support for online learning 
implementation and come up with a shared vision of the project. There was agreement among learning 
sets that developing alliances can serve to increase one’s own power and influence; allies can provide 
information that may help frame the issue differently, which might assist in determining the most 
appropriate course of action. Also, information is power, as Participant 2-B mentioned, and adopters 
can share it to get others to support a project, and to actively participate. Those who are most vocal 
against a project have to be heard in order to influence them to change their stance. 
 
Promoting a Positive View of the Change 
 
Promoting a positive view of the change was another micropolitical behaviour to gather support for 
online learning implementation used by quite a few adopters: when asked why they had agreed to 
participate in online learning implementation, Participants 3-A and 3-B responded as follows: 
 
“I think it is a great learning experience: getting to know how to use the technology, 
getting some advice about how we can improve our teaching techniques… this has 
proven to be quite worthwhile.” (Participant 3-A) (Comment 4.3.3.2-1) 
 
“Not to mention the flexibility that online teaching permits: I can teach from home, 
in my basement, without having to take the car and drive to the university… I know 
a colleague from [another university] that gives talks on the benefits of online 
teaching: we should invite him…” (Participant 3-B) (Comment 4.3.3.2-2) 
 
Many adopters felt that management had not devoted much energy to promoting the project, and 
that left considerable opportunity for resistors to impose their views on others. In their efforts to make 
their case for online learning, adopters had no counterarguments to offer to those opposed to the 





Discussions about ways to obtain much needed resources that could be shared with resistors to get 
them to participate in online learning clearly indicated that the ability to decipher and build 
relationships with powerful organizational actors, and to use this “map” to influence the right people, 
was a valuable micropolitical skill that many adopters planned to use. Ideas such as including 
colleagues and other departments in supporting the strategy, and involving outsiders, like consultants, 
to gain credibility, were mentioned in some of the sets. Some adopters had a lot of experience in 
dealing politically with management, as they focused more on relationship building with members of 
management rather than on defending a particular political position. 
 
Making Resources Available 
 
The approach of modulating relationships to increase one’s impact on others in order to obtain 
resources met everyone’s approval in the sets. Others argued that to obtain additional resources, one 
needs to identify people, both within the institution and outside, who have access to those controlling 
the resources. Getting allies with good reputations to set the stage for further discussions with 
management can be fruitful in problem resolution. Set participants discussed other approaches, such 
as formal committees and task forces, as ways to exert pressure on those who control the resources 
so that they make those resources available, which could be interpreted as a micropolitical game. 
Again, participants agreed that relationship building is important, and those relationships would last if 
and only if trust existed among people; trust was seen as essential to get others to do what is asked of 
them. Two participants in the learning set volunteered to meet the person who controls financial 
resources in the school in an attempt to obtain additional resources for online learning 
implementation. 
 
Participants discussed the idea that one’s opposition to online learning implementation can be 
legitimate and justified, prompting the resistors to acknowledge that they might be “radical” in their 
approach to resisting online learning implementation. Since opposition to online learning 
implementation could be legitimate, opening up a discussion with management to inform them about 
resistors’ potential concerns could prove to be the best short-term approach. Also, proactively seeking 
information to understand the issues might foster the idea that management was an ally. Meeting with 
management would help to understand their points of view. Adopters could become active 
proponents of online learning by influencing those who oppose change in an effort to build a common 
vision that benefits all. Coming together and working toward a common goal could increase one’s own 
influence; this common goal might be to help the project succeed, or to derail it. Participants agreed 
that building and sustaining trustworthy relationships with those who have a wide internal network of 
people was an effective strategy to gain access to those who controlled organizational resources. 
 
Resistors, for their part, used two strategies to get adopters to oppose online learning: referring to 
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Referring to Unbiased Experts 
 
During set meetings, many attempts were made by resistors to convince other less reluctant faculty 
members to refrain from participating in online learning implementation as, from their perspective, 
the entire endeavour “was doomed to fail.” As such, they acknowledged that they exerted their power 
to influence others’ actions with respect to online learning. Thus, in a university setting, it is not 
surprising that many resistors would refer to views of outside experts who are deemed unbiased, and 
whose stance against online learning appears to be well founded: 
 
“It’s time-consuming… with all the research and writing that we’re asked to do, how 
can one find time to adapt course materials to teach online? Mr. X [a renowned 
expert in management] thinks that university professors should not get involved in 
such endeavours that take them away from their research.” (Participant 3-D) 
(Comment 4.3.3.2-3) 
 
The perceived effectiveness of this micropolitical strategy was discussed among all four groups of 
participants and having influential and/or prestigious references was considered effective as long as 
“those experts we are referring to are well-known and have some kind of credibility within the 
academic community” (Comments 4.3.3.2-3/4/5). According to many resistors, this micropolitical 
behaviour was often not sufficient to increase opposition to the change. 
 
Justifying Opposition to the Change 
 
A certain number of resistors reminded other set members (and faculty members not involved in the 
research) of the reasons they were not participating in the project. For example, Participants 3-D, 3-E, 
and 3-F (all of them resistors) constantly shared their grievances about online learning 
implementation: the fact that they were not consulted prior to the implementation, that the choice to 
adapt certain courses for online delivery seemed arbitrary, that the resources to help faculty members 
participate in online learning implementation were not clearly described nor made available, and that 
the implementation schedule seemed unrealistic, were among some of the concerns voiced by faculty 
members opposed to the change. This appeared to be a deliberate use of a tactic to convince others 
through repetitive (although not always convincing) arguments. When I asked the question: “What are 
some of the more pressing issues that should be addressed,” I was met with comments such as: “There 
is nothing we can do…,” “Management has already made its decision…,” “Resisting is futile… we should 
just do what we’re asked to do, that’s it…” The prevalent feeling emerging among set participants was 
that they were powerless to solve some of the issues surrounding online learning implementation. 
 
The resistors who chose to expose their grievances about the project and argued that their opposition 
was legitimate were in fact engaged in an attempt to convince others to oppose the project. The fact 
that management did not consult them, and that decisions seemed arbitrary (from their standpoint) 
justified their opposition. Despite adopters sharing their favourable opinions about the project 
(Comments 4.3.3.2-1 and 4.3.3.2-2), resistors insisted that their losses were still greater than potential 
gains. Since the implementation of online learning was imposed on faculty members, management 
should have devised a plan to convince resistors to adopt online teaching. 
 
The next phase of the action research cycle would be an opportunity to test some of the micropolitical 
games (change the narrative, fuel optimism, insist on collective and personal gains that the change 
entailed, get management to clarify their intentions, and involve resistors in the change process) in 
two different settings: within the learning sets in an attempt to steer the dynamics among set members 
so that resistors become less opposed to online learning, and with other faculty members not involved 




4.3 The Third Phase: Taking Action 
 
At this point in the research, it was becoming clear that the actions in the previous phase were the 
ones I needed to take in order to engage resistors and maintain adopters’ support. Those actions would 
clearly be political in nature as they would help set participants answer the following questions: “What 
is the best way to gain power and influence by engaging in micropolitical behaviour? How can I increase 
gains and minimize losses that the change entails?” 
 
The third phase of the action research process was useful in taking action to change the narrative, to 
fuel optimism, to insist on collective and personal gains that the change entailed, to get management 
to clarify their intentions, and to involve resistors in the change process. At the beginning of each 
learning set meeting, I would promote a positive narrative about online learning implementation. 
Adopters (who had become allies) would quickly join in to do the same. Instead of letting resistors 
impose their point of view, adopters would take the lead. My hope was that this would empower 
passive adopters to become active supporters of the change as they felt more confident in being part 
of a guiding coalition. Also, taking action to sell the change to strong resistors who might have felt that 
they were losing ground and becoming less powerful was necessary as they were confronting 
management whom they framed as opponents. 
 
The positive narrative put forward by adopters promoted optimism about the change, even if some 
strong resistors accused us of being overly optimistic. Many comments were made about people 
feeling more empowered, even more so when, in the context of learning set meetings, it became 
possible to address the change process itself without having to deal with the negativity of some strong 




Figure 14: Empowering Adopters (Allies) to Influence Resistors 
 
Converting into a Supporter 
 
Resistors in each of the four groups appeared to be more willing to allow the adopters to share their 
experience with online learning, which led some resistors to reassess the reasons underlying their 
opposition to the project. To some extent, adopters had some kind of influence that they used, 
intentionally or not, to convince resistors to change their stance. Some resistors were gradually 
becoming allies to adopters and were more willing to support the change. Some adopters used the 
tactic of demonstrating the feasibility and relevance of online learning that I myself used with some 
resistors in other sets. Participants discussed ways to persuade someone to change their position and 
to convert into a supporter of the change and concluded that adopters could build alliances and gather 
support for the change. However, the idea that management was really an “ally” in helping faculty 
members meet their goals, as Participant 1-C put forward: 
 
“We need to stop seeing management as the ‘evil force’… they make decisions that 
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was met with scepticism by resistors, but at least engaged them in a dialogue about the goals that 
management was pursuing in this project, and those that other faculty members, not involved in the 
research, might have. It became obvious that, whether to support or oppose the change, building 
alliances was crucial, both for those impacted by the change, and for management. The more allies a 
person could count on, the more influence that person had in determining what the outcomes of the 
change should be, and how management should conduct the change. 
 
Influencing someone to reassess their stance towards online learning might take many forms, all of 
which participants addressed and assessed in the learning sets. They claimed that compelling those 
with an opposing perspective to change their minds by using arguments and information that directly 
challenge their ideas is the most common strategy that people use when implementing change. This 
micropolitical behaviour was assessed as risky: watch out for opponents’ reactions to the arguments 
presented to them as they could retaliate and find more powerful counterarguments to neutralize 
initial arguments. A participant referred to this as akin to experts with opposing views who argue in 
front of a judge. To lower the risk, “when you make an argument [to convince others that the change 
is worthwhile, and that they should get involved themselves], always be well-prepared to analyse, 
explain, demonstrate, prove and reason rationally with allies [those with whom you share the same 




Many set members agreed that it is much easier to build alliances when others believe that their allies 
are competent and can make a strong case for or against online learning. However, for the alliance to 
be effective and to last, allies need to foster reciprocity: 
 
“My colleague X feels that management must clarify their expectations. I agree. 
They did a lousy job in communicating with us… he thinks, as I do, that management 
should own up to their mistake and suggest a solution or, better still, alternative 
acceptable solutions to all of us who are not convinced, and provide sufficient 
resources… then I might reconsider…” (Participant 2-F) (Comment 4.2.3.3-1) 
 
Participants agreed that reciprocity is the basis of any successful alliance between two people: the 
success of any effort to build alliances will depend on the benefits that allies can reap by engaging in 
and maintaining an alliance. Also, allies need to know why others solicit their participation in online 
learning: they will be more willing to help if the reasons are valid and ensure personal gains and/or 
allow them to avoid personal losses. Finding allies who have influence and who are able to contribute 
to the change (or to act against it) is one of the best tactics to gain influence in the context of the 
change, according to many participants. Explaining how the goal can have a positive impact on a 
person’s career, reputation or performance, and the gains that allies are likely to reap from the change, 
as long as these gains are feasible, can help establish a lasting alliance with another organizational 
actor. As one participant put it: “You need to know whom you are dependent upon to achieve your 
goals, and who depends on you. When you know that, then you know with whom reciprocity is 
possible.” 
 
Fostering reciprocity supposes that trust is well established between allies, and that they are willing to 
engage in a relationship in which they share resources and information. Sharing information might not 
be sufficient, though, to gain the support of those opposed to the change and convert them into allies, 
as some set participants experienced (Comment 4.2.3.3-1). Lack of trust in management, which has 
prevailed from the beginning of the project, might fuel resistance to becoming management’s ally. A 
great number of set members, resistors and adopters alike, felt they needed to be involved in 




If not, then some might become more or less active “opponents” to management and resistors to 
online learning implementation. These discussions about the best course of action to take in that 
instance led to an assessment of ways to deal with implicit or explicit opposition. 
 
At the onset of online learning implementation, a few set participants had tried to obtain additional 
resources from management to handle the change but were not successful for reasons that seemed 
unclear to them. This crystallized the perception that management was hiding something and was 
uninterested in hearing about the resistors’ real concerns (Comment 4.4.3.3-1). In other words, 
management was not an ally, and was not interested in becoming one. A more confrontational strategy 
with management would have to be adopted to compel them to consider issues faculty members are 
facing. “Let’s brainstorm about some of the ways to get management to address your issues…,” I 
suggested in one meeting. The discussions that followed were characterized by an overall feeling of 
powerlessness: “There is nothing we can do…,” “We don’t have the leverage to change the situation 
to our advantage…,” “If only we had additional resources…” This apathy, revealed mainly by 
Participants 4-A and 4-B, was argued against by resistors who proposed a more forceful approach. 
They quickly jumped in to complain about the non-receptivity of management, that they were not 
interested in hearing about faculty members’ issues, and that that was just a repetition of past 
situations. Some argued that the best course of action would be to try to convince the most reluctant 
representatives of management one-by-one in private, while recognizing their contribution in public 
(Comment 4.4.3.2-2/3). The rationale for using this tactic, according to some adopters who felt that 
their contribution to the project was not fully recognized, was that 
 
“because they risk losing face, management representatives will not let themselves 
be convinced in public, in front of a crowd; convincing them in private and then 
acknowledging their contribution in public carries a powerful message about our 
ability to convince them without holding them to account for their initial reluctance 
to consider us as significant allies. Never hold a grudge.” 
 
Others argued differently, and suggested meeting with management to create obligations, extract 
promises, and make them accountable in public (Comment 4.2.3.3-3). It was pointed out that publicly 
compelling a person to accept concessions involves risks. It must be done with care: it is never about 
“settling a score” (Participant 4-C). 
 
Despite putting forward a positive narrative to fuel optimism, insisting on collective and personal gains, 
clarifying management’s intentions and involving resistors in the change process, some strong (active) 
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Despite some attempts to rally active resistors (for example, some adopters opted for a more positive 
approach to impress resistors: “The point is not to quash the opposition but to rally it. Positive and 
courteous behaviour is essential,” Participant 4-F, Comment 4.4.3.2-4), we did not succeed. Resistors 
argued that a more forceful approach with management would yield better results: “Oppose, protest, 
play devil’s advocate; let’s confront them without delay, and attack their ideas and positions” 
(Comments 4.1.3.3-2, 4.3.4.1-3). The idea, according to them, was to compel management by using 




Resistors accused management of cultivating uncertainty in the project so that they would not have to 
commit to provide the resources that resistors were seeking; in one instance, a meeting took place 
between management and two resistors, and the feeling was that management was intentionally 
vague about many aspects of the project: 
 
“The meeting didn’t go all that well… Mr. X was not very receptive… I’m surprised 
that he was not open to hearing our arguments: I know him well, and his attitude at 
the meeting is something that I have not seen before… he must be under a lot of 
pressure at the moment. My feeling is that he did not inform the other members 
that he was meeting with us, so he could not commit to anything…” (Participant 4-
A) (Comment 4.4.3.3-1) 
 
“That’s my feeling too… His answers were evasive, and he did not provide any clear 
answers to our questions…” (Participant 4-B) (Comment 4.4.3.3-2) 
 
If management was intentionally cultivating uncertainty, then resistors could resort to the same tactic 
to counteract management’s so-called “undisclosed intentions:” not participating in meetings, being 
discreet about one’s position on online learning, and not volunteering information were some tactics 
that might generate uncertainty and influence management to soften their position towards online 
learning. However, the effectiveness of such tactics was difficult to assess. As one participant pointed 
out, if someone is not participating in meetings, does not share their opinion on online learning with 
management, and does not volunteer information when asked, they could be perceived as being 




Set participants assessed resistance as one way to exert pressure upwards, and to force management 
to involve faculty members in the decision-making process about online learning implementation 
(Comment 4.2.3.3-3); this would constrain management to revise their strategy and find other (more 
constructive) ways to manage the change. This strategy might have yielded positive results as long as 
those resisting the change and exerting pressure were instrumental in online learning implementation: 
“Powerless resistors have no effect whatsoever in compelling management to change their decision” 
(Participant 2-D). Some resistors argued that they were already exerting pressure on management, but 
to no avail: were they in fact perceived by management as powerless actors? Was their most effective 
strategy to gain power in the first place and then exert pressure on management? Online learning 
implementation was moving forward, and the consequences for resistors were intensifying. A few 
strong resistors (in the fourth group) argued that resistors should only exert pressure when it is 









Getting management to recognize that the change is poorly managed (from the resistors’ point of 
view) was discussed and could serve to negotiate an alliance. This course of action was assessed as 
promising, as long as management was trustworthy, which was not perceived to be the case. 
Negotiating mitigating measures might be the most that resistors could obtain from engaging in 
negotiations with management. 
 
At this point, I considered soliciting management so that they could, once again, clarify their intentions, 
provide information and exhibit some of the tactics based on my notes in the previous section of the 
action research process. Unfortunately, I was not successful in getting management representatives 
to come and address active resistors’ concerns in the learning sets. Management was apprehensive 
about the reactions of resistors. This was a clear demonstration that a few strong resistors had indeed 
acquired power and influence, enough to discourage management from meeting with them and 
addressing the more pressing issues regarding online learning implementation. 
 
4.4 The Fourth Action Research Phase: Evaluating Action 
 
The last phase would help to assess actions taken in the previous phase: How successful was I in 
engaging resistors and maintaining the support of adopters? What might explain the outcomes? How 
did set participants assess their actions? In the previous phases of the action research process, I was 
hoping to help adopters gain influence and become active supporters of the change in order to initiate 
a bottom-up change. Being aware that resistors were becoming more powerful by engaging in active 
resistance, I was able to gain influence, but not enough to weaken active resistors; some of them 
engaged in an adversarial dynamic with management as adopters unsuccessfully tried to convert them 




Figure 16: Competitive Political Strategy 
 
Confrontation with management was a strategy proposed by strong resistors, mainly in the fourth 
group. They argued that this was the only remaining option to induce management to change their 
stance on online learning implementation because management had turned a deaf ear to the concerns 
they had voiced repeatedly in the past. Listening to their explanations, it became clear that their 
opposition was based mainly on the fact that they were not consulted and felt left out of the entire 
process. When asked what management should have done to avoid confrontation, resistors argued 
that soliciting their opinions and suggestions would have confirmed that they had some kind of 
relevance to the process: “Opponents’ rivalry is often legitimate; asking them to express it can provide 
new and previously unknown information, which could be relevant to the change. This demonstrates 
that you are ready to listen to opponents and to acknowledge their point of view, as long as this is 
perceived as genuine: if you ask for their point of view without any intention of taking it into account, 
this behaviour may increase rivalry instead” (Comments 4.3.3.4-1/2/3/4). This comment highlighted 
the fact that opposition to a project can indeed be legitimate, and those in opposition are sometimes 
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Gaining power and influence in order to get their voices heard by management was a prevalent 
micropolitical strategic game suggested by set members, specifically those in the third and fourth 
group in which resistors outnumbered adopters. Confronting management was deemed legitimate and 
justified on the basis of the actions that management had taken from the onset of the project. I then 
asked a different question: “How might those actions be effective in getting what you are hoping for?” 
Answers were quite revealing: 
 
“When you have power, people have no choice but to come up to you and ask you 
for advice: they acknowledge that without your input, things cannot move forward. 
When you don’t have any power, people tend to isolate you; they’re not interested 
in hearing about your concerns.” (Participant 3-D) (Comment 4.3.3.4-4) 
 
“Power is in the eye of the beholder… you might think that you have power, but 
others don’t necessarily see things the same way… We need to show [management] 
how the project impacts us and others in a negative way, and that they 
[management] need our contribution if the project is to succeed—this is how you 
gain respect: retaliation!” (Participant 3-E) (Comment 4.3.3.4-5) 
 
“We should be more forceful in letting others [management] know that they 
depended on us for the project’s success… we waited for them to come to us: we 
should have imposed ourselves on them.” (Participant 3-C) (Comment 4.3.3.4-6) 
 
Most resistors believed that confrontation was justified, and that it was their only possible course of 
action, regardless of the consequences of this strategy. I tried to steer the discussions around 
alternative ways to deal with management, but to no avail: strong resistors had taken the lead, and 
would confront management who, in their minds, bear sole responsibility for this because of their 
failure to consult and include all stakeholders in online learning implementation. Set members agreed 
that confrontation would be most effective if done in groups, rather than on an individual basis. 
 
Fostering Collective Action 
 
Fostering collective action to gain power and influence and using it to confront management (the 
opposition) was assessed as a useful political tactic to use prior to confronting management. 
Confrontation is more effective when many participate; however, this may incur some undesirable 
consequences: 
 
“There is also the sacred principle of academic freedom… I was talking to X 
[Participant 2-F] yesterday, and we felt that imposing decisions on us goes against 
academic freedom… management is all for money; they don’t care about us. If we 
are too forceful in our attempts to oppose online learning, I’m pretty sure that 
management might impose conditions on funding for our research.” (Participant 3-
F) (Comment 4.3.3.4-8) 
 
Strong resistors tried very hard to minimize the consequences that would come out of their 
confrontational strategy with management, but some (weak) resistors confided to me in private that 
they saw that as an influence tactic to engage them in confrontation with management. It became 
obvious that some resistors who led the charge against management did not have much credibility 
from the point of view of other resistors. When participants addressed that openly, there was a shift 
of perspective in the learning sets, and discussions about ways to convince management to become 
allies ensued. This led to a more positive outlook on the change and to the possibility that management 









With the shift (mostly in the first and second group of participants), adopters became more vocal (they 
apparently felt more powerful being part of a coalition) and changed the conversation; they claimed 
that adopting a more constructive strategy with management would yield better results than adopting 
a confrontational stance. Most resistors disagreed but did not offer any compelling argument to 
support their point of view. Adopters suggested that they should meet with management and convey 
the concerns of the resistors about online learning implementation. Some of them had already tested 
this tactic in the past, and were hopeful that it would work in the current context. Adopters appeared 
to be much more optimistic about the effectiveness of this approach than strong resistors who decided 
to move ahead with their confrontational strategy. Participants agreed that the consequences of using 
a more confrontational strategy and an alliance-based strategy would be assessed in upcoming 
meetings. 
 
Becoming more visible to management, meeting with them on a regular basis, being proactive, was 
perhaps a course of action that would bring positive results, according to adopters. They agreed to 
come up with an action plan to communicate to management some of the comments made by the 
most resistant faculty members, but without divulging names. The overarching feeling was that it 
would be important to share any kind of information with management to help them better administer 
this change. It was generally agreed that the change was poorly handled by management from the 
beginning, but many were convinced that the project could still yield positive outputs for both the 




In all four groups, discussions evolved around the best course of action to build alliances with 
management. Some felt that the most influential members of management should be contacted and 
made aware of the concerns of the resistors; others argued that all members of management should 
be informed, whatever their roles. A set participant already knew one member of management (a 
former colleague) and volunteered to talk to him privately to get some feedback about the best 
“strategy” to put in place to build alliances with management. Others disagreed, arguing that the 
information could be leaked to other management members who are less inclined to build alliances 
with faculty members, especially with those with a reputation for being strong resistors; this might 
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“If they [management] become aware of this information, they’ll freak out and 
retaliate… some of them have been on the defensive from the start, and this has 
increased in the face of all this opposition to the project…” (Participant 2-D) 
(Comment 4.2.3.4-1) 
 
Whatever the course of action, both adopters and resistors agreed that building and maintaining trust 
with management would be crucial for the successful implementation of online learning. That called 




Participants agreed that developing relationships with management in a proactive manner and 
managing those relationships as the project evolved constituted an important micropolitical strategy. 
Resistors argued that the effectiveness of this particular political strategy could only be assessed once 
the strategy had been deployed. There was no way to predict how management would react to 
adopters’ influence attempts. Adopters agreed but being accessible to people considered allies and 
fostering a constructive relationship with them create opportunities for reciprocity: “securing senior 
management’s support by actively participating in online learning implementation and asking them to 
reward people for their support in return” (Comment 4.1.3.4-1) is a good example of a reciprocal 
relationship. Furthermore, “senior management has structural power; having allies in senior 
management is a very effective way of gaining power and influence” (Comment 4.4.3.4-1). As another 
participant put it: “Having strong allies only makes you stronger.” 
 
Building alliances, especially with those with differing perspectives about online learning, might take 
some time. One participant suggested that building alliances with resistors might be the first step to 
take, and recommended the following to fellow adopters: “Take small steps; for example, propose an 
idea and then come back to it several times; persevere to gradually engage new allies in moving the 
change forward” (Comment 4.1.4.1-4). Others added, in situations in which powerful allies’ support is 
solicited to influence other, less powerful resistors: “When you are not in a position of strength, you 
have no control over the pace at which allies provide support. Being well-informed about their context 
makes it possible to adjust the frequency of your requests and obtain their support” (Participant 1-C) 
(Comment 4.1.4.1-4). These comments highlighted the fact that allies might depend on one another 
to gain power and influence that they could use to either support or oppose online learning 
implementation. 
 
Resistors to online learning implementation might have allies who could influence management, as is 
also the case with adopters. Resistors might engage their allies to block the change, and adopters 
would do the opposite. In most of the learning sets, participants believed that converting your 
“opponents” (those who promote a divergent view of the change outcomes and/or of the change 
process) into allies is a micropolitical strategic game that is relevant to both resistors and adopters. 
Through the discussions that took place in the learning sets of the second and third group of 
participants, I realized that, as the change agent, I needed to become a more active political player in 
the project, and that I had to work more closely with resistors to convert them into allies before they 
use their relationships and try more vigorously to persuade current adopters to become resistors to 
online learning implementation. Acknowledging interdependency and acting as a “political 
entrepreneur” (Buchanan and Badham, 2008), I could gradually gain the support of those most 
opposed to online learning implementation by stressing that their input was valuable and that the 
project’s success depended, at least in part, on their input. This could instil a change in attitudes in the 
most vocal resistors. I already had succeeded in converting a weak resistor into an ally; that person 
was slowly being perceived by others as a proponent of online learning. Asked about his change of 
perspective, he said that the fact that I had met with him made him aware that his input was valued, 
even if his view was not shared by other set members: 
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“This [action] research project might be an opportunity to get ourselves heard by 
management… at last. They would understand our concerns and recognize our 
efforts to make the project succeed.” (Participant 1-D) (Comment 4.1.3.4-1) 
 
Allies have to be relevant to one another: “Having influential, competent, trustworthy allies and 
identifying how they can support you” (Comments 4.1.4.1-3, 4.1.4.3-1, and 4.4.3.2-1) is a political 
strategy that cannot be neglected, particularly in large projects. This is why it is important to “ascertain 
how allies can help [to move the change forward]; their support can consist of actions that contribute 
to common goals.” It appeared that resistors had felt that their potential contribution to the project 
was irrelevant from the onset: perhaps if management had consulted with them and engaged them in 
decision-making, they would have felt they had a role to play in the success of the project. This was a 




Adopters and resistors used distinct micropolitical strategies when generating support for, or 
opposition to, the change induced by online learning implementation. They actively tried to 
demonstrate that their position for or against the project was relevant. In doing so, resistors referred 
to so-called “unbiased experts” to justify their opposition to the change. Adopters relied on making a 
case for online learning, involving allies through the help of others, promoting a positive view of the 
change, getting to know others and building relationships with them, and making resources available 
to initiate and sustain participation in the project. However, adopters and resistors used similar 
micropolitical strategies when building alliances in influencing others to become advocates of their 
position and in fostering reciprocity. When confronting opposition, both adopters and resistors 
cultivated uncertainty, exerted pressure and obtained concessions from those with an opposite 
perspective on online learning implementation. Finally, when involved in confrontation, adopters and 
resistors offered strong arguments to justify confrontation and foster collective action by securing the 
contribution of others. Adopters and resistors who attempted to convert opponents into allies 
increased their visibility with allies, managed relationships with others to build trust, acknowledged 
interdependency by making others (their allies) aware that their input was important for project 
success (failure), and demonstrated their relevance as allies. 
 
4.5 Analysis of the Data 
 
This section is an analysis of the data obtained in the first action research cycle based on the literature. 
The goal is to provide answers (1) to understand the underlying motives of faculty members’ 
reluctance/refusal to participate in the implementation of online learning; (2) to investigate the role 
that micropolitics might have played in this change, with the aim of addressing power issues more 
effectively; (3) to find ways to engage faculty members opposed to the change through action learning; 
and (4) to develop a framework that might help address micropolitical behaviour in such a way as to 
help me, the change agent, move the change forward more effectively, thus generating actionable 





Figure 18: Synthesis of the Data Obtained in the First Action Research Cycle 
 
Analyzing the data obtained in each of the four phases of this first action research cycle has permitted 
me to come up with the following conclusions: 
 
(1) In the change brought about by online learning implementation, adopters framed the change 
outcomes positively. They argued that the technology would yield positive outcomes. Resistors 
negatively framed the change content and the change process: they anticipated negative outcomes. 
 
This first phase of the action research cycle clearly demonstrated that online learning implementation 
can become highly politicized, even more so when the decision to implement it is imposed on those 
who are expected to participate in it. In reaction to this decision, people might use framing as a 
“political tool” to construct the issues to their advantage and to influence others to share their 
perspectives (D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010). 
 
In the learning sets, framing as a political tool was used in four different ways in constructing the issues 
related to online learning implementation, namely: (1) in how both resistors and adopters framed 
themselves; (2) in how they framed other faculty members who do not share their stance towards 
online learning; (3) in how they framed management who made a unilateral decision to implement 
online learning; and (4) in how they framed the change brought about by online learning 
implementation. 
 
Resistors framed themselves in a positive light by framing online learning in a negative way: online 
learning was doomed to fail as it would never yield the positive outcomes it promised. This contrasted 
with how adopters framed themselves: online learning would bring many benefits to faculty, to 
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any proof to support their contention, adopters were not successful in influencing resistors. This seems 
to have given credence to those opposing online learning, even if they too did not offer any strong 
argument to support their claims. Resistors were much more vocal in expressing themselves in the 
learning sets, and this might be an illustration of the endowment effect and loss aversion (Halpern and 
Hakel, 2003; Tagg, 2012; and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). This cognitive bias induces intense 
negative reactions in people when they frame outcomes as a loss. However, resistors were never 
specific about what those losses were for them: they kept insisting on the losses for others if we would 
move forward with online learning implementation: it is as if they were engaged in an altruistic 
endeavour to protect those who might be impacted in a negative way by online learning, and that they 
were not in any way protecting their own interests. 
 
In framing others who held a different view about online learning implementation, resistors and 
adopters did not make their opinions explicit. This has helped to maintain relative harmony among set 
members. However, resistors implied that less-experienced, newly hired faculty members (some of 
whom participated in the learning sets) should not get involved in online learning and they should 
oppose it. This appears to be an attempt to influence social norms which, in a higher education setting, 
are only affected by peer influence (Dermentzi and Papagiannids, 2018). 
 
Resistors were actively involved in the learning sets in framing management in a negative way (at least, 
in the beginning): they strongly argued that the decision to teach online should rest entirely with the 
individual, and that top-down managerial decisions to “coerce” people to teach online are bound to 
be met with resistance. Management had made many mistakes in implementing online learning, 
mostly by failing to provide the “right” information from the start to develop a shared perspective on 
the project. Management had failed to offer a compelling vision of online learning implementation. 
Indeed, management had taken a decision which was widely perceived as unstructured (a decision 
that cannot be justified to the satisfaction of those impacted by the decision). Unstructured decisions 
are among the most common political triggers as organizational actors will seek to support these 
decisions by forming alliances if these decisions generate gains for them, while if these decisions 
generate losses for them they will oppose them. In doing so, they will engage in micropolitical 
behaviour (Pfeffer and Sutton, 2006). 
 
The perception that the decision to implement online learning was unstructured entailed that “nobody 
in their right mind should trust management.” This perception was reinforced by resistors who had 
had “bad” experiences with them but they did not disclose to other set members what those “bad” 
experiences were. They also attributed their opposition to online learning to the fact that the change 
process was badly managed. Whatever efforts management had taken to mitigate the negative effects 
of online learning implementation, those mitigating measures were never sufficient to generate 
positive consequences. Many complained that all of this was wasting valuable institutional resources 
that could have been used for other, more relevant projects. Consequently, given the way that 
institutional resources were being used, management could not be trusted. This indicates that without 
trust, it is very difficult to exert influence on others, a concept that is absent from Crozier’s and 
Friedberg’s (1977) framework (Edmondson and Moingeon, 1999). 
 
Finally, comments made by resistors in this first phase confirm that online learning implementation is 
not only related to improving learning (a contention with which resistors did not agree), but also to 
the politics of top-down authority directives (Samarawickrema and Stacey, 2007). In the course of the 
learning sets, resistors showed that they were less concerned about the positive consequences of 
online learning implementation than being compelled to participate in the endeavour: forcing people 
to engage in it was “surely doomed to fail” (Comment 4.3.3.1-3). Some resistors went as far as to 
mention that, because of time issues, they would not have participated in the project if they had a 
choice. Indeed, forcing faculty members to engage in online learning implementation might directly 
affect their routines and has a negative effect on their work setting (Samarawickrema and Stacey, 
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2007). This negative effect was obvious in the way resistors framed online learning. It is interesting to 
note that, in justifying their reluctance to participate in the implementation, resistors consistently 
referred to first-order barriers (Kearney et al., 2018) found in the literature. 
 
The fact that management had taken a unilateral decision and imposed it on faculty members may be 
the consequence of authority appropriation by management because of certain institutional 
characteristics, such as a highly differentiated vertical structure, a culture of conformity, and complex 
processes (Claver et al., 1999). Their decision might not have been politically motivated, but rather an 
almost routine management decision taken to benefit the organization. However, it might have been 
perceived as having political undertones by resistors and was most likely to generate consequences 
that were assessed by them as being political, such as loss of power and influence (Markus, 1983) 
which then gives rise to power struggles (Frost and Egri, 1991). 
 
As for those who adopted online learning and the change it entailed, the anticipated gains (for faculty, 
for students and for the school) were perceived as greater than the losses that the change would 
generate (Ford and Ford, 2010). In general, adopters did not hesitate to support the goals put forward 
by online learning implementation because they found them to be beneficial. In the learning set 
discussions, the adopters would go from “them” to “me” at first when speaking of the change, and to 
“us” at the next stage since, and this was one of their distinctive traits, they hoped to be involved in 
the implementation of the change within the organization, as it would bring positive outcomes. 
 
Politically speaking, adopters are more than allies; they are promoters of the change who seek to 
influence colleagues who are less favourable to change (Ford and Ford, 2010). However, their influence 
tactics in the first phase of the action research cycle were rather limited. Adopters stressed the benefits 
that online learning entailed for faculty members, students and the institution, but they did not go 
further in exerting influence over the resistors: they had no hard data, such as statistics, reports, etc., 
to support their point of view. They mainly put forward arguments based on personal values and 
convictions. 
 
In framing the change in a negative way, resistors focussed on both the change content and the change 
process. More specifically, resistors came up with many more reasons for their opposition to online 
learning implementation than adopters did for their support, even when adopters outnumbered 
resistors in some learning sets. Reasons offered by resistors fell into two categories as defined in the 
current theory on change: reasons related to the change content and those related to the change 
process (Self and Schraeder, 2009). Change content refers to the technology itself, i.e. online learning: 
some strong resistors have had prior negative experiences of failed attempts by the institution to 
implement the technology, and used these instances to justify their stance. 
 
For those who did not have such negative experiences, they projected that online learning would never 
bring positive results, thus predicting negative outcomes. As for the change process, it refers to how 
the change was being conducted and how resources were allotted to help people manage the change. 
Since the change in my school was top-down, this might explain why resistors framed it as a political 
act that prompted them to engage in political activity to oppose top-down change (Hardy, 1995; 
Markus, 1983; and Pfeffer, 1981). In such circumstances, resistors view resistance as legitimate. They 
rationalize their lack of participation as a “normal” reaction to top-down change. Also, a lack of trust 
in management might explain resistors’ efforts to try to (rightly or wrongly) undermine management’s 
credibility by overtly questioning their intentions. This is one of the most important political factors 
underlying unsuccessful organizational change (Armenakis, Harris, and Mossholder, 1993): questioning 
the credibility of those who have initiated the change is a strong, political act to derail the change 




Gain maximization and loss minimization is captured in Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) framework. 
Clearly, in the learning sets, resistors perceive the change as a process whereby they would lose 
something. According to Beer and Nohria (2000), resistors have the tendency to get involved and even 
to get those around them involved in order to oppose the change. They will resort to specific, political 
acts to stop or neutralize change (Ford and Ford, 2010). Resistors obviously did not accept the content 
of change, which was clearly reflected in the language they used to frame the change: there was 
systematic use of “they” and “them” when referring to the change. 
 
Ambiguity of losses might also explain resistors’ political behaviour. Efforts to uncover shared losses 
that resistors anticipate in the project were unsuccessful. Although attempts were made to pinpoint 
the gains and losses that faculty members experienced during the implementation of online learning, 
coming up with a definitive list of concerns shared by all resistors was not possible. Buchanan and 
Badham (2008) argue that undisclosed, personal factors such as ambition, a strong desire to be the 
best, and values can explain a person’s political behaviour. Although these personal factors were never 
made explicit by set participants, one can infer that they might explain, at least partially, why some 
faculty members engaged in micropolitical behaviour to either oppose or support online learning 
implementation. 
 
Finally, it appears that resistors engaged in micropolitical behaviour to influence adopters to support 
their stance to challenge the change outcomes and the change process. These influence attempts, such 
as fuelling pessimism and anticipating negative outcomes from the change, are used by resistors to 
frame the entire endeavour in a negative way so that adopters change their position towards online 
learning and eventually come to oppose it. Indeed, research confirms that when change recipients 
have had prior negative experiences with change, they tend to adopt a more pessimistic view of a 
similar change when asked to participate in it (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). 
 
(2) It appears important to plan action so that adopters gain power and actively influence the change 
process by involving them in a coalition. As resistors tried to gain influence over the change process 
through different means, action was needed to convince them to adopt the change. 
 
This second phase of the action research cycle showed how important it was to negotiate the top-
down change that was imposed on faculty members (Quinn, 1978, 1980). These negotiation attempts 
would take two forms: selling the change to resistors and convincing adopters to come together to 
form a guiding coalition in order to gain power and influence to help move the change forward. 
 
Selling the change is not a micropolitical strategic game per se within the framework developed by 
Crozier and Friedberg (1977) as the authors do not provide a list of what those games may be. I would 
argue that “selling the change to resistors” might be one of them, and would serve to counteract their 
attempts to undermine the change. In doing so, one would gain power over the resistors. Their 
underlying motives to undermine the change were made clear in the learning sets: the fact that they 
were not consulted prior to the implementation, that the choice to adapt certain courses for online 
delivery seemed arbitrary, that the resources to help faculty members participate in online learning 
implementation were not clearly described nor made available, and that the implementation schedule 
seemed unrealistic, were among some of the concerns (mostly first-order barriers – Kearney et al., 
2018) voiced by faculty members opposed to the change. The overall motive appeared to be that they 
felt powerless to solve some of their issues surrounding online learning implementation. 
 
Had they been consulted by management prior to implementation, they would have engaged in a 
negotiation which would have increased their freedom of action (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Since 
resistors kept insisting that their losses (whatever they may be) were still greater than potential gains, 
and that implementation of online learning was imposed on them, management should have devised 
a plan to convince resistors to adopt online teaching. This action plan would have consisted of five 
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major steps: (1) changing the narrative put forward by resistors; (2) fueling optimism; (3) insisting on 
collective and personal gains that the change entailed; (4) getting management to clarify their 
intentions; and (5) involving resistors in the change process. These steps would unfold in this particular 
order since it appeared obvious that, before involving resistors in the change process, we needed to 
“convert” them into adopters of the change. 
 
In constructing the issues, resistors had clearly built a narrative against the change. A few adopters 
were successful in changing this narrative by selling the change to others through five micropolitical 
strategies: making a case for online learning, involving others to share the message, promoting a 
positive view of the change, building relationships, and making resources available to those needing 
them. They were very active in selling the change. Most of the adopters were much less active, but 
nevertheless supported online learning implementation. It appears this was also the case for resistors: 
some were more active than others. Those few adopters who were more active were also the most 
forceful in arguing for online learning. In learning set meetings, they initiated discussions about online 
learning and were sometimes successful in bringing a few resistors on board. They obviously felt 
empowered to do that, as more silent (“passive”) adopters did not. Was it that “active” adopters were 
more extroverted than “passive” adopters, or were there other factors to take into account to explain 
why some adopters were more successful than others in changing the narrative? 
 
By examining the behaviour exhibited by active adopters in making a case for online learning within 
the context of learning sets, some clues emerged about ways to fuel optimism towards the project. 
For example, active adopters would regularly rely on outside expertise to justify their stance, they 
would always be ready to provide answers to difficult questions posed by strong (“active”) resistors, 
they would demonstrate objectivity and sound judgment in analyzing the issues, and they would 
present relevant information to engage others in seeing things differently. They obviously had 
influence and knew how to fuel optimism in the project to bring others on board. On the other hand, 
the less active (passive) adopters were not as effective in engaging others. These micropolitical 
behaviours exhibited by active adopters seemed to be the manifestation of “power bases” found in 
the literature, such as those defined by French and Raven (1958), who have argued that power results 
from the use of five bases: reward power, coercive power, referent power, legitimate power, and 
expert power. These five power bases provide influence to those who can mobilize them. Benfari, 
Wilkinson and Orth (1986) claim that there are eight power bases which could be used “strategically” 
by organizational members to either support or oppose the change initiative: reward, coercion, 
authority, referent, expert, information, affiliation, and group power. 
 
Also, active adopters would reach out to others and build alliances to help disseminate optimism about 
the change: for example, they would identify influential people, consult and network with them in 
getting the word out there that online learning is a good thing; they would have influential, competent, 
trustworthy allies and engage them in supporting and disseminating this narrative; some would secure 
senior management’s support in their effort to generate support for the project; and many would rely 
on the support of colleagues. These micropolitical behaviours are clearly the manifestation of power 
based on the group (coalitions) and affiliation (networks). Finally, active adopters would ask 
management for resources (mostly information) to be made available to those seeking them. It 
became clear that to change the narrative, I needed to build a stronger case for online learning, 
develop and sustain solid relationships with active adopters, and obtain from management the 
resources resistors had been seeking. 
 
From the beginning of the project, it was clear that resistors complained that they were insufficiently 
informed about the outcomes of online learning implementation. More specifically, notes taken during 
learning set discussions indicate that resistors had hoped that management would provide more 
information about the goal of the change and that management would clarify the collective and 
personal gains that the change entailed. Management should have argued logically to demonstrate 
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the feasibility or relevance of the goal of implementing online learning; arguments that were presented 
had clearly not been convincing; management needed to find other, more compelling arguments, to 
rally them. They should also have related the objective of the change to resistors’ needs and values, 
and explained how the goal of implementing online learning would have had a positive impact on 
resistors’ careers, reputation or performance. Explaining the gains that resistors would likely make 
from the change, as long as these gains were feasible, might have helped management to engage 
them. Analyzing how people define a particular issue, their goal in solving this issue, and their stakes 
(in terms of gains and losses) are actions to take to determine how people might expand their zones 
of uncertainty (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). 
 
Also, information about management’s intentions would have been useful. Management should have 
asked resistors for their opinions and suggestions about the way the change should proceed, and then 
explained their intentions in implementing online learning. Resistors’ opposition to the project might 
have been legitimate; asking them to express it could have provided new and previously unknown 
information, which might have proven relevant to the change. This would also have demonstrated that 
management was ready to listen to them and to acknowledge their point of view. Furthermore, 
management should have tried to reduce the uncertainty and insecurity associated with the change 
process, as much as possible. They should have provided resistors with information that would have 
reduced their apprehension about the situation, in terms of their uncertainty about the extent and/or 
frequency of their losses. In order to rally resistors, management might have needed to temper their 
uncertainty about potential disadvantages, if possible. Consequently, providing information about 
foreseeable losses would most certainly have been an effective strategy. Management should have 
recognized the losses that resistors anticipated in the context of the change, without trying to 
undermine them; it might have been a way to gain their trust. Management should also have de-
dramatized the discourse of strong resistors and brought it back to facts. Some resistors tended to 
exaggerate their actual or potential losses. Management might have needed to reassure them in this 
regard to gain their trust. 
 
Indeed, trust appeared to be a major issue in involving resistors in the change process. Maintaining 
resistors’ trust by listening to their arguments, and expressing sincere empathy, might have helped 
management. They should have developed resistors’ trust, both with their image and the quality of 
the change pursued. Resistors obviously did not have faith in management’s ability to lead the change; 
management needed to reassure them. Management should have tried to convince the most reluctant 
resistors one-by-one in private, while recognizing their contribution in public. Because they risk losing 
face, strong resistors would certainly not let themselves be convinced in public; persuading them in 
private and then acknowledging their contribution in public carries a powerful message about 
management’s ability to convince others without holding them to account for their initial opposition. 
 
All those actions to sell the change to resistors would be accomplished at the same time as actions to 
bring adopters together in a guiding coalition. The literature shows that building a powerful coalition 
of adopters is a major success factor in organizational change (Kanter, 1983; Kotter, 2008). 
 
The ability to form coalitions is a source of power (Cyert and March, 1963). When change is bottom-
up (emergent), then political activity among organizational members is considered a force for change 
and a source of organizational innovation (Kanter, 1983). This is the approach taken by Crozier and 
Friedberg (1977), Pettigrew (1985b), Giddens (1979), and Tsoukas and Chia (2002). In addition, I was 
keenly aware that resistors might also initiate bottom-up change to derail the entire project. 
Consequently, two micropolitical strategic games could have emerged: resistors might have tried to 
compete for power and influence against management who imposed a top-down change on them, and 
adopters might have tried to share power and influence with their allies and maintain the coalition in 
place to move the change forward (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). 
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These strategies were indeed put forward by set participants as a means to solve their issues as they 
were becoming more political in their approach to doing so. 
 
(3) Taking action to empower passive adopters to become active supporters of the change and to 
eventually include them in a coalition was deemed the best course of action. Also, taking action to 
sell the change and disempower active resistors who confronted management whom they framed 
as opponents was considered. 
 
Empowerment is an essential requirement to bottom-up change (Kanter, 1983). Kotter (2008) argues 
that empowering change recipients underlies successful organizational change. Again, “empowering 
others” is not a strategic political game that Crozier and Friedberg (1977) have identified, as they do 
not offer a repertoire of strategic games, but I would contend that it is a strategic game to use in the 
context of organizational change. I would further argue that when people are not empowered, they 
will try to gain power in such a way as to impose their views on those who failed to empower them. 
Power struggles then become more apparent (Gunn, 2001), as when resistors engaged in “active 
resistance” in online learning implementation. 
 
When taking action in this third phase of the action research cycle, empowering passive adopters to 
become active and including them in a coalition gave them sufficient influence to move the change 
forward. This was apparent in their attempts to influence resistors. In selling the change to resistors 
and fueling optimism, they have countered some resistors’ pessimism towards the change. Many 
resistors felt that, from the beginning, management had not promoted the project sufficiently to 
engage as many people as possible in online learning implementation. If it had been recognized that 
they had legitimate concerns, resistors would probably have been more inclined to get involved in the 
change. 
 
Indeed, I asked those resistors who justified their opposition to the change for their opinions and 
suggestions. For some of them, their opposition to the project was indeed legitimate; asking them to 
express their concerns provided new and previously unknown information, such as certain losses that 
had not been foreseen (loss of prestige and the fear of being seen as incompetent to teach online). I 
showed that I was ready to listen to them and to acknowledge their point of view. I listened to opposing 
arguments to my requests, and expressed empathy. Recognizing the losses that resistors anticipate in 
the context of online learning implementation, without trying to undermine them, was a way to 
maintain their trust. 
 
I also needed to establish trust with other, more reluctant resistors, both with respect to my image 
and to the quality of the change pursued. Strong resistors may have not trusted my ability to lead the 
change; I felt I needed to reassure them. 
 
Actions that were taken in this phase stressed collective and personal gains. In their seminal article, 
Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth (1986, p. 13) argue that people “see power positively when they benefit 
from the situation. That benefit may be economic, symbolic, or personal. When the person on the 
receiving end perceives power as positive, the interaction takes on a win/win character. The recipient 
senses support, increased motivation, and ego enhancement.” In other words, when people accept 
being influenced by other parties, they must reap some kind of benefit (tangible and/or intangible) in 
the process. Thus, influence attempts are most successful when the person influencing others is able 
to explicitly frame the situation as a win-win process, something that management did not do in the 
current project. 
 
Describing the benefits that strong resistors would enjoy if they engaged in online learning was not a 
strategy that management had put forward, thus apparently exacerbating resistors’ opposition to 
online learning. During the discussions taking place in the learning sets, it became clear early on that 
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resistors saw no benefit whatsoever in doing what management wanted them to do. Management had 
failed in using their authority positively by erroneously expecting that faculty members would comply 
and commit to the project: “Recipients can short-circuit authority power in subtle or undetected ways. 
The manager may be buying short-term compliance at the expense of long-term commitment” 
(Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986, p. 14). The more management insisted that resistors participate 
in the project, the more they demonstrated active resistance. Management would have been more 
successful in their influence attempts with resistors if they had shared relevant information with them 
so that they could get answers to their questions, and by actively engaging them in finding solutions 
to the problems brought about by the implementation of online learning. 
 
Finally, involving resistors in the change process would have been politically desirable. I needed to find 
some kind of activities in which resistors were willing to participate. For example, these could include: 
establishing a group to discuss the advantages of adopting online learning (Aubusson et al, 2014; 
Dermentzi and Papagiannids, 2018; and Kearney et al., 2018); fostering discussions about the degree 
to which the technology is compatible with existing values, past experiences and actual needs; 
involving resistors in finding solutions to current/future problems faced during implementation; and 
encouraging resistors to experiment with the new technology on a limited basis, and making the results 
of adopting the technology explicit and visible (Surry, 1997). These were some of the approaches, 
based on the attributes of adopting new technology, which I planned to use to engage resistors in the 
change process. 
 
(4) In evaluating the upcoming outcomes, my actions will have been successful if adopters actively 
facilitate the change process, but will have failed if resistors maintain active resistance toward the 
project. 
 
The fourth phase of the first action research process showed that political action is assessed on one’s 
ability to gain allies and to engage them in either a collaborative strategy or in a competitive strategy, 
or both. Competitive strategic games are initiated by those opposing organizational change as 
resistance is merely the symptom of underlying power struggles (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Those 
who support the change will most likely engage in a collaborative strategic game. 
 
It appears that efforts have to be made to sustain a collaborative strategic game, and less effort to 
engage in a competitive game. Reciprocity (and acknowledging interdependency) helps to sustain 
collaboration (Crozier, 1973). Indeed, it forms the basis of collaboration and alliance-building among 
organizational members. The next action research cycle confirmed my ability (and adopters’ ability) to 
initiate and sustain a collaborative strategic game to transform a top-down change into a bottom-up 
change. 
 
Finally, analysing the action learning process underlying this first action research cycle has permitted 
me to come up with the following conclusion: Unsurprisingly, adopters and resistors seemed to have 
engaged in an action learning cycle that yielded two opposite outcomes. Adopters learned to gain 
power and to exert influence to facilitate the change process in such a way that the outcomes of the 
change would materialize. Resistors learned to use power to influence the change process to prevent 
anticipated losses. Since the change was top-down, they gained power and used it to confront 
management. I learned that spurring adopters to form a coalition to become more active in influencing 
others was probably the best course of action. This was a form of empowerment of those allies who 
would help the change move forward. To do that, I needed to let them steer a bottom-up change and 
to enroll resistors by initiating a collaborative strategic game with them. The next action research cycle 






4.5.1 Analyzing the Data Using Crozier’s and Friedberg’s Framework 
 
Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) framework is useful in analyzing the data from the first action research 
cycle to unearth the micropolitical behaviour of both adopters and resistors that facilitated or blocked 
the change. Applying the four components of the framework (strategic games, behavioural patterns, 
resistance as competitive strategic games, and interactions among organizational actors) to the data 
offers some insights about how the change recipients tried to influence the change. 
 
4.5.1.1 Strategic Games 
 
Data from the first action research cycle shows that adopters and resistors engaged in strategic games 
to either maintain or increase their liberty (in Crozier’s and Friedberg’s words, to “maintain their scope 
of action”) in the case of the adopters, or to increase their scope of action, in the case of the resistors 
who felt constrained by the system (the university) as online learning was imposed on them. 
 
In framing the change positively, adopters clearly hoped to maintain their position as a guiding force 
in online learning implementation. By siding with management, they upheld their power and relative 
influence on the change process. It might have been a “safe place” for them, especially for those who 
were seeking tenure. However, most of them did not try to exert influence on the change process as 
management was in charge. Some adopters might have come to the conclusion that opposing 
management could have had some dire consequences for their careers. Whatever their motivations, 
adopters projected a positive attitude towards both the change outcomes and the change process, 
and gradually engaged in “collaborative strategic games” by exhibiting behaviour to influence resistors 
in changing their stance towards online learning. Such micropolitical behaviour took the form of 
becoming part of a broader coalition of adopters and being more active in influencing the change 
process. I facilitated the emergence of this coalition through discussions in the learning sets. 
 
As for the resistors, they framed both the change content (online learning) and the change process 
(how it was being implemented) negatively. They tried to change the narrative put forward by the 
adopters and attempted to undermine the change. They hoped to gain power through different means 
such as referring to so-called “unbiased” experts and justifying their opposition to the change. They 
were obviously involved in a competitive strategic game which adopters tried to counteract by selling 
the change through a wide repertoire of micropolitical behaviours (making a case for online learning, 
involving other allies, promoting a positive view of the change, building relationships with resistors and 
making resources available to them). 
 
4.5.1.2 Behavioural Patterns 
 
It was clear that both adopters and resistors engaged in patterns of behaviour which reflected their 
power bases. It is through this behaviour that organizational members exert their power to influence 
others. The way people try to exert influence is through organizational power bases (Benfari, 
Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986). Here are examples of the influence tactics used by some research 
participants, and the underlying power bases: 
• Reward Power: “Explain how the goal [to support or oppose online learning implementation] can 
have a positive impact on an opponent’s career, reputation or performance.” 
• Coercion: “Threaten your opponents with blocking a promotion; threaten them with a strict 
performance assessment;” and “Emphasize the consequences of your opponents’ actions, and list 
possible sanctions.” 
• Referent Power: “Build opponents’ trust, both with your image and the quality of your goal;” 
“Adopt positive behaviours to impress opponents;” and “Listen to opposing arguments to your 
requests, and express empathy.” 
70 
 
• Expert Power: “Argue logically to demonstrate the feasibility or relevance of the goal [to support 
or oppose online learning implementation] that generates opposition from other people;” and 
“Use expert assessments or examples of unfavourable ‘experiences’ with others to discourage 
opponents.” 
 
Organizational members gain power through allies willing to share it; through reciprocity, allies share 
power and influence, and engage in such transactions for gain maximization and loss minimization 
(Cohen and Bradford, 1989). This supports Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) contention that people 
engage in patterns of behaviour to gain power and influence. These patterns can be observed and 
described as “strategic games” because they serve one purpose: to gain enough power and influence 
to maximize one’s gains and minimize one’s losses, especially in the context of organizational change 
where uncertainty and scarce resources exacerbate the need for gain maximization and loss 
minimization. This has clearly emerged in the data, namely that faculty members have engaged in 
micropolitical behaviour to initiate “strategic games” with others in such a way as to gain power and 
influence over the change process and/or the change outcomes in their attempts to maximize their 
gains and minimize their losses. The more power bases they had or had access to, directly or through 
their allies, the more influence they exerted over the change process in such a way that the change 
outcomes would benefit them. As such, they used their influence to maximize gains and minimize 
losses that the change entailed. In the context in which they did not have much influence, they had to 
deal with people who imposed losses on them (namely, higher management); these “opponents,” who 
had more power and influence, engaged in adversarial “political games” because their gains were the 
other actors’ losses, and vice-versa. 
 
4.5.1.3 Resistance as Competitive Strategic Games 
 
In the third phase of the action research cycle, resistance was assessed as a legitimate way to get one’s 
voice heard. It serves to increase one’s own scope of action and was used by resistors to justify their 
confrontational stance with management who had imposed this change on faculty members. The less 
one feels that one’s voice is heard, the more inclined that person will be to confront those who have 
been deaf to their concerns. This is what happened in the context of the change as resistors engaged 
in confrontation with management by cultivating uncertainty, exerting pressure and trying to obtain 
concessions from management. My perception of resistors’ behaviour gradually became more positive 
at this point as they argued that they were opposing the change for legitimate motives. 
 
4.5.1.4 Interactions among Organizational Actors 
 
Analyzing interactions among faculty members helped to uncover some of the strategic games that 
both adopters and resistors have engaged in and/or initiated to facilitate/block the change. These 
strategic games involved building alliances and developing coalitions by interacting with other 
organizational actors. For example, adopters and resistors gained power from their ability to solicit 
allies for support, and by ensuring that support was provided. As one research participant put it: “It is 
the art of asking without begging;” this consists of obtaining assurance that allies will help the 
individual acquire influence by increasing the number of power bases that individual has. A request for 
allies’ support is the most evident proof of trust, of respect for their power bases, and an expression 
of alliance. If the person’s request is granted, it is proof that the alliance is strong (Cohen and Bradford, 
1989). However, if the request for support is denied, the person should try to understand the cause of 
the refusal: an ally may want to help, but may not be able to due to unavoidable constraints; 
conversely, if an ally refuses, and it is not due to factors over which they have no control, it is an 
indication that they are most likely an opponent whose refusal is intended to generate a loss for the 
person. In the third phase of the action research process, empowering adopters to influence resistors 
was made possible by getting them to work together as a coalition engaged in converting resistors into 
adopters and then fostering reciprocity to sustain resistors’ involvement in online learning.  
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CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND 
ACTION RESEARCH CYCLE 
 
The findings following the first action research cycle indicated that empowering adopters to drive a 
bottom-up change to counteract the detrimental effect that resistors had on the change process was 
a solution to be considered. However, it might not be sufficient to move the change to fruitful 
completion as resistors might engage in power struggles to gain influence over the bottom-up change 
process in their attempt to maximize their gains and minimize their losses. Adopters and resistors had 
opposing views and interests with respect to the change: would it be possible to put forward a bottom-
up change process that would take into consideration their issues? To find out, the four phases of the 
second action research cycle would address the following questions: In their attempts to solve their 
issues, how did the political action of both adopters and resistors contribute to or impede the 
emergence of bottom-up change? Did they frame their political action as deliberate attempts to 
initiate bottom-up change? What are the actions that management should take to initiate and sustain 
a bottom-up change? How should adopters (and resistors) take part in a bottom-up change process 
that would minimize resistance? As I was somewhat successful in empowering adopters and forming 
a guiding coalition to move the change forward in the first cycle, what actions should I take to empower 
them more in the second cycle and engage them to actively participate in a bottom-up change? And 
finally, are there specific modes of political action that are more effective in empowering adopters and 
engaging resistors in a bottom-up change? 
 
The chapter is again divided into four sections, one for each of the action research phases. The last 
section offers an analysis of the data using the current literature. A conclusion is drawn at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
5.1 The First Action Research Phase: (Re-)Constructing the Issues 
 
The first phase of the second action research cycle served as the basis for reconstructing the issues, 
both from an adopter’s and a resistor’s standpoint. The aim of reconstructing the issues was to 
increase (or at least maintain) adopters’ involvement in the change by framing their role as active 
political allies, and to show resistors that they were not “enemies” of the change, more specifically 
that their concerns were legitimate and could provide valuable input to help move the change forward. 
However, their opposition to the change was not stalling the change as a powerful coalition of adopters 
was gradually being established and would hopefully make the entire process successful. 
 
From the beginning, adopters had wanted the implementation of online learning to succeed as they 
foresaw the positive outcomes of this endeavour. In their attempts to solve their issues (i.e., prevent 
the failure of online learning implementation) and increase the probability that the positive outcomes 
would materialize, they needed to realize that they had an active role to play in the change. Becoming 
active allies in search of other allies among faculty members not involved in the research would 
undoubtedly contribute to the success of online learning implementation. Putting together a formal 
coalition (for example, a committee) of adopters might increase the likelihood that resistors would 
become less influential in the change process and finally participate in the project. Strong resistors 
were still opposing the change and hoping to gain more influence to undermine it. Acknowledging that 
their concerns were legitimate and that, as the coalition grew, resistance was becoming less effective, 
might be a way to convince them to join the coalition. Figure 19 synthesizes data obtained during 





Figure 19: Reframing the Issues of both Adopters and Resistors 
 
To initiate a dialogue about their experience in using micropolitical action to solve some of their issues 
pertaining to online learning implementation, the initial questions I asked participants in each of the 
four groups were the following: “How effective have you been in actively getting other people to 
support the change? How effective have you been in opposing the change? Were you able to convert 
those with opposing views into allies?” Answers to those questions varied according to participants’ 
stance on online learning implementation: those who supported the change needed to find allies to 
help them move the change forward, and those opposed to the change hoped to find allies who would 
block the change. Whatever their opinions about online learning, participants mentioned that their 
experience in solving their issues using micropolitical action could be defined by two approaches: 
gaining allies and managing opposition. 
 
In their attempts to gain allies, participants acknowledged that it was, for some, quite a challenge to 
determine who their allies were, and which influence tactics would have the most impact on them in 
order to convince them to support/oppose online learning implementation. Those who had had 
previous experience within the institution argued that they had developed the skills to gain allies very 
effectively. For example, Participant 1-C (an adopter) initiated this discussion by sharing her experience 
within the institution. The fact that she has a solid reputation among organizational members is proof, 
according to her, of her “good” political skills, which proved useful in devising and implementing a 
strategy to influence others to become allies. She is a proponent of a more “direct” (face-to-face) 
strategy, and she argued that it enables her to receive immediate feedback when influencing others. 
A discussion followed, during which the participants shared anecdotal evidence about trying to exert 
influence. Some contended that both direct and indirect influence strategies should be employed, as 
they are complementary. Some argued that the micropolitical strategies below helped them to exert 
influence: 
 
“When meeting with potential allies for the first time, you should always be 
prepared to analyse the context, to explain your point, to demonstrate to them that 
what you’re proposing is good, to prove that you’re right, and to discuss rationally; 
you need a strong business case to convince people to become your allies.” 
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“Always show your potential allies evidence of objectivity and solid judgment about 
what is going on; bring them the facts: show them that they need our input for the 
project to succeed.” (Participant 1-F) (Comment 4.1.4.1-2) 
 
These suggestions prompted a discussion about the inability of some resistors to gain allies; 
participants argued that management would have been willing to engage in a dialogue with the most 
vocal opponents to online learning implementation if only resistors had used more appropriate and 
constructive influencing strategies. When I shared this comment with resistors in other groups, they 
acknowledged that management’s behaviour (namely imposing online learning) might have been 
induced by their own inability to exert their influence constructively upwards. One participant 
suggested that everybody should act on the premise that others are “potential allies,” until they clearly 
demonstrate that they are not; in his opinion, this is an effective approach to building alliances with 
those whose actions might impact others. Many agreed and argued that this was even more important 
in the context of organizational change that impacts many people. In these instances, an alliance is 
possible when the goals of those forming this alliance are compatible, and when they agree on the 
means adopted to achieve change outcomes. 
 
Confirming Goal Compatibility 
 
There is a plurality of views within the institution pertaining to the goals that online learning could 
achieve. In the first action research cycle, adopters framed the outcomes of the change as goals that 
would meet the needs of faculty members themselves, as well as those of the students, and of the 
school. Some goals are personal, some are more organizational, and some fall in between. It was 
obvious in the first cycle that faculty members do not all share the same goals and do not have the 
same stakes in the project. In their efforts to gain allies, participants stressed the importance of 
confirming that those who might become allies have similar, or at least, compatible goals. Of course, 
this is only possible when people are willing to reveal what their true goals are: 
 
“Mr. X mentioned to me that members of management do not understand what all 
the fuss is about… a few management members think that some faculty members 
have underlying motives that they won’t divulge, and that they’re trying to block the 
implementation because, if the project is successful, then they might not get out of 
it what they are hoping for…” (Participant 2-B) (Comment 4.2.4.1-1) 
 
Again, alliances are possible only if those engaged in the alliance trust one another. Set members 
agreed that there has been some mistrust between faculty members and management for a while, 
and that this was not solely the consequence of mismanaging the implementation of online learning. 
There were a few discussions about the causes for that mistrust: Was it that management thought that 
faculty members were more self-interested, and that they had lost sight of collective interests? It was 
agreed that, in order to build a shared vision, the interests of both faculty members and management 
needed to be met. Therefore, an ally may become an opponent if their needs are no longer met as the 
change progresses. In other words, one has to monitor how the change impacts the needs of those 
considered allies as they might become resistors to the change if they believe that the change (and its 
consequences) no longer meets their needs at one point in the change process. Finally, although some 
people could be perceived as resistors, they might simply be unaware of the detrimental impact of 
their actions and decisions on others with whom they should initiate an alliance. 
 
Managing Compatibility of Means 
 
Once compatibility of goals has been confirmed, compatibility of means has to be assessed because 




“We need to come together with our allies and try to find some common ground 
about how the change should be done… you are all aware that the project cannot 
succeed without the input of everyone: you [referring to Participant 4-F], you have 
unique expertise in your field. Without your input, we will not be able to adapt our 
courses for online delivery. As for you [referring to Participant 4-E], you are the only 
one here who has such an expertise in […]: without it, we can’t go ahead.” 
(Participant 4-A) (Comment 4.4.4.1-1) 
 
Allies needed to forge some kind of agreement about the means that will meet the goals if they are to 
work together in a constructive way; those participants in the learning sets who were successful in 
gaining allies argued that allies need to learn to work together to achieve the goals, either personal or 
collective, that are beneficial to them and/or others. Consequently, they help one another, and, on a 
micropolitical level, they share power with one another: this is how reciprocity emerges among allies, 
and trust becomes possible. As one participant put it, “you make your allies more powerful when you 
help them in getting others to do what your allies want them to do.” Sharing information, expertise, 
and contacts can help to empower allies. 
 
Acknowledging Goal Incompatibility 
 
It appeared that managing opposition first might be necessary to gradually gain allies: admitting that 
goals are incompatible might be the first step in understanding why opposition to online learning 
implementation exists. Some set participants argued that before people agree on how the change 
should occur, they need to agree on the goals of the change. Discussions among faculty members 
about opposing views concerning online learning implementation took place in all of the four groups. 
They posed questions such as “What might explain the apparent impossibility of reconciling the views 
of the resistors and those of the adopters? What could be the underlying motives of each group?” The 
objective of asking those questions was to initiate a dialogue that would evolve into collaboration 
between adopters and resistors. It could be an opportunity to get set members to agree on common 
issues (i.e., compatible gains) but, unfortunately, this did not happen in all four groups. 
 
Tensions among adopters and resistors rose to such a point that it was agreed to terminate the second 
action research cycle in the third and fourth group of participants. These unsuccessful attempts to find 
common ground among adopters and resistors were fueled by suspicion; for example, Participants 4-
C and 4-F (both resistors) quickly dismissed the insinuation that their (undisclosed) goal was for the 
project to fail. Instead, they argued that management was not dedicating the needed resources to 
support them in their efforts to get the project to move forward. There was obviously no way to find 
common ground, and these irreconcilable views were supported by the belief that resistors were 
pursuing hidden agendas in the project, and that their stance against online learning was too 
entrenched to be changed. Consequently, some set participants (adopters and resistors alike) were 
unable to convert their opponents into allies. According to them, it was impossible to recall events that 
their opponents had encountered and that necessitated some kind of resolution that would have 
presented an opportunity to work collectively and find common ground. Some met with management, 
and tried to establish some form of alliance with them, but to no avail: 
 
“We calmly met with management, and asked for more money: if they wanted me 
onboard, they would have to give me what I needed to hire an assistant who would 
help me adapt my course for online delivery… I won’t do it by myself, with all the 
work that I already have…” (Participant 3-C) (Comment 4.3.4.1-1) 
 
“We let management be aware of the consequences of not having consulted us prior 
to deciding to put the project in place… it was time to let them know that we should 




These comments highlight the idea that compatibility of goals is essential for an alliance to exist. If 




Goal incompatibility meant that the only way that goals could be achieved, while resistors were using 
their power and influence to derail the process by which the goals could be met, was to weaken them 
through several means. In their efforts to weaken the resistors, some adopters engaged in “power 
struggles” to lessen the grip that their opponents had on the means that would help to achieve their 
goal to derail the change. Those resistors retaliated and engaged in a confrontational mode of political 
action with management, demanding additional resources and negotiating the timeline. These efforts 
were assessed by set members (resistors mostly) as effective strategies to use with management to 
impose their own agenda: 
 
“We should refuse to further participate in the project, resist pressures, keep up our 
end and force compromises!” (Participant 3-E) (Comment 4.3.4.1-3) 
 
The notion of interdependency was discussed as a way to force compromise (Comment 4.3.4.1-4). 
Those who had framed online learning implementation as a zero-sum political game were proponents 
of excluding opponents from important decisions, not sharing crucial information with them, and 
preventing them from accessing resources so that they could not facilitate (in the case of resistors) or 
impede (in the case of adopters) the change process: 
 
“Let’s play devil’s advocate, and confront them immediately… this project is a great 
opportunity to let them know about how much they depend on us…” (Participant 3-
C) (Comment 4.3.4.1-4) 
 
Some disagreed and argued that interdependency can serve as the basis of a win-win strategy, even 
more so with allies who gain something from maintaining their alliances in place. For example, 
adopters of the change who were successful in being part of the coalition increased the likelihood that 
the change would succeed and that their goals would be met. 
 
5.2 The Second Action Research Phase: Planning Action 
 
I initiated discussions in the second phase of the action research cycle with questions such as “What 
are the actions that management (and adopters who have become active allies) should take to involve 
resistors in a bottom-up change? What actions would help to sustain a bottom-up change? How should 
adopters and resistors take part in a bottom-up change process that would minimize resistance?” 
Answers to these questions helped plan future steps to sustain adopters’ political action and to engage 






Figure 20: Involving Resistors: Positive and Negative Outcomes 
 
Discussions in the learning sets were useful in identifying positive outcomes of involving resistors and 




Discussions among set members highlighted the idea that an enhanced reputation might be one of the 
most interesting consequences of being competent at gaining allies and managing opponents. Being 
considered someone who makes things happen with the help of allies, who ensures that allies reap 
some kind of benefit for helping, is possibly the most important reward for being politically astute. All 
set participants agreed that this is the most compelling argument for getting involved and involving 
others in a coalition. However, the reputation that one wields is a function of those around them: “we 




Other set members argued that an organizational actor who is effective at gaining allies and managing 
opponents might have no problem building support for upcoming projects; they insisted that people 





Numerous comments were made in the learning sets that getting others to reciprocate and share 
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Set participants agreed that creating partnerships and fostering open and honest relationships were 
key short-term consequences of gaining allies and managing opponents. In building reciprocal 
relationships with management, one participant recommended that they meet with management and 
straightforwardly address their perception of faculty members’ hidden agendas, as this would “clear 
the air” and consolidate relationships among all those concerned with online learning implementation. 
Insisting that organizational members all work for the greater good and emphasizing that sharing 
issues might help remove barriers to collaboration with management, a participant commented: 
 
“We need to meet with them [management] and be clear about our intentions… we 
need to clear the air. If we don’t do that, trust among us will never be possible. The 
stakes are high: we are all aware that management will do whatever it takes to push 
the project forward. We all know that public funding will be declining in the next 
few years. Online courses are not a fad: we need to offer our students an alternative 
to traditional courses… this is how we might increase enrolment.” (Participant 2-A) 
(Comment 4.2.4.2-1) 
 
This comment outlines the notion that allies engage in reciprocal relationships to maintain the alliance 
in place. As one participant put it: “It’s a two-way street.” 
 
Personal and Collective Gains 
 
Achieving personal and collective goals through the use of power and influence is “perhaps the most 
satisfying feeling there is.” (Participant 1-C) Allies who work together to achieve goals that are 
compatible, who share power with their allies when they need it, and who are able to take power away 
from their opponents who were not convertible into allies, increase the probabilities of achieving 
personal and collective goals: 
 
“Those opposing the project are only thinking about themselves, their career, their 
interests… we work in a larger community, and we should try to contribute to 
collective endeavours from which everyone will benefit, perhaps not to the same 
degree… Some have lost focus on what a university is all about: it’s about working 
together, learning to put aside some of our immediate goals to contribute to the 
greater good…” (Participant 4-A) (Comment 4.4.4.2-2) 
 
There are negative outcomes of not being able to gain allies and invite them to join a coalition: this 





There are negative consequences of not being able to gain allies and manage opponents. These 
include: the occurrence of organizational barriers, increased opposition, and loss of power and 
influence. “Building an agenda and imposing it on others to promote their [the university’s] interests” 
is how most resistors framed the action taken by management (Comment 4.2.4.2-2); there was some 
discussion about the effectiveness of this strategy, but it was generally assessed as ineffective as it 
generated organizational barriers such as faculty members’ (resistors’) refusal to share their expertise 
in developing online courses. 
 
Furthermore, excluding faculty members from the decision to implement online learning might foster 
a reluctance on their part to participate in upcoming important decisions. Management’s inability to 




“We need to come up with our agenda… we need to frame the project from our 
point of view. Let’s not give management a choice: let’s make a list of the items that 
we want to discuss with them, and send it to them. Then let’s wait for their 
response.” (Participant 2-E) (Comment 4.2.4.2-2) 
 
This shows that an inability to manage opposition effectively might create barriers to change. People 




During the second cycle, many resistors justified their opposition to online learning implementation 
based on management’s inability to gain allies and manage opposition to the project. This was less 
apparent in the first cycle, when resistors justified their opposition to online learning implementation, 
not as a retaliatory measure against management’s inability to gain allies and manage opposition to 
the project, but rather as a reaction to unfavorable external factors (time constraints, loss of academic 
freedom, etc.). 
 
Loss of Power and Influence 
 
Finally, management’s inability to gain allies and manage opposition resulted in becoming powerless: 
“allies make you stronger” (Participant 3-B) and lack of allies makes it more difficult to carry out 
important projects. Powerlessness can impede major initiatives: in the case of the resistors, some felt 
that they did not have sufficient power and influence to change the course of action taken by 
management. Getting their allies to help them gain power and influence might engage them in 
pursuing goals not necessarily compatible with those of the institution. 
 
In taking action to engage resistors, I was careful not to make the same “mistakes” that resistors were 
blaming management for, and to put forward the positive outcomes of joining an ever-growing 
coalition of adopters. Many allies were quite active in generating support for this bottom-up change 
as people felt they were empowered to make decisions about how the change affecting them would 
unfold. 
 
I took action to sustain alliances such as getting to know adopters on a more personal level to better 
grasp their concerns and help address them (I wanted them to remain allies), by involving them in 
decisions regarding the bottom-up change process, and by working with them more regularly than 
management had done. In doing so, I gained power and influence that I was willing to share with them, 
which fostered group cohesiveness, all the while objectively acknowledging the shortcomings of not 
having enough power and influence. 
 
5.3 The Third Action Research Phase: Taking Action 
 
As I was becoming more successful in empowering adopters to form a guiding coalition and move the 
change forward, what actions would consolidate my power and influence so that I could eventually 
address the detrimental behaviour of those still opposing the change? Would gaining power suffice to 
convert resistors to become adopters as they came to feel that resistance was futile (as one participant 
pointed out: “If you can’t beat them, join them”)? Figure 21 outlines the actions that I undertook to 





Figure 21: Consolidating Power 
 
Getting to Know People 
 
It became quite clear that devising an effective bottom-up change should include allies (adopters) who 
share compatible goals. Set members (adopters and resistors alike) agreed that building and sustaining 
alliances were most useful to them in moving their agendas forward. Allies can become opponents if 
goals become incompatible, so it is essential to monitor how the context (events, people, decisions, 
etc.) might impact the goals that allies are pursuing. Getting to know people who might become allies, 
actively involving them in micropolitical action, and working with opponents to determine if they can 
become allies, constitute lessons learned by set participants and myself. Furthermore, being proactive, 
assessing the different perspectives that people (colleagues, superiors, employees, etc.) have on 
organizational issues, understanding their goals, both personal and organizational, and asking them 
questions about their work environment are actions that help in getting to know others, some of whom 
might become allies. Relationships with allies should be based on mutual trust and a keen 




Data suggest that once allies have been identified, they need to be involved in micropolitical action. 
Set participants, many of them adopters, argued that inviting allies to participate in projects, assigning 
specific tasks, asking for help and acknowledging their contribution are important activities because, 
as one set participant mentioned: “Allies who are not involved become disengaged and the alliance 
will fall apart.” (Participant 1-C) Allies need to feel useful and involving them in projects and different 
initiatives serves to maintain the alliance. There are many ways to involve them: 
 
“We need to develop influential, competent and confident allies, and prepare them 
to intervene on our behalf. I know that X is an ally; he could talk to Y to convince 
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“We need to help our allies to build a strong rationale, and refer to views of 
recognized experts. I know someone who could help us do that.” (Participant 1-B) 
(Comment 4.1.4.3-2) 
 
Finally, it appears that allies will hope to reap some kind of benefit in getting involved because the 
goals pursued are compatible with those initiating the alliance. 
 
Working with Opponents 
 
One of the most common insights among set participants was that opponents should not be seen as 
adversaries nor enemies, but as potential allies (Participant 1-E, comment 4.1.4.1-1; and Participant 1-
F, comment 4.1.4.1-2). This entailed perceiving resistors to online learning implementation as potential 
adopters if their opposition to the project was recognized as legitimate. Engaging in dialogue with them 
and being empathetic might help to address their issues and shed some light on their needs and values. 
Linking the goal pursued to their needs and their values (as was mentioned in the first cycle) was one 
way to convert them into allies, as a participant suggested. One participant (1-F) mentioned that, 
oftentimes, people tend to ostracize their opponents, which could be risky because powerful 
opponents might then use their influence to derail the project, being unaware that the project might 




A second lesson learned and shared by participants (namely in the first and second sets) was that 
gaining power and influence and sharing it is “how one gets things done” (Participant 1-B); it seemed 
that the only way to move an agenda forward was to influence others to become allies and engage 
them in helping push the agenda in the right direction. The concept of interdependency (“who depends 
on you and whom you are dependent upon”) was discussed and some argued that it determines how 
much power one has over others: “If others depend on you, then you have more power than they do; 
you can influence them by sharing your power—resources, information and/or expertise with them—
in exchange for desired behaviour on their part” (Participant 3-C). It appeared that sharing power was, 
thus, an important lesson learned by some participants. Sharing power with allies (empowering them) 
by helping them achieve their goals, providing them with relevant information and resources, and 
putting them in contact with those who can help them achieve their goals, seemed to be an effective 
way to gain power because if one has empowered one’s allies for a specific project, they might be 
more likely to reciprocate and share their power with that individual in the context of a different 
project. Reciprocity, as participant 4-B suggested, should never be underestimated in the context of 
micropolitical action. 
 
Fostering Group Cohesiveness 
 
It was suggested in two learning sets that resistors who joined forces to oppose online learning 
implementation and who cooperated with each other were more able to exert influence on the 
bottom-up change process than those who did not work in teams. This supposed that group 
cohesiveness was possible. Some set members (namely Participant 4-A, Participant 2-B and Participant 
3-B) argued that working with teams of people who have built alliances among themselves and 
becoming an ally by insisting upon the compatibility of goals, and asking for their input, are ways to 




Finally, a few set participants mentioned that power is dynamic, and its intensity varies according to 
context: one might be powerful in a particular context, but be powerless in a different context or when 
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the initial context has evolved. Data suggest that being able to assess how much power one has in a 
specific context and how it fluctuates is a skill that organizational actors need to develop. Thus, 
underestimating or overestimating one’s power is a major limitation because one never knows how 
little power one has or how powerful one may be. The need to gain power depends on one’s ability to 
assess one’s own power in specific situations. I would argue that when one is aware of how little power 
one has, one can ask allies for more power; and if one has considerable power, it can be shared with 
allies, with the expectation that they will eventually reciprocate. 
 
The last phase of the action research cycle was to engage participants in a discussion about the future: 
“if you had to do it again, what would you do differently? In other words, how would you exert 
influence on those you want to have as allies, and those whom you perceive as opponents? And why?” 
These discussions took place with participants in the first and second groups as there were an equal 
number of adopters and resistors in each of these two groups. I was not successful in initiating a 
discussion on this topic in the third or fourth group as resistors, in greater numbers in these groups, 
did not see this discussion as being “relevant.” The most interesting data accumulated in that last 
phase were related to the justifications offered for using a particular tactic: the context in which a 
tactic is being used seems to largely determine its effectiveness, a tactic being effective when the 
person using it is able to get others do what he or she wants them to do. 
 
5.4 The Fourth Action Research Phase: Evaluating Action 
 
Are there specific modes of political action that are more effective in empowering adopters and 
engaging resistors in a bottom-up change? So far, asking allies (adopters) for help proved useful as 
they were willing to help, and assisting them in achieving their goals (and thus fostering reciprocity) 
seemed to be the best way to sustain bottom-up change. Since only two groups participated in this 
last phase (the first and second group) and that data is sparse, thematic analysis did not appear 
relevant. Instead, I offer a synthesis of what was discussed in these sets as it relates to data obtained 
so far. 
 
Asking Allies for Help 
 
A set member argued that soliciting the help of others to accomplish certain tasks that result in specific 
goals is to admit that some goals cannot be achieved alone, and that the contribution of allies is 
essential. Furthermore, obtaining the help of allies is a persuasive demonstration of political 
astuteness. As data seem to suggest, one needs to build alliances to acquire influence in a particular 
context. Finding allies who have influence and who are able to contribute seems to be one of the most 
effective tactics to gain influence in the context of organizational change. Having influential, 
competent, trustworthy allies and identifying how they can support the project might be useful in large 
projects. It seems obvious that allies will be much more willing to offer support if they perceive that 
they are likely to achieve their goals. Moreover, they will probably be interested in associating with 
those who have the skills, expertise and/or information to enable them to achieve their goals: 
 
“When you make an argument [to convince others that the change is worthwhile, 
and that they should get involved themselves], always be well-prepared to analyse, 
explain, demonstrate, prove and reason rationally with allies [those with whom you 
share the same goals] whose support you are soliciting.” (Comment 4.1.4.1-1) 
 
The consensus among participants in the first and second group seemed to be that demonstrating 
objectivity and sound judgment in analyzing the situation in which support from allies is required, and 
with respect to the nature of the request, is another micropolitical behaviour they identified to 
persuade allies to help. 
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They commented that decisions should be based on observable and measurable facts and data. As one 
participant noted, the ability to provide a convincing rationale for action was more likely to convince 
potential allies. 
 
Taking small steps (for example, proposing an idea and then coming back to it several times; 
persevering) to gradually engage allies in moving the change forward, was deemed useful because 
“when you are not in a position of strength, you have no control over the pace at which allies provide 
support.” (Comment 4.1.4.1-4) Being well-informed about their context makes it possible to adjust the 
frequency of requests. 
 
Obtaining expert opinions to justify the requests made of allies is another persuasion tactic that was 
discussed because expert opinions are often valued in organizations (such as universities) and can 
encourage allies to provide support if they perceive that this is justified by expertise. Presenting allies 
with relevant information, and providing the rationale behind the request, might be a powerful tactic 
as allies need to know why their support is being solicited. They might be more willing to help if the 
reasons are valid and ensure gains and/or allow them to avoid losses. Producing and managing 
influential information (such as survey results) was assessed as a useful tactic as relevant information 
can sometimes shed new light on a situation, which may be sufficient to secure support from allies. 




Helping allies was another influence tactic that seemed an effective way to initiate reciprocity. 
Generously sharing expertise and skills with allies with the aim of making them stronger, always 
keeping them informed, being accessible to allies, and fostering positive relationships with them are 
means by which help can be given to allies. Sharing benefits and resources with allies, collaborating 
spontaneously, and getting involved without waiting for allies to request support, were assessed as 
influence tactics that demonstrate political astuteness. Encouraging allies to collaborate and to form 
coalitions, and publicly recognizing allies’ contributions, is how alliances are maintained. Finally, public 
recognition shows one’s ability to work in a team and to recognize the fair value of teammates’ 
contributions (Participant 1-D). 
 
5.5 Analysis of the Data 
 





Figure 22: Summary of the Findings in the Second Action Research Cycle 
 
Discussions that took place in the learning sets during the second action research cycle were much 
more focused on micropolitics than in the first cycle. Analysis of the data obtained in the second action 
research cycle shows that: 
 
(1) Adopters have become active political allies. In their efforts to build alliances, they put the 
emphasis on compatibility of goals and means. Resistors’ concerns about the change were 
legitimate: they had no influence on the goal of the change, so they tried to influence the means. 
 
The data accumulated in the first phase of the second action research cycle suggests that the 
effectiveness of micropolitical action is determined by one’s ability to gain allies by managing 
compatibility of goals and compatibility of means: allies agree on what the goals of the change should 
be, and how the change should be conducted (Mangham, 1979). I would argue that as long as allies 
agree on compatibility of goals, disagreement about compatibility of means might engage them in a 
fruitful dialogue about the way the change process could be improved. I would further contend that 
the purpose of confronting those with incompatible means and/or goals is to convert them into allies 
by showing them the gains that the change entails for them, and/or the losses that the change prevents 
for them. These attempts frequently increase the occurrence of political activity within the 
organization (Mintzberg, 1983). 
 
A skilled change agent must be able to identify proponents and opponents to the change in order to 
influence them, with the aim of implementing the change (Buchanan and Badham, 2008). By managing 
compatibility of goals and compatibility of means, the change agent might gain allies who will make 
the change possible. Moreover, this suggests that the change agent must acquire sufficient power to 
be able to share it with those who support the change (the allies), and if compatibility of goals cannot 
be achieved with some, then with sufficient power, the change agent might need to force them to 
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(2) There were many positive outcomes in joining a coalition of adopters: these served as compelling 
arguments to convert resistors into adopters. The inability to engage resistors in a coalition of 
adopters might be used by resistors to justify their opposition to the change. 
 
One of the outcomes of joining a coalition is to gain power and influence (Cohen and Bradford, 1989). 
What I saw in this data confirms that the way people try to acquire power is sometimes potentially 
through organizational allies (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986). If they are to do this, they can do it 
in a number of ways: organizational members gain power through allies who are willing to share their 
power bases; through reciprocity, allies share power bases with each other, and they engage in such 
transactions for gain maximization and loss minimization. This supports Crozier’s and Friedberg’s 
(1977) contention that people engage in patterns of behaviour to gain power and influence. These 
patterns can be observed and described as “strategic games” because they serve one purpose: to gain 
enough power and influence to maximize one’s gains and minimize one’s losses, even more so in the 
context of organizational change where uncertainty and scarce resources exacerbate one’s needs for 
gain maximization and loss minimization. 
 
This has clearly emerged in the data, namely that faculty members have engaged in micropolitical 
behaviour to initiate “strategic games” with others in such a way as to gain power and influence over 
the change process and/or the change outcomes in their attempts to maximize their gains and 
minimize their losses. The more power bases they had, or had access to, directly or through their allies, 
the more influence they exerted over the change process in such a way that the change outcomes 
would benefit them. As such, they used their influence to maximize gains and minimize losses that the 
change entailed. In the context in which they did not have much influence, they had to deal with people 
who imposed losses on them (namely, management); these “opponents” who had more power and 
influence, engaged in adversarial “political games” because their gains were other people’s losses, and 
vice-versa. 
 
Also, the positive outcomes in joining a coalition of adopters can serve as compelling arguments to 
convince resistors to become adopters of the change as they might benefit from becoming members 
of the coalition. Management was not successful in doing that, and it appears that their inability to 
engage resistors was used by resistors to justify their opposition to the change. Insisting on the positive 
outcomes of joining a coalition of adopters might convince resistors to actively participate in the 
change. 
 
(3) Newly converted resistors acknowledged that there were many benefits to participating in a 
bottom-up change. 
 
Participating in a bottom-up change provides an opportunity to exert influence on the change process 
so that gains can be maximized, and losses, minimized. Within Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) 
framework, it increases one’s scope of action. A condition under which bottom-change might succeed 
is when those participating in it are able to use their power bases to effectively influence others in the 
change process (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986). 
 
Newly converted resistors acknowledge that, to this day, there are indeed many political advantages 
to participating in a bottom-up change. They have become outspoken proponents of the change. As 
the change agent, being able to achieve that consolidated my power and influence. I have become an 
“informal” member of the coalition, representing management and making sure that the coalition still 
has the power and influence that it had lacked originally, and which had led, at least partially, to many 
of the problems I had encountered. The goal of the change is the same; however, there is much more 
flexibility in how the change is being implemented. Self-determination helps facilitate the acceptance 




(4) A powerful coalition of adopters has been put together and bottom-up change has been 
sustained to this day. 
 
Adopters have indeed become active political allies. Following the first action research cycle, I took 
action to empower adopters so that they became more active politically, ultimately forming a powerful 
coalition of adopters that would drive the change, which would become bottom-up. After the first 
cycle, they had become more active, but a strong coalition had not yet taken shape. This was the goal 
of the second action research cycle. In the meantime, adopters were seeking people with whom an 
alliance was feasible. In their efforts to build alliances, they emphasized compatibility of goals and 
means. Gaining a critical number of allies (adopters) and putting together a coalition of adopters of 
the change helped to sustain bottom-up change (Kanter, 1983; and Kotter, 2008). Efforts to include 
resistors in the coalition started with acknowledging that their concerns about the goal of the change 
were legitimate, albeit not always explicit: since they had no influence on the goal of the change, they 
tried to influence the means and in doing so, undermine the change. There was a need to convert 
resistors into adopters of the change by listening to their concerns, and then including them in the 
coalition as active adopters. That powerful coalition of adopters remains in place, but it is fragile. There 
are a few strong resistors who still might derail the project from outside the coalition of adopters. 
 
What did set participants learn in this second cycle? Adopters learned that gaining a critical number of 
allies and putting together a coalition of adopters of the change might help to sustain bottom-up 
change, and resistors learned that their concerns about the change were indeed legitimate: they had 
no influence on the goal of the change, so they learned ways to influence the means. Adopters quickly 
learned that there were many positive outcomes in joining a coalition of adopters: they used this as a 
compelling argument to convert resistors into adopters. They were not always successful in doing this, 
and they learned that their inability to engage resistors in a coalition of adopters might have been used 
by resistors to justify their opposition to the change. For those newly converted resistors, they learned 
that that there were many benefits to participating in a bottom-up change. As for myself, I learned 
how to put together and sustain a coalition of adopters to drive bottom-up change that is still active 
to this day. 
 
5.5.1 Analyzing the Data Using Crozier’s and Friedberg’s Framework 
 
It is in the second action research cycle that strategic games became more prevalent as adopters were 
becoming more active in the process of influencing the resistors to become adopters of online learning. 
Behavioural patterns of both adopters and resistors showed more clearly how they used their power 
bases to exert influence. Resistance was reduced by involving resistors in a collaborative strategic 
game in which they were able to influence the change process and, thus, increase their scope of action. 
Finally, the interactions among adopters helped to sustain a powerful guiding coalition to help 
implement online learning. 
 
5.5.1.1 Strategic Games 
 
Adopters became involved in a collaborative game and encouraged others to do so by confirming goal 
compatibility and managing compatibility of means. This shows that collaboration is indeed difficult to 
sustain (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Their efforts proved useful as the coalition that emerged 
provided many benefits, the most important one being able to influence the (bottom-up) change 
process so that the outcomes of the change (online learning) are most beneficial to the members of 
the coalition. Other benefits outlined by set members include an enhanced reputation, collective 
support, reciprocal relationships, and personal and collective gains. Personal gains were not specifically 
identified nor assessed in the learning sets as they took different forms depending on each individual. 
As mentioned in the previous section, ambition, a desire to be the best, and values can explain a 
person’s political behaviour (Badham, 2008), and vary considerably from one person to another. 
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5.5.1.2 Behavioural Patterns 
 
The third phase of the action research cycle showed that adopters took action to consolidate their 
power as they were gaining more and more influence over the change process. In doing so, they used 
tactics to leverage power bases to exert influence over allies with whom they needed to consolidate 
their position as a guiding coalition. Their general strategy of consolidation was to identify influential 
allies and emphasize their compatibility on certain issues. The goal was to ask allies to share their 
power bases, and to specify their expected contribution. These influence tactics were used as a 
strategy to gain support from allies in order to manage their own stakes, i.e., to maximize their gains 
and minimize their losses, which were also similar (not necessarily identical) to allies’ gains and losses. 
Alliances are based on compatible issues (Cohen and Bradford, 1989). When requesting support, 
individuals must be able to leverage their limited power bases (from a weak position of power) to 
secure power bases from allies or other organizational actors who have access to them. In a 
consolidation mode of political action, the person’s influence tactics are limited. They must secure 
power bases relevant to the context, and which their allies are able to mobilize in order to expand their 
repertoire of influence tactics. 
 
5.5.1.3 Resistance as Competitive Strategic Games 
 
The fact that many resistors converted into adopters of online learning after they had their voices 
heard and were given ways to influence the change process constructively makes a strong case that 
resistance as defined in the literature on change management is not a phenomenon that should be 
eradicated and necessarily a force against change, but can become a force for change if properly 
managed. The concept itself is currently undergoing a major transformation among scholars and is 
increasingly being defined as encompassing many other phenomena that change recipients experience 
during change (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999): loss of power, anxiety, cynicism, and organizational 
silence, to name a few. In other words, resistance is the symptom with multiple causes, one of which 
is loss of power. 
 
5.5.1.4 Interactions among Organizational Actors 
 
It became clear in the second action research cycle that sustaining a coalition of adopters rests on their 
ability to interact constructively: getting to know people in such a way that it becomes possible to learn 
the benefits they hope to reap in the change, involving them, working with opponents as “potential 
allies,” sharing power with others with the same goal, fostering group cohesiveness, acknowledging 
one’s own shortcomings and asking others for help, and reciprocally helping others, are all 
micropolitical behaviours that adopters exhibited in their efforts to maintain the coalition which, to 




CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
The purpose of this study was (1) to understand the underlying motives of faculty members’ 
reluctance/refusal to participate in the implementation of online learning; (2) to investigate the role 
that micropolitics might have played in this change using action research with the aim of addressing 
power issues more effectively; (3) to find ways to engage faculty members opposed to the change 
through action learning; and (4) to develop a framework that might help address micropolitical 
behaviour in such a way as to help me, the change agent, move the change forward more effectively, 
thus generating actionable knowledge. The following sections present my conclusions with respect to 
each of those four goals. 
 
6.1 Faculty Members’ Motives for Opposing Online Learning 
 
In terms of understanding the underlying motives of faculty members’ reluctance/refusal to 
participate in the implementation of online learning, I was unable to uncover any that were common 
to most set participants opposed to the project. Many referred to first-order barriers despite the fact 
that quite a number of these had already been addressed by management at the onset of the research. 
They predicted multiple losses if the change succeeded without being able to identify clearly what 
those losses would be. This was most obvious in the initial phase of the first action research cycle when 
resistors framed the change brought about by online learning implementation. As for the adopters, 
the gains they anticipated for faculty, students and the school were very clear. It became apparent 
during the first action research cycle that many resistors tried to impose a narrative that both the 
change content (online learning) and the change process (the way it was being implemented) were 
problematic. A recurring comment they shared was that they were involved neither in the decision to 
implement this nor in the way it would be done. In other words, they felt powerless as the decision 
was imposed on them. As for the adopters, they felt no need to become active supporters of the 
change and gain power and influence to move it forward since management was overseeing both 
content and process. Hence, loss of power and/or lack of recognition that they had power seemed to 
have been the catalyst underlying resistors’ opposition behaviour. Their motive for opposing online 
learning was political, which triggered the goal to investigate the micropolitics of online learning 
implementation. 
 
6.2 Using Action Research to Investigate Micropolitics of Online Learning Implementation 
 
Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) strategic analysis of intra-organizational power provided the 
framework to investigate the role that micropolitics played in implementing online learning. It appears 
that early in the process, resistors engaged in micropolitical strategic games to undermine the change 
by generating opposition to both change content and change process. They tried to influence others 
not to participate in the endeavour. Had they succeeded, they would have gained power over 
management, and could have negotiated many aspects of the change. Conceptualizing their resistance 
behaviour as “competitive strategic games” against management was useful in unearthing the power 
struggles underlying the change in my school. 
 
In reaction to resistors’ behaviour, adopters tried to influence them to engage in online learning. They 
employed a wide variety of means to sell the change, which I used to try to enroll resistors in online 
learning, but to no avail. Resistors’ competitive strategic games were gradually helping them gain 
power and influence over the change process in their attempt to prevent the outcomes (online learning 
implementation and related losses) from becoming reality. A solution to counteract this was to get 
adopters to form a coalition to empower them to become active supporters. Through alliance building, 
they gradually gained power which they actively used to engage resistors. They succeeded in getting a 
few (weak, i.e., less influential) resistors on board. 
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Strong resistors retaliated and engaged in active resistance that sustained their competitive strategy 
which fueled power struggles and might explain why the second action research cycle for Group 3 and 
4 was not completed. 
 
Nevertheless, I needed to get most resistors to collaborate with adopters. This was the purpose of the 
second action research cycle, which consisted of finding ways to enroll resistors. Figure 22 summarizes 
the political dynamics of the project from data obtained at each phase of the first action research cycle. 
Using the aggregate dimensions from the data for each of the four phases of the action research cycle, 
Figure 23 shows that adopters gradually gained power to influence the change process so that the 
outcomes would materialize. As for resistors, they maintained their strong power position throughout. 
They were already in a strong position from the onset, which explains why it was so problematic for 




Figure 23: The Political Dynamics of Online Learning Implementation Derived from 
the Analysis of Data Obtained at Each Phase of the First Action Research Cycle 
 
The second action research cycle allowed me to delve deeper into the micropolitical behaviour of those 
impacted by and engaged in the change (Figure 24). Adopters became much more active in the 
coalition and worked hard to gain allies and manage opposition to the project. Reframing the issues 
helped to address resistors’ behaviour constructively. They became less reluctant to listen to the 
arguments put forward by adopters, and realized that it would be more beneficial for them to engage 
in an emerging bottom-up change, in which they could voice their concerns and influence the change 
process accordingly, than to stall the change. In joining the coalition of adopters, many resistors 
consolidated their power in driving the bottom-up change as adopters were willing to share some of 
their power bases with them. A coalition of powerful adopters emerged and was instrumental in 
sustaining the bottom-up change which has made possible the successful implementation of online 
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Figure 24: The Political Dynamics of Online Learning Implementation Derived from 
the Analysis of Data Obtained at Each Phase of the Second Action Research Cycle 
 
The third purpose of the study (to find ways to engage faculty members opposed to the change 
through action learning) was met and is discussed in the following section. 
 
6.3 Engaging Faculty Members Opposed to the Change through Action Learning 
 
Action learning took place at every step of the research as participants convened in “Learning Sets” 
and were regularly reminded that the purpose of a learning set is to foster social learning. Indeed, the 
idea that both adopters and resistors could learn from one another was stressed throughout the 
meetings. Resistors might have had good reasons to oppose online learning, and adopters’ support for 
online learning might have been legitimate despite their lack of trust in management. As adopters 
became more active in gaining power and using their influence to move the change forward, learning 
was taking place: they learned how to gain power and how to use it to help implement online learning 
which they believed was worthwhile. As for resistors, their assessment of what they learned in the 
process was not made explicit despite the fact that the great majority now support and actively 
participate in online learning. I would hypothesize that they learned to use their power and influence 
more constructively by interacting with adopters engaged in the change. 
 
To summarize learning that took place in the action research process, I would say that in constructing 
the issues, participants realized that organizational change is indeed politically loaded: people who feel 
that the change is worthwhile will try to gain power to influence the change process. Those who 
disagree will try to gain power to obstruct the change process so that the outcomes do not materialize. 
In planning action, adopters learned ways to gain power (through building alliances and forming a 
coalition) to actively influence the change process, and resistors learned that engaging in power 
struggles can only hurt them in the long run. When taking action, adopters and resistors learned to use 
their power to help them achieve their goals, whatever they may be, and finally, when evaluating 
action, they learned the positive and/or negative impact that their influence attempts had on others 
and on the school. 
 
The last purpose of this research was to develop a framework to help me address micropolitical 
behaviour in such a way as to move the change forward more effectively, thus generating actionable 





































































































6.4 Actionable Knowledge: Four Modes of Political Action as “Strategic Games” 
 
It appears that in the context of top-down, organizational change such as the one that took place in 
my organization, change recipients who had more gains than losses (the adopters), but who had weak 
power and influence over the change process, were more likely to be passive; they did not have enough 
power and influence to steer the change process. In helping them gain power and influence to move 
the change forward, I helped initiate a bottom-up change in which they became active members. They 
actively facilitated the change process (by engaging resistors in a powerful coalition) so that they could 
reap the benefits that the change entailed. Furthermore, in the context of the top-down change that 
was put forward by management and which imposed losses on some organizational members, they 
became resistors and gained power to resist the top-down change; they could also have initiated their 
own, bottom-up change to neutralize the other by engaging in micropolitical behaviour to derail the 
official, top-down change. From their point of view, a bottom-up change would have provided better 
gains and/or prevented greater losses than the change imposed on them. Instead of initiating their 
own bottom-up change, they engaged in the one put forward by adopters in which they wielded 
influence over the change process so that their desired outcomes become possible. 
 
Not only did adopters’ micropolitical behaviour facilitate the change process by allowing them to build 
alliances and a coalition that moved the change forward, resistors’ micropolitical behaviour impeded 
the change process by allowing them to build alliances that they used to undermine the change, or at 
least neutralize it. Two types of strategic games (using Crozier’s and Friedberg’s terminology) that 
either helped to support the change or to impede it, took place in my school: 
 
• Collaborative strategic games based on people’s attempts to gain power and influence through 
their allies, and by helping their allies gain power and influence, to help the change move 
forward. 
 
• Competitive strategic games based on people’s attempts to prevent their “opponents” (i.e., 
those with different or opposing views about the outcomes of the change) from blocking or 
moving the change forward by reducing their opponents’ power and influence. Competitive 
games can be seen as resistance to change when someone blocks the change by reducing other 
people’s influence over the change process. 
 
The more power and influence organizational members have, the more impact they have on the 
change process (and, ultimately, change outcomes). Top-down change, such as that in my organization, 
created the context in which those who were negatively impacted by this change initially had no power 
over how the change was being conducted and the outcomes that the change would yield. They strived 
to gain power and influence to block the change, which gave rise to competitive strategic games. 
Bottom-up change, on the other hand, was initiated by adopters who gradually gained sufficient power 
and influence to impact the change outcomes and/or how the change unfolded and to initiate 
collaborative strategic games with resistors. As I was analyzing the data and using the framework 
developed by Crozier and Friedberg (1977), it became clear to me that both adopters and resistors got 
involved in four types of “strategic games,” i.e. clear patterns of behaviour to influence the change 
process, either to move the change forward or to block it. Furthermore, using these four games helped 
me provide a rationale to explain the successful “conversion” of resistors into adopters in the context 
of the change. According to Crozier and Friedberg (1977), people engage in patterns of behaviour to 
gain power and influence. These “strategic games” are deemed successful when people are able to 
acquire organizational power or gain access to the people who hold it. These games serve one purpose: 
to maximize one’s gains and minimize one’s losses, especially in the context of organizational change 




In the context of this research, the theoretical framework developed by Crozier and Friedberg provided 
the terminology to analyse and address adopters’ and resistors’ micropolitical behaviour in the context 
of the change. Concepts such as allies, opponents, strategic games, coalitions, power bases, influence, 
reciprocity, scarce resources and many more helped me to make sense of what was going on in my 
organization. Using these concepts and data obtained during the learning sets, I propose the following 
framework (Figure 25) as actionable knowledge for managing change in a highly political environment 
such as a university. This framework serves as a guide to help me address people’s micropolitical 
behaviour during organizational change in my school. This 2 X 2 matrix is based on data obtained in 
the action research cycles (and presented in the previous chapters), as well as observations that I made 




Figure 25: Four Modes of Political Action in the Context 
of Organizational Change 
 
In the context in which people have weak power and might gain something from the change if it 
succeeds, they may involve their allies to gain power and influence to ensure that those gains are 
possible. This game of “consolidation” takes place in the upper, left-hand corner of the matrix. I 
observed that in order to move the change forward, both adopters and resistors tried to consolidate 
their power with their allies, with whom they shared compatible gains, or hoped to avoid similar losses. 
 
In the top right-hand box, those who had considerable power (i.e., they possessed and/or had access 
to a great number of power bases) would work with their allies to expand their power to help them 
maximize their gains and minimize their losses. This strategic game of “expansion” helped many to 
maintain their alliances in place. In the bottom left-hand corner, those who had more to lose than to 
gain from the change and no allies in sight needed to protect the power they had, and had to prevent 
their “opponents” (those with a different view about the outcomes of online learning implementation) 
from weakening them further. This “protection” mode of political action became likely among strong 
resistors as they realized they were losing ground to adopters who, in the first action research cycle, 
formed a coalition and gradually became more powerful than them. In what appears to be retaliation, 
resistors gained power and engaged in active resistance. 
 
Finally, in the bottom right corner, if someone had many power bases, they used them against their 
opponents who were imposing losses on them, which is what resistors did by framing the change 
negatively (information power), by generating opposition to the change (group power), by exerting 
pressure (group power), and by confronting their “opponents,” to name a few strategies. 
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The strategic games of consolidation and expansion were observed in the first action research cycle. 
Adopters realized that they had insufficient power to influence the change process that, from their 
standpoint, would yield positive results. Resistors had more power and influence and threatened to 
derail the change process. Adopters needed to gain power, acquire allies and move into expansion to 
be successful. Adopters pursued the strategic game of expansion in the second action research cycle. 
They gradually gained power and influence through different means such as coming together and 
working as a coalition, confirming goal compatibility and compatibility of means with some resistors. 
The change gradually evolved from a top-down endeavour to a bottom-up initiative driven by an ever-
growing number of adopters. 
 
The strategic games of protection and confrontation were those in which resistors got involved. In the 
first action research cycle, resistors protected themselves from losses imposed on them by 
management’s decision to implement online learning. They anticipated negative outcomes and 
succeeded in gaining power and influence to block the change process and confront management 
whom they did not trust and framed as “opponents.” They engaged in active resistance that 
jeopardized online learning implementation. With the help of influential adopters, I was able to reduce 
resistance which became less intense in the second action research cycle as adopters were able to 
“convert” many resistors into adopters. As the change emerged, newly-converted adopters joined a 
growing coalition of people in favour of the change and were able to consolidate their power to 
influence a change process which they had deemed unworthy a few months earlier. Discussions in the 
learning sets (and what participants have learned from their discussions) have shown that there is a 
“strategic” (almost “normative”) way to use power and influence to help both people and the 
organization maximize their gains and minimize their losses. The following section is an account of my 
interpretation of how people got involved in those games to either facilitate or impede the change 
process and what I learned from it. 
 
6.4.1 Gaining Power through a Consolidation Mode of Political Action 
 
In this mode, I observed that each person’s goal was to strengthen their power bases, both 
quantitatively (increasing the number of power bases that the person had or had access to) and 
qualitatively (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986). Cohen and Bradford (1989) argue that organizational 
members gain power through allies who are willing to share their power bases; through reciprocity, 
allies share power and influence with each other, and they engage in such transactions for gain 
maximization and loss minimization. This supports Crozier and Friedberg’s (1977) contention that 
people engage in patterns of behaviour to gain power and influence. In that mode, the person can rely 
on their allies to gain access to power bases that they do not have access to at a particular moment in 
time. Consequently, I observed that consolidation involved engaging with allies who had common or 
at least compatible goals in implementing online learning. This implies that both adopters and resistors 
who realized they had less influence on the change process might have felt the need to consolidate 
with their allies. The game of consolidation was observed in the first group of adopters, who decided 
to form a coalition. They realized that by coming together, they increased their chances of steering the 
change process in the right direction (so that it yields positive outcomes for faculty, students and the 
university). Thus, in this context I saw that when a person depended on other people to achieve their 
goals, permitting them to maximize their gains and minimize their losses, one strategy was to adopt a 
consolidation mode of political action with allies who had the necessary power bases. 
 
Many set members had various power bases such as competencies, expertise and information (Benfari, 
Wilkinson, and Orth, 1986) and agreed that sharing them with other members of the coalition would 
make their coalition more influential in the change process. It appeared that the next step would be 
to reach out to resistors and try to convert them into allies. The rationale in the learning sets was that 
if individuals can consolidate their power (and increase their influence), this implies that they are in an 
advantageous political context, surrounded by allies who are politically stronger (i.e., they have more 
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and better power bases), and on whom they can depend to consolidate their own power. Resistors 
would not “resist” gaining power and influence as they felt that they were disempowered throughout 
a change that was imposed on them. The only condition was to support the change and to do this, they 
needed to realize that overall the change would be beneficial and that they would gain something from 
it. 
 
Discussions among set members have shown that, in order to successfully engage in a consolidation 
mode of political action, the individual must identify allies, assess their power bases, and determine 
how they can maximize their gains and minimize their losses if their allies choose to support them. The 
dynamics underlying this political mode of action seemed to unfold as follows: when consolidating his 
or her position, a person in a weak position of power in a particular context solicited allies for support. 
As the “political game” is a game of interests, the person tried to convince allies of the gains they were 
likely to make and/or the losses they could avoid if they supported the person. The political game is 
anything but altruistic, according to one set participant. The goal of all organizational actors is to 
maximize their gains and minimize their losses, although these gains and losses are usually intangible 
(e.g., reputation gains, reduced situational uncertainty, etc.) (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977). Therefore, 
it appears that clearly identifying the political attributes of other actors (what they want to get out of 
the game, i.e., their stakes and interests; what they have, i.e., their resources, namely their power 
bases) is an asset in the game: it prepares organizational actors to effectively exercise their influence, 
in full awareness of the gains their allies want to make and the losses they want to avoid, and what 
resources to request from them. 
 
It also appears that consolidating one’s own power depends on the person’s ability to solicit allies for 
support and ensure that support is provided. As one research participant put it: “It is the art of asking 
without begging;” it consists of obtaining assurance that allies will help the individual acquire influence 
by increasing the quantity and quality of the person’s power bases. I would argue that a request for 
allies’ support is the most evident proof of trust, of respect for their power bases, and an expression 
of alliance. If the person’s request is granted, it is proof that the alliance is strong, and that the person 
will be able to shift to gain power and influence. If the request is denied, then the person might need 
to move into a protection mode of political action. 
 
6.4.2 Protecting One’s Own Power through a Protection Mode of Political Action 
 
Participants engaged in action learning have argued that protecting oneself from “opponents” is 
obviously an uncomfortable situation. An “opponent” was defined as someone who not only has a 
differing view about the outcomes of the change, but who also refuses to share their power bases with 
others and/or uses them to derail the change and impose losses on others. In this mode, a person is in 
a weak position and is up against opponents to the change that they want to implement. It seems that 
this is the position that most resistors found themselves in from the onset of online learning 
implementation. They felt disempowered by management who had decided to impose the change on 
them. They apparently assumed that they had more to lose than to gain from this endeavour. In the 
first action research cycle, it was clear that resistors framed management as the “great villain,” not to 
be trusted in any way. To counteract this, resistors tried to gain power and influence over the change 
process (and succeeded). Their resistance attempts jeopardized the change. This is when I found 
myself in a protection mode and decided to conduct action research to better understand and address 
their concerns. In hindsight, had I not done so, the change would certainly have failed entirely. 
 
As discussions took place in the second action research cycle, management was no longer the “great 
villain” but, instead, the fault lay with people who had made the mistake of thinking that imposing 
online learning on faculty members would succeed. One participant rightly mentioned: “While it is 
tempting to consider opponents (management) as adversaries, an opponent is never an enemy, but a 
potential ally.” The basic principle that was put forward by a participant is: individuals who express a 
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form of opposition may have very good reasons, of which the change agent is perhaps unaware, and 
which he or she should discover. This change of tone was what I adopted towards resistors to gradually 
involve them in the change process in the second action research cycle. An opponent is an individual 
who anticipates losses in a situation and goes up against the person in an effort to avoid these losses. 
Opponents, in this scenario, may be resistant to the person’s influence and may attempt to obstruct 
their efforts to implement their change. An opponent is likely to have no interest in allowing someone 
who will generate a loss for them to gain power: instead they will likely push the person into a 
protective mode where, due to limited influence, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for them to carry 
out projects, fulfil mandates, or implement changes that would benefit the organization. Resistors had 
indeed forced management (and myself) into a protective mode. As the representative of 
management, I needed to convert resistors (opponents) into allies. I could not do it alone and I needed 
the support of adopters who agreed to consolidate their power and form a strong coalition for online 
learning implementation. 
 
It appears that opponents can deny the person access to the resources needed (such as information) 
to implement actions to achieve their goals, as resistors did. Too often, people in a protective mode of 
political action tend to isolate themselves from others, avoiding opponents to escape their anger 
(Pettigrew, 1985b). This is the least effective strategy, as one research participant pointed out. On the 
contrary, it seems from the experience in this context that a person in a protective mode of political 
action should be very active in the political game. 
 
This is exactly what I and the allies did in the second action research cycle. Discussions were sometimes 
heated as people often react emotionally to loss, because it is felt more intensely than gain (due to the 
psychological phenomenon of loss aversion—Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The atmosphere was 
tense, and opponents (adopters and resistors alike) often strongly expressed anger and disagreement 
in an attempt to neutralize the person’s efforts to achieve a goal that would, sooner or later, generate 
losses for them. However, by taking the initiative to meet the opponents, to better understand the 
reasons for their opposition, I was able to gain knowledge that was useful. By having the courage to 
demonstrate the merits of our ideas, while being receptive to opposing ideas, we (adopters and I) were 
able to engage with the resistors. Thus, those in a protective mode can be politically very active in their 
attempts to convert opponents. However, if their efforts to convert their opponents into allies fail, it 
seems that the only possible alternative is confrontation. This is probably why protection is an 
uncomfortable political position: it is first preferable to convert opponents and if this is not possible, 
to confront them. This is what resistors had tried to do at the onset of online learning implementation 
(meeting with management to voice their concerns), but they felt they were not heard. They then 
decided to confront management by resisting the change. 
 
One research participant argued that rather than convert or confront opponents, persons in a 
protective mode of political action sometimes need to consider a third option: withdrawing from the 
“game” (the situation). By withdrawing, the individual gives their opponents carte blanche. This 
strategy would most certainly only be harmful to the person withdrawing, who would then be 
perceived as unable to cope with the pressure and lacking in political courage. Their reputation would 
likely be tainted, and they would become very vulnerable. As a result, their longstanding allies might 
desert them. This is the worst possible situation, “which is why it is important to choose your battles!” 
as a research participant concluded. Rather than an end, a protective mode of political action seems 
to be an opportunity for the person to apply their talents of persuasion to rally opponents; if attempts 
are inconclusive, and if the goal cannot be achieved without incurring losses for opponents, it may be 
necessary for the person to shift to an offensive (confrontational) mode of political action, and to 






6.4.3 Reducing the Power of Opponents through a Confrontational Mode of Political Action 
 
Confrontation may be politically necessary when it becomes impossible to convert opponents into 
allies, but should be a last resort (as one participant mentioned). It seems likely that an organizational 
actor will shift to confrontation when opponents have given them no alternative. This is what resistors 
did when they decided to block the change: they had tried unsuccessfully to be heard by management 
who had imposed the change on them. Resistors then engaged in confrontation in which they asserted 
themselves. Management retaliated and also engaged in confrontation rather than jeopardize the 
change that they had initiated, and which served the collective interest of most (with the exception of 
opponents). This is when I decided to conduct this research. 
 
It seems that confrontation is absolutely not about settling a score, as one participant put it: it is an 
assertion of power that aims to help the organization maximize gains and minimize losses, at the 
expense of incurring losses for opponents who do not collaborate. A politically skilled (astute) person 
would have to keep in mind that an opponent is always a potential ally, which is why confrontation is 
not personal, even if it is perceived as such (Cohen and Bradford, 1989). I would further argue that 
confrontation is not an attack: the aim is never to attack the individual on a personal level, but rather 
to confront their ideas, arguments and actions. It is important also to choose the right way to express 
confrontation: Will it be public or private? How forceful will it be? Because the intensity of a 
confrontation depends on opponents’ potential losses, it might be worthwhile to identify opponents’ 
stakes before confronting them, as one would do with allies. Finally, there is clearly potential to 
damage relationships in this mode of action and the confronting person should be careful not to 
damage the relationship with opponents, maintaining some room for manoeuvre to convert them into 
allies after a confrontation. I would argue that confrontation should never be the goal of a political 
game; rather, it might be a necessary step where there is no other recourse with opponents. This was 
made obvious in the second action research cycle when many resistors decided to join the coalition of 
adopters as they realized that there were benefits in influencing the change process so that their gains 
become attainable. 
 
6.4.4 Empowering Allies through an Expansion Mode of Political Action 
 
As the change agent, I found myself in the second action research cycle adopting an expansion mode 
of political action. I had succeeded in building a strong coalition of adopters who had become my allies. 
They had many benefits in associating with me because I was able to empower them and make them 
more influential in helping them maximize their gains and minimize their losses, whatever they may 
have been. 
 
When in an expansion mode, the person’s likely most difficult challenge will be to stay there, as I 
observed. It was a delicate balance between directing allies without forcing them, in order to maximize 
their gains and minimize their losses. Since we shared similar gains and losses, I needed to make sure 
that those gains and losses remained the same as the change was moving on. To help allies achieve 
their goals, I found it necessary to carefully identify the gains they hoped to make and the losses they 
wanted to avoid. This is why, as the change agent, I needed to stay “on top of my game” by showing 
how competent I was in managing the change, staying well informed about the concerns of my allies 
and sharing information with them, involving them in decisions and providing them with the needed 
resources to help the change move forward. This means that in an expansion mode of political action, 
the person may have greater flexibility to achieve their goals. It also means that, to maintain this 
flexibility, it makes sense for the political actor to carefully study the context and grasp its dynamics in 
order to anticipate potential changes in the political terrain within the organization that could impact 




In summary, I have tried to show from this research that political modes of action (and the underlying 
power dynamics) are indicative of a person’s power bases and the presence or absence of allies in their 
context with whom to share those power bases. In a consolidation mode, the aims of the actor seem 
to be to increase the number of their power bases and create alliances, enabling them to shift to an 
expansion mode. Once in this mode, the individual can maintain their political position by empowering 
their allies. If they do not succeed in consolidating their power and alliances, the person will likely have 
to shift to a protective mode of action, and then try to convert opponents (who are making them 
weaker, politically) into allies to shift out of it. If this is not possible, there is an option to consider an 
offensive (confrontational) mode of political action in order to make opponents less powerful, to then 
help them make gains and convert them into allies. In an expansion mode of political action, the 
organizational actor has a large number of power bases and allies with whom to share them. The basic 
strategy that worked in my research was to help allies manage their stakes (to make gains and avoid 
losses). Consequently, by sharing my power bases with allies I was able to make them more powerful 
and succeed in moving the change forward. 
 
6.5 Initiating a Bottom-Up Change by Empowering Allies (Adopters) and Involving Opponents 
(Resistors) 
 
The implications of this research in my context are that there seems to be a relationship between an 
individual’s power and how this will be exerted in the context of organizational change (Figure 26). In 
an expansion mode of political action, an individual can rely on allies to either facilitate or resist 
(impede) the change process, depending on the gains and losses associated with the outcomes of the 
change. The political position (consolidation, expansion, protection and confrontation) determines 
power and, therefore, the individual’s capacity to exert influence. The change agent (and change 
recipients) should try to shift to the most advantageous political position, expansion, maintaining it as 
long as possible. This strategic game allows more flexibility, access to resources, and coalition 
development. It is in an expansion mode of political action that the change agent—and recipients—




Figure 26: Links between an Individual’s Power and Organizational Change 
 
The left-hand matrix is a generalization of the data obtained in the first action research cycle and which 
support the idea that people adopt a passive role in top-down changes in which they feel 
disempowered. They do not have much influence over the change process, so the outcomes (their 
gains and losses) are those that have been decided by management. If those outcomes take the form 
of gains that are greater than losses, then people might hope to acquire power and influence in such 
a way as to actively move the change process forward. 
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If those outcomes take the form of losses that are greater than gains, then people might try to gain 
power and influence in such a way as to actively impede the change process (as was the case in my 
university). In both instances, people tried to gain power and influence and, thus, became actively 
engaged in strategic games. 
 
The right-hand matrix is based on data obtained in the second action research cycle. Data show that 
the individuals’ political aim was to increase and maintain their flexibility on the organizational terrain 
and reduce their uncertainty about gains and losses that the change entails. In an expansion mode of 
political action, I, as the change agent, had the most flexibility: because my context was favourable, I 
could “lead the change” and address resistance most effectively. Allies were willing to comply with my 
requests and were receptive to my influence attempts. In this scenario, “opponents” (i.e., resistors) 
became allies when they saw the benefits of facilitating the change. This position of expansion has the 
least uncertainty. Conversely, I saw that a protective mode of political action had the greatest 
uncertainty since it implies an unfavourable context. Here change agents are surrounded by 
opponents, and the quality and quantity of their power bases is suboptimal. The likelihood of losses 
against opponents is thus increased. Change agents would have to extricate themselves from this 
political position. It appears that by moving strategically on the right-hand matrix in the following 
manner (as indicated by the arrows in the matrix), the change agent increases the likelihood of making 
the change successful. This can be summarized as follows: 
 
• If—after identifying the context and assessing the quantity and quality of their power bases—the 
person conducting the change determines that they are in a consolidation mode of political action, 
the goal would be to increase the quantity and quality of current or available power bases with 
the support of their allies. Consulting influential allies, asking them to share their power bases, 
requesting their help, specifying the contribution anticipated, being objective and showing sound 
judgement, and asking allies to intervene might help to consolidate power. These were some of 
the tactics used by adopters in the first action research cycle when they formed a coalition and 
became more active in the change process. Comments made by set participants confirm that they 
are the same tactics that management should have used to consolidate their power prior to 
implementing online learning. 
 
• If the change agent is in an expansion mode of political action, the goal is to help allies maximize 
their gains and minimize their losses; politically skilled change agents should maintain their power 
and alliances based on the principle of reciprocity and actively share their power with their allies 
to make them more influential on the change process, and to make their opponents less influential 
until they become allies. Helping allies to make gains and avoid losses, sharing power bases with 
them, keeping them informed about the change, being accessible to them, responding quickly to 
their requests, consulting them, sharing responsibilities with them, and making them participate 
in decisions are all tactics that one could use to expand, as the data show. 
 
• If the change agent is in a protective mode of political action, their goal would be to shift to a 
consolidation mode of political action by converting their opponents (resistors) into allies 
(adopters). In this mode, tactics such as arguing to show the feasibility or pertinence of the goal 
which has met with opposition, linking the goal to opponents’ needs and values, listening to the 
opposition voiced against the change, and explaining how the goal pursued will help opponents to 
maximize their gains and minimize their losses, might all be useful in converting opponents into 






• If the change agent confronts their opponents, and opponents have no choice but to comply, the 
change agent’s goal might be to shift to an expansion mode of political action by converting them 
into allies after they have complied (albeit reluctantly) with the change agent’s demands, and then 
make them more influential so that they actively participate in the bottom-up change driven by 
allies. I contend that the ultimate goal of politically astute change agents is to direct all their efforts 
towards achieving an expansion mode of political action, which has proved fruitful in solving my 
problem. 
 
This “strategic” way to use power proved useful in the change I am conducting. It cannot be generalized 
to other contexts; nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to repeat this research in other contexts to 
find out if there is a “normative” or more effective way to use power when implementing change. 
 
6.6 Concluding Reflections 
 
This research was developed and conducted by establishing many linkages among concepts relating to 
online learning implementation, change, power and micropolitics. Action research was incorporated 
in the research design to help understand why faculty members engage in micropolitical behaviour in 
the context of top-down change, and how this behaviour (and the change agent’s behaviour) might 
facilitate or impede the change process. The research explored how the loss of power among faculty 
members might explain their resistance to the change and found ways to address those power issues 
in order to help me manage the change process more effectively. The overall objective of this 
endeavour was to get faculty members actively and constructively involved in the change process 
underpinning the implementation of online learning in my organization. Learning sets were put in place 
to foster action learning among research subjects in order to help them navigate the change more 
constructively. 
 
6.6.1 Contribution to Disciplinary Knowledge 
 
The research has provided a small but useful extension to Crozier’s and Friedberg’s (1977) framework 
through its mapping of strategic games onto a change process model. Process theories of change focus 
on the various phases for change agents to follow in implementing change and on ways to understand 
how organizational members experience change as it unfolds (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999). Many 
of the multi-phase processual models for change fail to account for the political nature of both change 
recipients’ and change agents’ behaviour (Buchanan and Badham, 2008). Those which do (Egan, 1994; 
Kotter, 1995; Pettigrew, 1985b; and Robbins, 2005) describe which micropolitical behaviour (mostly of 
change agents) might help move the change forward, but not how to engage in such micropolitical 
behaviour as a tool to influence change recipients as the change unfolds. For example, Egan (1994) 
offers advice on choosing a political strategy, but his advice is rather generic: “learn the name of the 
game in your organization: how are politics played here? Enlist your supporters early; form powerful 
alliances and coalitions; identify the key players.” How can one decipher the game? How does one 
form powerful alliances and coalitions and keep them in place as the change moves on? How does one 
identify the key players? Who are the key players? Are they the ones who wield the most power or 
those who have a wide network of contacts? How can one engage them in the change? 
 
Another example is Kotter’s (1995) recommendation to form a powerful coalition of individuals who 
embrace the need for change and who can rally others to support the effort as a necessary step for 
successful change is certainly relevant. However, how can such a coalition take shape? How can change 
recipients increase their power and influence over the change process by actively participating in a 
coalition? How can a coalition help initiate bottom-up change? As for Pettigrew (1985b), he advises 
the change agent to pay attention to the organizational context because change processes are often 
untidy, iterative, and politicized. However, he does not offer advice about how such politics should be 
managed by the change agent. 
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Robbins (2005) recommends that change agents frame their arguments in terms of organizational 
goals and develop powerful allies. How does one manage conflicting frames, those put forward by 
people supporting the change and those opposing it? How can one develop powerful allies? How does 
one distinguish between a strong and a weak ally? Finally, many of those models fail to describe and 
explain the micropolitical behaviour of change recipients: how does this behaviour manifest itself and 
what are the different forms it can take? Which behaviour is conducive to change and which is not? 
How can the behaviour of those opposing the change be transformed to become a force for change? 
This research provides answers to many of the questions above and, as such, contributes to our 
understanding of the politics of organizational change. 
 
Another contribution to disciplinary knowledge is to have shown that political strategic games unfold 
and change over time. Political games are highly dynamic: a player can be in a consolidation stance 
one day and in protection the next; in other words, they may count on allies only to suddenly find they 
have none because the stakes have changed. Similarly, they may have a large number of power bases 
in a given situation, but lose some when the situation changes. Moreover, the dynamics of political 
games vary with the nature and magnitude of gains and losses. Consequently, as the change agent’s 
political position (and related tactics) constantly change, identifying the factors that impact the 
dynamics of political games is undoubtedly an asset for the change agent. 
 
6.6.2 Contribution to Practice 
 
Managers can learn to identify and assess the quality and quantity of their power bases and their 
starting mode by reflecting on their own power bases and those of others. Based on accumulated data 
and in an attempt to provide consistency to a fragmented theoretical framework about how people 
gain and use power, I have argued that micropolitical behaviour is the manifestation of certain types 
of power bases that people have and/or to which they can have access (Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth, 
1986). Based on the model of organizational power bases of Benfari, Wilkinson, and Orth (1986) (which 
is a revised – and extended – version of French and Raven’s model), micropolitical behaviour revealed 
in the research can be associated with the different power bases developed by Benfari, Wilkinson, and 
Orth (1986): 
• Legitimate power enables the manager to compel people to carry out a given course of action. 
• The manager can choose to reward those who perform to these expectations. 
• Otherwise, coercive power can be used to achieve the desired results. 
• Skill is a source of power based on education-driven knowledge and know-how. Someone who has 
developed their skills in a particular field can wield this power to make other people act in a given 
way. 
• Expert power is related to experience and practice. It is developed over time. Someone with 
expertise can wield this power to make other people act in a given way. 
• Information power depends on what a manager knows about others (their stakes) and the overall 
situation, the organization’s strategic priorities and so forth. 
• Referent power lies in the personal qualities of the person exerting it in predisposing others to do 
their bidding. 
• Connection (affiliation) power stems from a player’s formal or informal network of contacts. These 
contacts are apt to share power bases that the person does not actually possess but that are such 
as to help them achieve their objective. 
• Finally, group power is a collective power that a person has by virtue of a formal or informal group 
with which they are associated within an organization. 
 
The more power bases managers have, the more influence they might wield in a particular context. 
The quality of those power bases can be inferred by context: if they are relevant in a particular context, 
one could conclude that these power bases are of good quality. For example, a manager who has 
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expertise in conducting a specific type of change has more power and influence than a manager who 
doesn’t. One who has relevant information about other people’s stakes has more influence than one 
who doesn’t. If managers don’t have enough power, they should then try to build alliances so that their 
allies share their power bases with them. More specifically, when in a consolidation mode of political 
action, the manager should identify influential allies, consult them, spend time with them and insist 
upon the compatibility of their respective stakes. They should ask them to share their power bases, 
and never hesitate to request their allies’ help. They should be objective and show sound judgement 
in what they ask of their allies. They could also ask their allies to intervene on their behalf (affiliation 
power). 
 
If managers are in an expansion mode of political action, they should help their allies manage their 
stakes (to make gains and avoid losses). They should share their power bases with their allies, for 
example by making them better skilled in dealing with the change and fostering group cohesiveness. 
They should keep their allies informed, be accessible to them, and respond quickly to their requests. 
They should consult their allies, share their responsibilities with them, and make them participate in 
decisions. They should always remain visible and accessible to their allies. 
 
In a protection mode of political action, managers should meet with the “opponents” (the resistors) 
and argue to show the feasibility or pertinence of the goal which has encountered opposition. They 
should try to link the goal of the change to opponents’ needs and values. They should listen to the 
opposition’s request and show empathy. Finally, they should explain how the goal pursued will help 
their opponents maximize their gains and minimize their losses. 
 
If a protection mode of political action does not help to convert opponents into allies, managers should 
gain power (with the help of their allies) and then move into a confrontation mode of political action 
with the opponents. They should state their conditions and show how they allow the opponents to 
make gains and avoid losses. They might need to impose or demand, but without aggressiveness. They 
should try to obtain their opponents’ trust in both their image and the quality of the change pursued. 
They should try to convince their most determined opponents one by one, in private, and then publicly 
acclaim their contribution. 
 
This is how managers can use their power bases and manage them to engage in the strategic games of 
consolidation, expansion, protection and confrontation to influence both allies and opponents to 




There are obvious limitations to the research, the most important one being the peculiarities of the 
context in which the research was conducted: universities are indeed peculiar organizations in which 
the rules and behaviour of their members are quite different from those in “normal” organizations. 
The principle of academic freedom provides their members with much liberty to do what they want, a 
degree of freedom that is not found in other types of organizations. This might explain why resistance 
to change (and underlying competitive political games) is so intense in a university setting. Power 
games are very much determined by context, which is why contextualism, according to Pettigrew 
(1985a) (and which has been the basis of this research) is the only process by which a researcher can 
methodically uncover legitimation and delegitimation processes that organizational change entails. 
 
Another limitation related to context is that power is culturally determined: the way people wield 
power and exert influence is a reflection of cultural norms (Buchanan and Badham, 2008; and Scott-
Morgan, 1995). The games of consolidation, expansion, protection and confrontation might not be 
“played” the same way in places with differing cultural norms. Finally, further research might help to 
unveil ways by which people enter into transactions of power bases. This topic was not investigated in 
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great depth in this research, but appears to be an important aspect underlying political games: any 
type of game involves at least two players who agree to play, either within the framework of a win-
win game (as in the case of consolidation and expansion) or within the framework of a win-lose game 




I have learned a great deal in conducting this research despite the many challenges that I faced 
throughout. The most important challenge was to sort out and make sense of the amount of data that 
I have accumulated. I had difficulties in determining what was relevant. I spent a great deal of time 
going back to the data, trying to understand how it could help me better grasp the underlying political 
dynamics of online learning implementation. Thematic analysis helped me make sense of the data and 
focus on the problem that I was hoping to solve: engaging resistors in online learning implementation. 
 
Another challenge was that this issue (online learning implementation) is a highly politicized one in my 
university, and I had to deal with set participants dropping out of the learning sets for undisclosed 
motives. The few who chose to drop out are less active in opposing the change as it has gained 
momentum with the coalition that was put in place to move it forward. They might feel less powerful 
in opposing the change, which does not mean that they have abandoned their “crusade” against online 
learning. Also, in making my allies (the adopters) more powerful, I have gained a reputation for 
“making things happen.” The administration is pleased with the way things are unfolding, and there is 
a possibility that many more courses will be offered online in the next few years. I have become more 
politically astute and less reluctant to engage in micropolitics. 
 
Throughout this research, I realized how much I hate conflict, to the extent that I will tend to minimize 
or discard opposing views. In my attempts to avoid conflict, I tend to overemphasize the positive. 
Hearing discordant voices, instead of suppressing them, can allow a new perspective on issues to 
emerge. Not listening gave resistors the impression that their views were irrelevant or not worth 
discussing. I realized that to address the issue at hand, I must learn that “confronting” opponents might 
be necessary for problem resolution. I also learned about the importance of giving allies the space they 
need to convince the “opponents.” Letting the allies conduct learning set meetings had a more positive 
impact on the resistors than I could have had. Self-regulation among set members, I learned, is a 
powerful political force: some adopters took the lead, and steered the discussions in such a way that 
their issues were addressed for the first time. Being more of an observer than an active member of the 
situation unfolding proved to be a good “strategy” on my part. My inclination to exert control over 
group processes was tempered by the results achieved. 
 
I also realized that my inclination to obey and do what is expected has jeopardized the change. 
Challenging management on certain decisions and demanding that information be shared with change 
recipients might have helped move the change forward. I should have tried from the beginning to build 
a coalition with those in favor of the change. Encouraging them to influence those opposed to the 
change early on would have had a positive impact on the implementation of online learning. Instead, 
I worked alone in moving the change forward. I could have increased my power earlier in the project 
by gathering adopters in a coalition. Having confidence in the group’s ability to assess and solve 
organizational issues proved to be an effective strategy, but it is a stance that I seldom take. Based on 
the success achieved to this day, I have started doing this more often. 
 
From an ethical perspective, I addressed ethical issues that have arisen when certain participants 
appeared to put their own self-interests above organizational interests. I aimed to engage faculty 
members to “work in the best interests of others,” and to encourage them to participate actively in 
the success of online learning implementation by demonstrating that they stood to benefit from the 
change. Management placed me in charge of managing the change related to the implementation of 
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online learning in my organization, and holds me accountable for this endeavour. I was worried that 
conducting research while implementing this change would create confusion: How would I be 
perceived by set participants? Could they become suspicious of my motives? This did not seem to be 
the case. 
 
At one point, though, I did have undisclosed motives (mostly with groups 3 and 4 in which the number 
of resistors was greater than the number of adopters): I hoped that adopters would retaliate against 
resistors who kept opposing online learning implementation. This was unrealistic as resistors were 
greater in number. I realized that in doing so, I was taking sides and letting my own biases interfere 
with the research. As a change agent, I was hoping that resistors would be defeated by adopters, but 
as a researcher I was keenly aware that encouraging resistors to share their concerns might help find 
ways to move the change forward. 
 
Thus, my roles as researcher and change agent did overlap in these instances but following Coghlan 
and Brannick’s (2010) recommendation, I cultivated role flexibility and permeability. This was 
conducive to creating a dialogue, which helped to sustain “a subjective and intersubjective process of 
inquiry and confrontation” (Cunliffe, 2010, p. 406). 
 
I started this research in 2016, not knowing where it would lead me. Three years later, I find that many 
of my assumptions about power, change and resistance were wrong. Power is indeed a useful tool to 
engage allies in becoming adopters of online learning, as it is a tool to persuade opponents, who are 
resistors of the change, to become allies. Although it is reassuring to conduct a top-down change as 
one feels that they are in control (as I did), the probability of succeeding is better if the change is 
bottom-up and involves everyone, even those who are opposing it: the only way to convince someone 
to become an ally is to listen to them. Finally, resistance is not so detrimental to change: it is the 
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